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Abstract 
 
 
 
In an interdisciplinary, hermeneutical study using primary and secondary documents 
from history, philosophy, political theory, and critical pedagogy, the dissertation focuses 
on dialogue, friendship, and citizenship.  The philosophical foundations of friendship in 
the works of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson are discussed.  Included in the study is 
the history of citizenship and analysis of works on dialogue and community.  A critical 
consciousness is significant for real dialogue to precipitate friendship.  The philosophical 
foundations of friendship in the works of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson are echoed 
in the Peaceable Schools Model for secondary schools.  Based on social justice and the 
avoidance of conflict, the Peaceable Schools Model ministers a progressive pedagogy and 
fosters a living citizenship for students in public schools and in the community. 
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Preface 
 
The 21
st
 century school community resembles the global community.  The school 
community, once a melting pot of different cultural norms and traditions from across the 
world, is today rich in multiculturalism and diversity.  Schools symbolize and treasure the 
differentiation of peoples, the uniqueness of cultural traditions, and the recognition and 
contribution of all individuals.  The acknowledgement and inclusion of all cultures, 
however, brings challenge to the school curricula, particularly, citizenship education.  
The civic curriculum advances nationalism or civic pride, patriotism, virtue, and, 
of course, knowledge of history and government (Gutman, 1989, Macedo, 1995, 
Coleman, 1998).  This notwithstanding, the pedagogical approach to the curriculum is 
significant particularly with regard to a mobile or changing school population.   
Citizenship education is, therefore, faced with challenge.  School demographics continue 
to change.  How can citizenship education accommodate the growing and changing 
population?  How can citizenship education encourage inclusion for all students?  Also, 
how can interaction amongst individuals and groups enhance citizenship not only in the 
school community but in the greater community and in the nation?   
My goal is to create a living, active citizenship model for public schools where all 
groups participate regardless of race or ethnicity.   Early research into the notion of 
citizenship revealed a myriad of theories each significant and contributory in its attempt 
to sustain citizenship in the nation in light of changing populations.  However, in order 
for citizenship to accommodate changing demographics, it is important to establish a 
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dialogue and friendship between individuals with an ultimate view towards the good of 
the nation.   
The challenge is a primary task for schools.  Students are the most important 
resource for the future.  Through citizenship practice, they will posture the nation 
throughout the generations ahead. A citizenship model for schools based upon dialogue 
and friendship assures students open the pathway to citizenship and sustain our country 
through its practice.    
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 A democratic nation depends upon the active participation of its citizenry.  
Whether motivated by a common passion that advocates the ends of existing government 
or the interests or passions that are adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the 
community, the democratic nation depends upon the active participation of its citizenry.  
James Madison wrote, the liberty to express either passion is “essential to political life”. 
“As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, 
different opinions will be formed” (Madison, Federalist 10, in Rossiter, 1961 p.78 ).  
Regardless of ideology, religion, race, ethnicity, or socio economic background, if 
government is constructed to meet the needs of its citizens, then all might be in 
agreement.   
 Active citizenship, participation in the democratic process, assumes a connection 
between the individual and the political process.  The participation of the individual in 
the political process or active citizenship results from the bond created through dialogue 
and friendship.   Literature reveals friendship is significantly present where citizenship is 
evident in the community.  Aristotle suggested friendship in the community was a 
reciprocal relationship nourished by love and desire.  Friendship builds community and 
enhances citizenship because of a common view towards participatory government 
(Pakaluk, 1991).  Augustine suggested friendship was a union of souls who experience 
love and justice amongst themselves (City of God, 1984).  Thomas Hobbes (1996) valued 
friendship as integral to community.  It was man‟s nature to need a friend, expeditious to 
his very being.  Immanuel Kant saw a friend as another self so long as mutual care or 
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concern between men was evident (Pakaluk, 1991).  Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) 
observed individuals in the United States combine their well being with that of their 
fellow citizens.  Self love motivates the individual to help others and creates a bond 
amongst people identified by self interest and ultimately community interest.  
Community interest or commitment to association in community is a standard of 
citizenship that Emerson thought was a strong characteristic of citizenship (Scorza, 
2004).  Citizenship is dialogue and friendship, a critical consciousness, between 
individuals.  Individuals are self reliant with a willingness to engage in a reciprocal 
relationship with others.  This be said, the virtuous ideals of responsibility, respect, trust, 
truth, honor, wisdom, autonomy and integrity to self, the other, the community, and to the 
nation are consequential.  An active citizen exudes critical consciousness of self, others, 
equality, and tolerance. Active citizens possess a critical consciousness, are self reliant, 
assertive in the community, responsible, and accountable for their actions.  Active 
citizens exude a civic virtue and pride in both community and county.   
A critical consciousness, necessary for dialogue, evolves with awareness of social 
reality.  The conditions, ideological views, or cultural characteristics of one‟s life may not 
be the same as another‟s life.  Communities form with inhabitants from all walks of life, 
from a variety of religions, races, ethnicities, and socio economic backgrounds.  For each 
individual, what is present or true for them may not be for the other.  One individual does 
not mirror another.    Therefore, a critical consciousness is essential to qualify true 
dialogue.   With a critical consciousness, individuals are not distinct or exclusive of the 
other; they are with the other (my italics) and aware of the other.     Yet, awareness of 
another‟s social reality alone does not define the critical consciousness.  Once cognizant 
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of these conditions or another‟s social reality, individuals, through acceptance and 
understanding of their own being, open their self to the other as a being. Individuals 
engage in dialogue and share perspectives of their physical world.  Common themes 
emerge such as poverty, ethnic bias, racism.  Reflection on these conditions leads to 
action.  Individuals do not manipulate or overpower each other through dialogue.  They 
create a consciousness or analysis of why conditions in social reality exist as they do.  
The dialogue between the persons is constantly evolving, exposing the causes of social 
reality that bring about social injustice and aim towards social reconstruction.  Emerson, 
too, suggests that individuals be accepting and understanding of their self and, therefore, 
open their self to the other as a being and engage in dialogue (Self Reliance, Essays:  
First Series, 1844).   Freire reiterates Emerson when he wrote that “I can only become 
myself when other men also become themselves” (Freire, 2008, p. 40).     
Individuals reflect about their position in the world, their work, contribution, and 
influence.  The relationship opens social reality to a world of understanding and 
possibility amongst people.   Freire suggests social reality is not static but changing.  
Historical conditions precipitated by industrial, technological, and social change affect 
individual well being.  Because of these changes and their effects upon the individual, a 
dialectical, or consistently evolving, relationship with social reality (a critical 
consciousness) ensues (Freire, 2008).  Therefore, dialogue that is dialectical or 
consistently evolving because of social reality precipitates friendship.   
The friendship that defines active citizenship is dialectical as well.  Friendship has 
no bounds or limitations.  It does not include particular individuals because of their 
culture, race, gender, or socio economic status.   Friendship assures everyone the 
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opportunity for a reciprocal relationship.   Further, friendship, when shared with a critical 
consciousness, expresses virtuous ideals such as truth, honesty, and respect that vitalize 
or create a living citizenship.   This unique discourse of friendship assuages the 
challenges presented by hierarchical relationships in schools and communities.  Unlike 
citizenship absolutely or unconditionally defined by literal guidelines and obligations for 
the individual, a living citizenship adapts to the needs of social reality, a visceral 
experience.  Rather than a cold, superficial friendship typified with “literary gossip with 
subtle antagonisms”, friendship based upon a dialectical critical consciousness embraces 
the other individual (Emerson, 1852. Collected Works 202 in McNulty, 1946).  Only in 
this regard, the dissertation suggests, can a discourse of friendship or dialogue and 
friendship and living citizenship prevail in democracy. 
 
  Educators have a responsibility to help students create a discourse or dialogue 
and ultimately a living citizenship.  The dissertation underscores the task is best 
undertaken through the Peaceable Schools model.  Whether in the individual classroom 
or the school as a whole, the Peaceable Schools model creates an atmosphere where all 
individuals, students, and staff evolve with social reality.  They exercise dialogue, 
friendship, community and a living citizenship expressed with trust, civility, and 
equality in a democratic society.  
The notion of Peaceable Schools began in the 1990s when schools were faced 
with the mandate to develop curriculum models that assuaged social injustice and 
violence in society.  Images of sexual promiscuity, drug use, discrimination and violence 
disturbed parents, children, and alike.  These images further incited interpersonal and 
systemic violence.  In response, a vision of Peaceable Schools and Communities 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 
developed.  Ideals of democracy and diversity were put into practice in schools through 
curriculum, climate, governance, and in neighborhoods and communities 
(http://www.lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html). 
 
Peaceable Schools envision a community that embraces empowered 
learning, consensus building, excellence, and equity for all members.  The 
schools are built with values of working on the systemic transformation on 
all levels. Diversity is viewed as a resource, not as a problem.  The 
significance of the self, reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power is 
important.  Also, holistic solutions, conflict as an opportunity for change, 
and equity in the community characterizes the growth or lived process of 
Peaceable Schools.  (http://www.lesley.edu/academic 
centers/peace/institute.html). 
  
The dissertation asserts the philosophical foundations of Peaceable Schools are 
rooted in the Greek and the American tradition particularly as embodied in the writings of 
Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson.   Epicurus (341-270 BC) and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (19
th
 century) wrote extensively on friendship.   In Greece, Epicurus asserted a 
Garden as an appropriate forum where individuals discover the self and others.  In 
Concord, Massachusetts, Ralph Waldo Emerson lectured extensively in the Lyceum 
where he praised individual self reliance and friendship amongst people.  For each 
philosopher, it is important for the individual to not only discover self and other but to 
evolve with actual existence or reality.    
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My study argues that the works of Epicurus and Emerson, written centuries apart, 
are the cornerstone for the Peaceable Schools model. 
 
Significance of the Study 
 
I hope to enhance citizenship behavior amongst individuals in secondary 
educational institutions using documents or a theme from history, political theory, and 
philosophy.  I have developed a plan of study that includes citizenship, citizenship 
education, friendship, ethics, and morality that guided my research.  As a teacher, I am in 
an excellent position to undertake this study because I see the interactions amongst my 
students everyday.  My classroom is my laboratory.  While this is an advantage, I realize 
the limitations as well.  Particularly, I have steadfastly recognized the possibility of bias 
and the need for reflection, reason, and ethics.   
 It is important that teachers recognize student diversity when setting goals for 
citizenship.  The diversity of our student body inspires knowledge, compassion, and 
critical understanding of where people come from and how these roots or cultural norms 
affect their manifestation of citizenship.  These differences are a catalyst for a 
reexamination of school curricula.   The Massachusetts frameworks do not provide a 
particular course of study to enhance citizenship.  My dissertation will hopefully be a 
model for state or national frameworks in the Social Sciences and beyond. 
 Through interdisciplinary exploration I, as a researcher, have experienced 
knowledge and growth that students and educators will experience as well.  The use of  
primary source documents as they relate to friendship, oppression, and inclusion have 
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been vital to the hermeneutical study asserting the connection between the Greek and 
American tradition and Peaceable Schools.   
The 21
st
 century gave birth to an age unlike any other age.  Ours is a world 
typified by transition in society described by migration, immigration, interracial and cross 
cultural relationships.   As new and diverse ethnic groups enter our schools, citizenship 
education is faced with the challenge of accommodating this growing and changing 
population.  Each group brings its own cultural norms and interpretations that influence 
their understanding of citizenship.  Because of these norms and interpretations, 
citizenship practice could change as our country becomes more populated with diverse 
people.  My exploration of citizenship theories, religion in democracy, and compassion 
from different cultural perspectives is an integral part of my study.   
I am drawn to history, political theory, and philosophy that serve as a guide for 
our students to learn citizenship.   In the early days of the United States, the nation had a 
diverse ethnic population for its time.  The new American man was a “mixture of 
English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes.  From this promiscuous 
breed, that race now called Americans have arisen” (deCrevecoeur, 1770 in Bailey and 
Kennedy, p. 87).  Further, “The American ought therefore to love this country much 
better than that wherein either he or his forefathers were born.”  (deCrevecoeur, 1770 in 
Bailey and Kennedy, p. 87).  Love for country is significant, however, unlike the 18
th
 
century and beyond, where immigrants were part of a melting pot or created a meshed or 
mailed citizenry, today, the United States is a diverse population that treasures and lives 
its cultural heritage (Kerber, 1997).  Diversity is not denied as the history of citizenship 
shows, but welcomed and applauded.  How, then can educators create a bond in our 
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diverse society?  With love of country, I committed myself to a discourse with an 
interdisciplinary foundation to help students understand the ideals of citizenship as it 
could apply to a republican democracy.  Understanding our past can serve as 
understanding for our present and future.  My goal is to create a basis for citizenship 
discourse today.   
My dissertation encourages compassion, respect, and toleration amongst all 
students.  It encourages citizenship for our diverse American culture.   This study is not 
for one culture or one socio-economic or political ideology.  Rather it celebrates the 
diversity of our American culture.  It reasserts the hope of the early founders in American 
History in the 21
st
 century classroom.  All cultures will be able to use this document as 
part of citizenship study.  
Our students and our country deserve constant attention with regards to 
citizenship.   As a teacher, I embrace the diversity of my students.  I also value my 
students.  I value the future they create for themselves and for country.  I am committed 
to finding a way to help make them better citizens who will enhance democracy.  I seek 
to understand their differences and bring about a common ground.  The challenge before 
me offers an outstanding opportunity to reexamine a pathway for community and 
citizenship education in our schools.     
I seek a constructive citizenship model for secondary education students 
characterized by dialogue, friendship and community.    A constructive discourse of 
friendship and citizenship encourages critical thinking, understanding, negotiation, and 
collaboration amongst secondary students. A constructive discourse engages all students, 
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regardless of class or background.  While the discourse is innovative in the school it is 
transferrable both to the outside community and globally.   
 The idea of a discourse of friendship developed after reading an article on Liberal 
Citizenship and Civic Friendship (Scorza, 2004).  Jason Scorza (2004) asserts friendship 
can contribute to good citizenship because it fosters a reciprocal behavior that is rich in 
tenderness, trust, and compassion.   
Individuals act on friendly motives based on their principles of moral right 
(Sherman, 1987).  Friendship, according to Immanuel Kant, is a central tenet in the 
pursuit of happiness which is obtained not in the actual sentiments of friendship but in the 
reasoning that governs these sentiments.  Aristotle asserts that friendship includes 
motives of attachment in harmony with the ends of a good life. Civic virtue, according to 
Aristotle can be encouraged by the quality of friendships (Sherman, 1987).  Happiness or 
doing and living well require not only ethics and intellect but activities that manifest 
these virtues.  This is expressed in friendship.  The consequences of friendship are in 
concert with the ends of a good life (Sherman, 1987).  Friendships are reciprocal 
relationships that are characterized by a common bond. (Sherman, 1987).  An 
individual‟s happiness depends upon the happiness of others.  There is an obvious 
attachment within the relationship.  Yet, the actual activity of friendship depends on the 
happiness of the other person.   If there is no regard for the other person, there is no 
friendship (Sherman, 1987).  To enhance this, compassion and understanding as noted 
earlier can contribute to this friendship. 
    Can friendship develop through moral development or character education?   
Aristotle writes virtue is established in the state of nature.  However, do students 
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experience this today?  In Great Britain, the Crick Report recommended that compulsory 
citizenship education include a moral component.  The moral component included 
character traits and virtues that seek to motivate individuals to act responsibly.  This 
moral component would also motivate tolerance and a “determination to act justly” and 
have a “disposition to work with and for others” (Arthur, 2005, p. 244).  In the United 
States there are a number of organizations, courses, and curriculum materials that seek to 
promote character or ways to improve the behavior of children.  In Massachusetts, 
character and civility are included in the 1999 curriculum frameworks.  In these 
frameworks there is an excerpt from the Constitution of Massachusetts, “Wisdom, and 
knowledge, as well as virtue…are considered being necessary for the preservation of 
their rights and liberties…” (Character, Civility, and the Massachusetts Curriculum 
Frameworks, 1999, p.1).  Wisdom, knowledge, and virtue in the community depend on 
the opportunities and benefits of education.  Yet, there is no consensus as to how 
character education could be implemented.  Why are virtue, ethics, and character 
significant to friendship and ultimately to citizenship?   These traits help individuals to 
reason their decisions and judgments before they act them out in the community. 
Schools strive to do their part to promote good citizens and citizenship.  Heather 
Higgins aptly quotes Gordon Wood,  
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In a monarchy, each man‟s desire to do what was right in his own eyes 
could be restrained by fear or force… each man must somehow be 
persuaded to submerge his personal wants into the greater good of the 
whole…a republic was such a delicate polity precisely because it 
demanded an extraordinary moral character in people  (Wood, 1979, p. 
171).   
 
A diverse population typifies the school community. Within these communities, 
individuals form friendships that are critical for “democratic connectedness” (Katels in 
Scorza, 2004).  Forming friendships contributes to the moral development of the 
individual‟s character and the shared democratic culture.  Friendships promote an 
element of respect, reciprocity in a relationship, and a vision toward a common goal 
which is community or simply getting along. Friendships are formed with an element of 
civility.  Civility creates a tie, a bond.  Scorza cites Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) when 
he notes “primary relationships between citizens emerge as the focus of civic identity and 
activity” (Scorza 2004, p. 86).  Friendship allows people to feel valued and respected.  
Consequently, justice and law are maintained in the state.  The extension of personal 
friendships based on virtue is an independent check on civic corruption (Scorza, 2004).  
Clearly, this is not the case with all friendships.  Relationships can be built upon 
friendship bonds but they are not always with virtue and compassion.  If individuals are 
virtuous and compassionate, they might be less apt to engage in negative activities.   
Moral character is especially significant.  As people develop and act as civic friends, they 
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have the capacity to reach a broad consensus on public policy matters.  A friendship is a 
relationship based on trust and respect.  
Is trust absent in citizenship?  Willman (2004) suggests trust is absent in 
citizenship (Willman in Scorza 2004).  There is no sense of trust, compassion, or 
reciprocity.  There is no emotional bond in relationships of citizens.  Scorza doesn‟t 
disagree per se but rather looks to trust as a positive attribute of friendship and 
citizenship.  Because friendships are consensual, there is an obligation to giving 
preference and care to fellow citizens (Scorza, 2004).  Friendships could exhibit trust, 
compassion, and reciprocity.  Civic education should start from the values and 
institutional processes learned in schools through its ethos and organization.    
Circumstances, however, potentially separate individuals and make friendships 
difficult to establish.  Despair and conflict could influence an individual‟s citizenship.  
Yet, compassion and friendship in the community can enhance democratic citizenship. 
Students can be encouraged to use compassion through critical thinking.  They can be 
taught to act with compassion and imagination as part of the continuing dialogue of 
citizenship (Arendt, Habermas in Waghid, 2005).  Compassion is the most important 
emotion (taught through moral development and critical literacy) to prepare people to 
engage in deliberation and just action in life (Nussbaum, Arendt in Waghid, 2005).  
Predicaments arise when an individual acts, listens, and responds to another individual 
who is different from one’s self.  Hannah Arendt has developed an account of action as 
the means whereby conflict in class status can be met head on.  Action, according to 
Hannah Arendt, is the process of the initiative,(when students question an argument 
without having to be told or asked by teachers to do so), risk taking, (when students 
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announce what they do, have done, and intend to do with regards to a given situation), 
listening and responding, (where students can have the capacity and willingness not only 
to disclose their inner voices through speech, but also to encourage listening and 
responding to others without being inhibited in doing so), and hopefully lasting dialogue 
students engage in for thoughtful deliberation (Arendt, in Waghid, 2005).  While 
predicaments or conflicts arise, individuals act compassionately to resolve the 
predicament and come to a mutual conclusion.  According to Nussbaum, students and 
teachers can extend democratic citizenship through the realization of one‟s 
vulnerabilities.  This requires moral development of the individual (Nussbaum in 
Waghid, 2005).  This is particularly useful in areas where conflict amongst people is 
apparent.  This can be applied to inner cities or countries.  How can this development 
occur? 
For moral development, as it regards compassion, the predicaments of others are 
serious.   Also, these predicaments do not always result in conflict.  The experiences 
encountered are not unique to the individual.  The individual with compassion 
experiences the predicament. (Nussbaum in Waghid, 2005).  In other words, all parties in 
dialogue are susceptible to conflict and undesirable predicaments.  The goal is to act 
compassionately toward others, to act justly and humanely and bring about civil dialogue 
that enhances democratic citizenship.  Waghid aptly cites this educational virtue with 
application to students who have experienced apartheid in South Africa, who experienced 
conflict and injustice through no fault of their own.  Compassion is best cultivated in a 
school community where moral development prompts teachers and students to question 
meanings and imagine alternative possibilities, modify judgments, foster respect and 
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develop critical engagement (Waghid, 2005.).  To bring this compassion to fruition, the 
teacher articulates the methodology to include “compassionate imagining” (Nussbaum in 
Waghid, 2005, pp. 334-336).   
“Compassionate imagination” (Greene in Waghid, 2005) allows teachers and 
students to look at things as if they could be otherwise or look at things anew.  Greene 
suggests this view awakens the inner voices or “multiple voices” and “multiple realities” 
of others‟ situations.  When individuals see, hear, and connect with others new and 
various judgments occur (Greene in Waghid, 2005).  Simply put, the teacher develops a 
space that is conducive to students entering a lived world of the others and ultimately 
seek social justice and equality acting upon values taken for granted.  If individuals do 
this, civic engagement and civic reconciliation has great potential.  The imaginative 
process prompts connection with others rather than simply participating in other‟s 
predicaments (Waghid, 2005).  Of course, compassion and imagination pedagogy include 
the understanding of many histories and cultures of people best manifested through 
critical thinking and moral reasoning.  Compassion and imagination bring people together 
and also enhances character education.   Compassion and imagination notwithstanding, 
the question of how this is implemented begs answer.   
Dialogue and friendship are the ultimate means for this to occur not only for 
character education but for citizenship education. Richly significant, however, is the 
critical consciousness in individuals that is present in dialogue. A critical consciousness 
begins with the acceptance and understanding of one‟s own being and then of the other‟s 
being. When individuals are aware of each other‟s being, the social reality or the 
conditions present in their life such as poverty, ethnic bias, and racism, they begin to 
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engage in dialogue and share perspectives of their physical world. Reflection on these 
conditions leads to question and action. Freire wrote, 
 
Critical consciousness always submits that causality to analysis; what is 
true today may not be so tomorrow. Naive consciousness sees causality as 
a static, established fact, and thus is deceived in its perception. Magic 
consciousness is characterized by fatalism, which leads men to fold their 
arms, resigned to the impossibility of resisting the power of facts (Freire, 
2010, p. 39).  
 
Critical consciousness is never at rest. Individuals do not manipulate or overpower each 
other through dialogue. They create a consciousness and analysis of why conditions in 
social reality exist as they do.  Through dialogue an action corresponds to the social 
reality. An individual realizes he is not only in the world, but engages in its “relations 
with the world…and adds to the world, which he did not make” (Freire, 2010, p. 39). If 
critical consciousness is absent, real dialogue and friendship will not be present. 
Citizenship through dialogue and friendship, I argue, needs a critical consciousness. 
Critical consciousness qualifies dialogue that opens paths to the civic definition of 
friendship.  If citizenship education is grounded in dialogue and critical consciousness is 
lacking, active citizenship will be a descriptive only for citizenship and not a means to 
live citizenship. 
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The Goal of Citizenship Education 
 
According to Rakove (2001), politics in pre Revolutionary America was local, 
primarily in towns with no real government influence.  Citizenship was not an issue.  The 
question of a civil society was not apparent but rather what was the influence of the state 
on the individual?   The task of the post Revolutionary era was not to create a civil 
society but to constitute the role of the state through what was ultimately the 
Constitution.  In the community, a public spiritedness, willingness to subordinate public 
interest to the public good was evident.  Individuals had a common view to the general 
good and knowledge of rights in order to monitor the government for pernicious ambition 
(Rakove in Ravitch, 2001).  There was also the tendency for individuals to undertake 
civic duties and share a republican commitment.  The founders had hoped that individuals 
engage in activities that supported and maintained a fair and just political order (Sinopoli, 
1992). 
If republicanism ideology was to succeed, it was inherent citizenship education 
had to be taught (Rakove, 2001).   Citizenship education was primarily undertaken by the 
families or independent schools.  “Republican Motherhood” symbolized the mother‟s 
role to instill virtue into her children.  Males who did not attend independent private 
schools followed the footsteps of their fathers as craftsmen, merchants, or farmers.  The 
idea of state funded schools was not popular given the anti tax mentality of the people 
(Rakove in Ravitch, 2001). 
When America emerged as the nation of United States, schooling and books were 
needed to create a new American society.  A new national identity, a character was 
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needed with a common language with distinct American pronunciations. This helped to 
promote a common bond amongst individuals and nationalism through education.   
Thomas Jefferson wrote the best safeguard against tyranny was mass education.  
Individuals must “know ambition under all shapes and be prompt to exert their natural 
powers to defeat its purposes.  The government depended on an informed 
public…citizens could arm themselves with literature and defend themselves against 
incursions of a powerful government” (Ravitch, Viteritti, 2001, p. 16).  With literacy, 
they could defend themselves and protect their freedoms (Ravitch, Viteritti, 2001).   In 
the period of the early republic primers and children‟s literature was a common means of 
educating young citizens. 
In 1837, as Secretary of Education in Massachusetts, Horace Mann wrote 
“common schools” were the teachers of patriotism and civic values. Mann asserted that 
schools were connected to freedom and democratization through teaching about 
democracy and equality amongst individuals.  In the common school, all children were 
sent to learn together absent of difference, class, and social condition.   Mann was 
essentially anti Catholic and supported nondenominational Protestantism.  He did not 
object to the Bible in schools but did not want to see a specific religion, such as 
Catholicism, advanced (Ravitch, 2001).  There were critics indeed, but common schools 
became increasingly popular because of their goal of moral and political integrity 
(Ravitch, 2001).  By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had a popular 
public school system with nearly free education from first to twelfth grade (Ravitch, 
2001). The relation between democracy and education was strong and school reformers 
wrote the goal of the democratic school system was school efficiency to promote 
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citizenship (Ravitch, 2001).  Not only would the school promote citizenship, ideally, it 
was a means for moral and political development as well as social progress.  In all, a civil 
society developed and nurtured democracy through its participants.  
John Dewey wrote that education was a process of development and growth.  He 
compared his view of education to Rousseau, when he noted the development of a seed 
into a full grown plant (Dewey, 1964).  Educators must judge and devise conditions, 
materials, physical constraints or concerns, moral and social concerns that interact with 
the existing powers and preferences to bring about transformation of the individual.  This 
individual would participate in democracy.  “Democracy” according to Dewey (2009), is 
more than a form of government.  It is primarily a mode of associated living, a 
communicated experience.  Dewey hoped this interaction amongst individuals in a 
community would break down barriers of race, gender, class, religion, ethnicity and all 
other inhibitors of the common experience.  Dewey was not a pluralist nor an advocate of 
special groups that had interest of their own or what he called an “anti social spirit” 
(Ravitch, 2001). 
Dewey‟s approach to education implied that individuals should engage in orderly 
and ordered activity.  He noted that a democracy needed a certain fund of common values 
so it could function as a community with a purpose or vision of a good life.  The learning 
of a certain fund of common values in a community would be done through instruction 
and purpose.  Instruction was to be undertaken with underlying values inherent in 
Republicanism (Dewey in Ravitch, 2001).   
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Today, citizenship education is part of the social studies curriculum.  Mission 
statements seek responsibility and accountability in society.  Courses in government 
abound in programs of study, but do they teach citizenship?   
It is important to me to determine appropriate pedagogy for citizenship.  Not all 
high school graduates attend and graduate from post secondary institutions.  For many 
students, the secondary classroom is the last opportunity to learn about democracy, civic 
knowledge, and civic responsibility.  I hope to provide this opportunity for citizenship 
education through dialogue and friendship rooted in history. 
 
 
Research Design 
 
 
 In a hermeneutic study of documents and writings, I have written a philosophical, 
historical, and educational dissertation.    The product is an interdisciplinary, constructive 
approach to citizenship education. 
 In Chapter 1, a sampling of the literature addresses the ideal and practical 
philosophical foundations in friendship from the ancient civilizations to modernity.  In 
Chapter 2, a historical overview of citizenship reveals tensions and challenges in early 
citizenship, the evolution of the individual, and the evolution of the liberal democratic 
model of citizenship.  Challenges to citizenship in the United States are also discussed.  
Chapter 3 reveals the context of Epicurus and Emerson‟s relevant work.  The contexts, 
centuries apart, strike parallels where self reliance is realized and friendship results. 
Chapter 4 discusses Epicurus‟s and Emerson‟s philosophical notion of friendship.    
Chapter 5 illuminates the 20
th
 century works of Martin Buber and Paulo Freire.  The 
critical consciousness between individuals advanced by these philosophers is the conduit 
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to dialogue.  Without a critical consciousness, dialogue and friendship are absent.  In 
Chapter 6, the study asserts the Peaceable Schools model appropriate for citizenship 
education.  The model, I assert, rests upon foundations of the Peaceable Schools model in 
Epicurus and Emerson.   The significance of the study for secondary education forms the 
subject matter of Chapter 7.    
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Chapter 1 
Friendship:  An Overview 
 
What is friendship?  What or who is a friend?  A sampling of literature reveals the 
notion of friendship with both distinctions and commonalities that edify citizenship.   The 
ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophers included in this section represent the 
hopefulness of friendship and the recognition that true friendship, a reciprocal friendship, 
is difficult to achieve.  The sources indicate that true friendship is attainable depending 
upon the intent of the individual and the reciprocity of the other.  
Socrates wrote there was no clear definition of friendship, but the inference that 
friends are reciprocal and equal with a mutual belonging out of sameness was evident.  
Individuals gravitate to each other out of desire (Socrates in Pakaluk, 1991).  “Love is 
reciprocal; friends are equal in rank” (Socrates in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 27).  Individuals seek 
each other not for what they are or what is “like” but rather for belonging to each other.   
Man‟s self sufficiency in happiness includes friendship.  Aristotle wrote that friendship 
implies a virtue and is necessary for living.  Friendship involves equality.  In a reciprocal 
relationship both parties get the same and wish the same to each other or exchange one 
thing for another.  In the community, friendship is a reciprocal relationship characterized 
by love and desire.  “Friendship cannot be between a soulless thing.  There is no mutual 
loving and you do not wish good to it.”  (Aristotle, in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 30-32.)  To a 
friend, you must wish goods for his own sake.  If good is wished in this way and the same 
wish is not returned by the other, one is said to have goodwill and not a reciprocated good 
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will or friendship.  Friends are aware of the reciprocated good will.  Friends seek a 
mutual understanding that goodwill is for the other no matter what the circumstance.  
Understanding is apparent.   
 
But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; 
for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are 
good, and they are good in themselves.  (Hence they wish goods to each 
other for each other‟s own sake.)  Now those who wish goods to their 
friend for the friend‟s own sake are friends most of all; for they have this 
attitude because of the friend himself, not coincidentally (Aristotle in 
Pakaluk, 1991, p. 33). 
 
Some friendships are good and others are simply called good.  Important to the good 
friendship is conversation.  “Distance does not dissolve friendship unconditionally, but 
only its activity.  Lack of conversation has dissolved many a friendship.” (Aristotle in 
Pakaluk, 1991, p. 36.)  The verbal exchange between individuals strengthens friendship.   
 Aristotle revealed that friendship involved individuals with two or more parts.  In 
other words, friendship amongst individuals meant friendship towards oneself first.  “An 
extreme degree of friendship resembles one‟s friendship to oneself.” (Aristotle, in 
Pakaluk, 1991, p. 56).  This is an early indication of self reliance or awareness or comfort 
with one self.  Man learns to accept himself for what he is.  He approves of himself and 
supposes he is decent in mind and spirit.  “If man is at odds with himself, he has an 
appetite for one thing and a wish for another.  Cowardice takes control of him and he 
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refrains from a friendship.” (Aristotle in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 56).  Therefore, man should be 
comfortable with himself first and ultimately with others.  If man finds self awareness 
and comfort, he is able to create friendship.  He is able to engage with the other.  He 
experiences friendship that is pleasant, with good fortune, and relieving of pain or 
discomfort.  “A friend consoles us by the sight of him and by conversation, if he is 
dexterous, since he knows our character and what gives us pleasure and pain.” (Aristotle 
in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 67).  
Friendship gives foundation to an individual‟s virtue and the life of the political 
community.   Friends are reciprocally bonded together in a community of shared reason 
and love (Lord, 1984, Doyle and Smith, 2002).    Aristotle wrote:  
 
In loving their friend, they love what is good for themselves, for the good 
person, in coming to be a friend comes to be a good for his friend.  Each 
loves what is good for himself and returns like for like in what he wishes 
and in giving pleasure (Aristotle, 2000, p. 150).   
 
Fidelity in friendship edifies the community and enhances citizenship.  Aristotle defines 
citizenship as a multitude of individuals who, in a democracy, share in decision or office 
(Lord, 1984). Individuals share a view to a self sufficient life in a city.  These individuals 
look towards what Aristotle calls a regime, or government.  The immediate view of the 
city‟s population may change but the general view of the regime or a government 
seemingly does not. Aristotle implies the overall good of the regime is vital to the general 
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welfare of the citizen.  Citizens can become dissimilar but preservation of the partnership 
between the individuals and the regime is a constant goal.   
For Aristotle, the virtue of the good friend and the good citizen is important. 
(Lord, 1984).  Conditions or norms result in service, moral attainment; self control, 
devotion, and activity in the life of the city or state are significant.  The honor or good 
name of the city is the guardian of government with generosity to forgive and forget in 
the face of common danger or view to a common cause (Lord, 1984).  The goal for 
individuals is always the good of the city.  Character assures this goal.  Admittedly, 
Greek citizenship is not all inclusive.  Women and slaves are not included.  Indeed, it is a 
privileged citizenship that excludes certain social groups from citizenship.  However, it is 
Aristotle‟s assertion that the citizens are virtuous with a view towards the good of the city 
that is significant. 
Cicero believes that true friendship is possible only amongst good men.  Like 
Aristotle, Cicero wrote that friendship is based on virtue or ethics.  Unlike Aristotle, 
however, virtue was a priori to friendship.  Friendship, according to Cicero, is part of 
man‟s nature.  “In nature, something propels as to the open hand and heart…we judge it 
desirable because all its profits are encompassed by the feeling of love which it 
generates” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 90-91).  Individuals form a compact when there 
is indication of virtue that shines from within and “fastens itself to this as to something 
like itself, and when this happens love is bound to arise” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 98).  
Friendship exists only between good men.  Men are models of virtue with integrity, 
justice, and generosity.  There is no sense of greed, lust, or insolence.  Friendship is 
necessary.  “Men are meant by nature to have some sort of companionship with one 
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another” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 86-87).  Friendship improves the quality of life.  It 
makes life worth living.  It is wonderful, according to Cicero, to share life with someone 
with whom one speaks freely, rejoices in another‟s happiness, and shares the suffering of 
the other.  Friendship is a “ray of hope into the future” that keeps it from “faltering on the 
wayside”.   When friends are together, “they are rich when poor, together when separate, 
strong when weak.  They live on after they have died, so great is the honor that follows 
them, so vivid the memory, so poignant the sorrow” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 88).  
Men acknowledge the other as a vision of themselves.  An openness and awareness exists 
between them.  Yet, there are limits to Cicero‟s friendship model.  They are without 
reservation, dishonor or deception, hypocrisy, and rank.  If these limits circumscribe the 
relationship, there is no friendship.  Good is the essence of friendship.    
Cicero doubted friendship existed amongst men in politics and state affairs.  He 
was convinced there was deception and hypocrisy.  Yet, when anyone in either of these 
circumstances shows himself to be “reliable and loyal, we are bound to adjudge him a 
species virtually divine” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, p.103). 
In the Roman republic, networks of friends formed the micropolitics of political 
society.  Political community was similar to friendship relationships.  Both were based on 
a goal, love of country, and love of self and other.  Friendship was considered the 
ultimate expression of love.  Like Aristotle, St. Augustine saw the connection between 
community and friendship but like Cicero, St. Augustine feared the danger modern 
politics posed to community.  Traditions and identities are easily destabilized.  Identities, 
the base of friendship are often in question.  The Roman republic faced this challenge.  
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The challenge of establishing identities prevails throughout the 21
st
 century as well.  The 
challenge is overcome if friendship is priority.   
St. Augustine asserted the community of friends informed the polis.  Friends 
create a communion of souls who experience love of self and other.  Love and justice 
guide reasoning about politics.  “Kingdoms are gangs of criminals” without love and 
justice (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 139).     Kingdoms or political communities fail because 
“criminal gangs” or men from “demoralized ranks” are bound by plunder (St. Augustine, 
1984, p. 139). 
In the community that experiences friendship, citizenship is not an afterthought or 
an occasion.  Individuals experience diverse traits and then common traits of objects of 
love and virtue.  A harmony amongst individuals exists. 
   
In the case of music for strings or wind, and in vocal music, there is a 
certain harmony to be kept between the different parts, and if this is 
altered or disorganized the cultivated ear finds it intolerable; and the 
united efforts of dissimilar voices are blended into harmony by the 
exercise of restraint.  In the same way a community of different classes, 
high, low and middle unites, like the varying sounds of music, to form a 
harmony of very different parts through the exercise of rational restraint; 
and what is called harmony in music answers to concord in a community, 
and it is the best and closest bond of security in a country.  And this 
cannot possibly exist without justice (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 74). 
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Friendship eventually solidifies the relationship.  It tempers potential hostility in the 
polis. 
 Augustine saw friendships form from a spiritual perspective.  If man has love of 
God, he is a man with good intentions towards his fellow man.      
 
 When a man‟s resolve is to love God, and to love his neighbour sic as 
himself, not according to man‟s standards but according to God‟s he is 
undoubtedly said to be a man of good will, because of this love (St. 
Augustine, 1984, p. 557).   
 
In the Roman Empire, the idea of community and citizenship was not widespread 
but rather within the small group of patrician families with outstanding evidence of 
service.  Imperial and local citizenship extended to a privileged class.  Citizenship did not 
extend to lower classes.  Rome made demands on character, virtue and manliness 
(Matheson, 1897).  Foreigners could not become citizens.  When nations were conquered, 
they were allowed to retain their language and culture so long as they remained loyal to 
Rome (Matheson, 1897).  Friendship and community were absent.  “In a global 
community, friendships form around the goods they share” (St. Augustine in Pakaluk, 
1991, p. 128).  This was not the case in the Roman Empire.  A deformed polis eroded the 
empire.   
By the 6
th
 century, the Roman Empire had fallen in Western Europe and new 
nation-states and a new liberal democratic citizenship emerged.  The new citizen was part 
of a town and a larger polity.  The citizen experienced a new development in political 
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life, that of representation, particularly in shires or burroughs.  In England, this 
representation was very limited, a sign of a long struggle between the monarch and 
Parliament. For the most part, however, the struggle was a civil struggle.  It was not a 
bloody struggle as the French Revolution was a bloody struggle for representation and 
citizenship.  There was a certain amount of autonomy and respect in the British model of 
citizenship.  During the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, men argued and bickered, indeed, but this 
conflict was contained within the Parliament, not the streets (Gross, 1999).    The 
individual and political rights advanced by Parliament were a long process frequently 
interrupted by social injustice, economic strife, and civil wars.  English civil war 
gradually led to the limitation of power of the crown and the state to the extension of 
individual rights and religious freedom and toleration.  Voltaire wrote, “Here is the most 
essential difference between Rome and England: the results of civil wars in Rome has 
been slavery, the fruit of turmoils in England, liberty” (Voltaire, Philosophical Letters of 
1773 in Gross, 1999, p. 87).  In this atmosphere, the views of Thomas Hobbes and 
Immanuel Kant are insightful.  
Thomas Hobbes (circa 1651) was an advocate for monarchy albeit with liberal 
policies.  He affirmed friendships were important but they would not sustain the human 
condition.  Friendships could prevail but they need a power to enforce justice while they 
pursue the common good.  “The Laws of Nature without the terrour sic of some power to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions that carry us to Partiality, 
Pride, Revenge, and the like” (Hobbes 1996, p.117).   Still, however, Hobbes valued 
friendships as integral to the community.  Men “suffer” or experience “grief” so someone 
needed to guide them (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88).   This was natural in Hobbes‟s view.  
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Hobbes emphasized the need for justice because friends act unjustly toward others.  He 
thought this contrary to the notion that friends are naturally oriented to happiness, which 
was higher than justice as Aristotle asserted. 
Men, in Hobbes‟s view, become friends by chance.  No two human beings are 
natural friends.  By nature, men are enemies.  There are numerous potential legitimate 
causes of quarrel and with no standard of conduct to adhere to men are at a loss for 
someone to mediate the situation.  Yet, “every man looketh that his companion should 
value him at the same rate he values himself” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88).  However, rather 
cynically, Hobbes asserts a friend is someone who “desires such things as are necessary 
to commodious living” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88).  Men form friendships for “fear of death” 
or allies where “men join together to give them security” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 90).  Man is 
fit for society not by nature but by training.  He seeks to live with others in peace and 
unity but these are not natural tendencies but conscious efforts towards a means to an end 
that is security. 
 
Therefore, the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend, not only 
to the procuring but also to the assuring of a contented life and differ only 
the way:  which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in the divers 
(sic)men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each 
one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired (Hobbes, 1996, p. 
70).   
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Hobbes sees no sincere, genuine reciprocal relationship between men.  Rather, 
friendship is always motivated by power, material gain, or reputation.  Greed is 
associated with friendship.  Even the hermit has needs so he will seek a friend.  He seeks 
a friend for protection, for fear of death or a desire for things necessary for a comfortable 
life filled with goods or the hope to obtain them.  Men do not enjoy friendship, or have 
any love for society itself except for the safety they afford and opportunities for success 
they bring.  “Men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping 
company where there is no power to over awe them all” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88).  Hobbes, 
regrettably, saw a human reality he wanted to change.  He took prevailing tendencies into 
account and tried to protect man from corruption, injustice, and greed. 
Immanuel Kant is more generous to man‟s nature than Thomas Hobbes.  Yet, he 
is reserved in the practice of friendship contrasted with the true idea of friendship.   
 
„A friend is another self‟ …if men, however, were so reminded that each 
one looked to the happiness of others, than the welfare of each would be 
secured by the efforts of his fellows.  If we felt that others would care for 
our happiness as we for theirs there would be no reason to fear that we 
should be left behind.  The happiness that I gave to another would be 
returned to me.  There is an exchange of welfare, no one would suffer, for 
another would look after my happiness as I looked after his.  It might seem 
that I should be the loser by caring for the happiness of others, but this 
care were reciprocated, there would be no loss and the happiness of each 
would be promoted by the generosity of others.  This is the idea of 
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friendship, in which self love is superseded by a generous reciprocity of 
love (Kant in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 210-211). 
 
Kant did not think everyone could be a friend in the true sense.  The challenges in 
society precluded this.   
 
Such citizens are very rare.  They are men of kindly disposition who are 
always prepared to look on the best side of things.  The combination of 
such goodness of heart with taste and understanding characterizes the 
friend of man and in itself constitutes the high degree of perfection in man 
(Kant in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 217).   
 
As a rule, man forms rather particular relationships or relationships with a motive 
because this is natural in contrast to the true reciprocal idea of friendship. 
 Friendship as a relationship is absent or without treatment in the Early Republic in 
American History.  There is little mention of it as important in an ordered civil society.  
Still, however, there was a need for loyalty, trust, and understanding.  Attitudes that relate 
to social friendship are significant.  What is necessary for a just and effective national 
government?  What binds or creates unity for the people?  Opportunity needs to exist 
where this occurs.   
 Notions of friendship are illuminated surrounding the ratification of the 
Constitution of the United States of America.  Once the Constitution was complete, it was 
sent to the states of ratification.  A debate ensued between two groups, Federalists and 
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Anti federalists.  Federalists supported the Constitution and its focus on a strong national 
government.  Anti federalists were fearful of a strong national government and supported 
strong state governments.  Small or local communities shared a common good.  
Localism defined the American landscape during the 18
th
 century.  It found 
support in Protestantism that demanded political autonomy.  In many respects, the 
teachings and practice of Christianity provided foundations for friendship and unity at 
local levels (DeSorba, 2003).      
 Small communities shared acquaintances, habits, affection, and attachment.  
Conversation, understanding, and intimacy amongst individuals were evident.  The close 
relationship amongst individuals and between individuals and the government guarded 
the people‟s liberty and their voice (De Sorbo, 2003).     Hopeful individuals who may 
have thought otherwise were impractical.   There was fear that the republican government 
over such a broad territory would fail.    Anti-Federalists sought to keep as much as 
possible the vitality of local government, in which rulers and ruled could see, know and 
understand each other.  They sought close association.  The Constitution challenged this 
goal (De Sorbo, 2003). 
 
“Brutus”, or Robert Yates, a New York politician and judge, the most vocal of the Anti-
Federalists feared the diverse republic would affect the central government  
(The Founding 
Fathers,http.//www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_new_yo
rk_html). 
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In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should 
be similar.  If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of 
opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving 
against those of the other.  This will retard the operations of government 
and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good…Their 
manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions‟ and 
their sentiments are by no coincident.  The laws and customs of the several 
states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; each 
would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of consequence, a 
legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would not 
only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be 
composed of such heterogenous and discordant principles, as would 
constantly be contending with each other 
(Brutus, http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus01.txt). 
 
 The Federalist response cautioned against this assertion. 
 Americans could unite under the new Constitution.   The most influential 
proponent of the Constitution, James Madison, assuaged the Anti Federalists‟ fear.   
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Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of 
America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no 
longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer 
continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be 
fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire (Madison, 
Federalist 14, in Rossiter, 1961, p. 103-104).   
  
Americans were divided.  It was clear Anti federalists perceived the absence of 
conditions of a social friendship they felt necessary for harmony and social order.  
Federalists were criticized for being unconcerned with social friendship and focused on 
controlling competing interests.  Typical were the claims they were not concerned with 
behavior and attitudes thought necessary for an orderly nation.  (The Constitution was 
eventually ratified by 1789 after a Bill of Rights was included.) 
 How does the large republic create a bond or unity to secure the general welfare?  
Alexis de Tocqueville observes this conceptually in a “doctrine of self interest well 
understood.” (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 500).    He recognized that Americans set their sights 
on justice, the ends of good government and democracy.    Majority rule is absolute for 
democracy.  The majority is the people of America who elect officials to the legislature.  
As elected officials they are named to office directly by the people and briefly in term.  
Their purpose is to submit to the general views and passions of the people or the 
majority.  Tocqueville contends the majority is founded on the notion that the likelihood 
of enlightenment or wisdom found in many united is greater than that to be found in one.  
The majority is founded on the principle that the interests of the greatest number are 
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preferred to those of the few.   Often, however, the majority has the tendency to become 
problematic or tyrannical.  Freedom is in peril when the power of the majority becomes 
so powerful that nothing stops it or moderates it.  This is evil and dangerous in itself.   
 
I see only God who can be omnipotent without danger, because his 
wisdom and justice are always equal to his power.  There is, therefore, no 
authority on earth so respectable in itself or vested with a right so sacred 
that I should wish to allow to act without control and to dominate without 
obstacles.  Therefore, when I see the right and the ability to do everything 
granted to any power whatsoever, whether it is called people or king, 
democracy or aristocracy, whether it is exercised in a monarchy or in a 
republic; I say:  There is the seed of tyranny, and I seek to go live under 
other laws (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 241). 
 
Where is the guarantee against tyranny?  Even though a majority may be well informed 
on an issue and their intentions are good, they may not always be prudent.  What if the 
measure supposed prudent is incompatible with lifestyle or inconvenient to an established 
precedent?  Tocqueville warns against democracy rehabilitating despotism.  Can a large 
group determine the common good and implement the means towards that end?  
Tocqueville asserts the doctrine of self interest well understood safeguards the common 
goods. 
 In the United States, individuals combine their well being with that of their fellow 
citizens.   
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American moralists do not claim that one must sacrifice oneself to those 
like oneself because it is great to do it; but they say boldly that such 
sacrifices are as necessary to the one who imposes them on himself as to 
the one who profits from them (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 501). 
 
The love of themselves lures them to the aid of others.  They sacrifice a part of their time 
to the good of the state.  Americans much prefer allegiance to their philosophy than their 
individual desires.  This notion keeps democracy grounded.    “It forms a multitude of 
citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, and masters of themselves” 
(Tocqueville, 2000, p. 502).  It might not lead them to virtue, but it certainly keeps those 
who would fall far below it to attain it and retain it.  Egocentrism and greed could lead 
one to “stupid excess”.  Yet, if the individual yields selfishness to the prosperity of those 
like them, misery is avoided (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 503).   
 The doctrine of self interest well understood is evident not only in the political 
arena but in the local associations and communities.  Even though these are local they are 
concomitant with a social relationship that ensures reciprocity amongst individuals with a 
view towards good ends.  “Sentiments and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, 
and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another” 
(Tocqueville, 2000, p. 491).   “As soon as several of the inhabitants…have conceived a 
sentiment or an idea that they want to produce in the world, they seek each other out; and 
when they have found each other, they unite” (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 492).  Tocqueville 
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was confident the doctrine of self interest well understood assured encounters were 
positive and renewed civilization. 
Jason Scorza (2004) notes friendship between individuals is a means to exercise 
citizenship.  In a friendship, individuals are respectful, truthful, and accountable to each 
other.   Ralph Waldo Emerson, in Scorza (2004), suggested friendship was a normative 
model for the standard of citizenship through the notion of democratic connectedness or a 
strong commitment to association.  Through the very practice of friendship and its norms 
of truth and tenderness, Scorza (2004) writes that these norms are transferable to political 
communities.  Individuals interacting in associations within communities as “friends” 
will know something about what it is to be a good citizen because of the norms of truth 
and tenderness.  This idea of good citizenship practice is at least possible initially because 
the same norms of “truth and tenderness” will also work to preserve and strengthen the 
city or state even in the face of diversity (Emerson, 1841 in Scorza, 2004, p. 95).  Scorza 
(2004) suggests these crucial norms of friendship, truth and tenderness between 
individuals in the community can gradually come to be a more open form of deliberation, 
a more stable form of disagreement and ultimately a more democratic connectedness.  He 
implies that everyone deliberates and disagrees, but to do so with truth and tenderness 
will prevent volatile exchanges.  Truth and tenderness between individuals is critical to 
maintain while winning a point or argument is secondary.    
Friends are frank with each other.  Citizens through friendship seek the truth and 
deal with the truth even if it prompts an element of incivility.  The ultimate norm, that of 
tenderness in the relationship helps to stabilize the relationship.  A “Rough Civility” 
produces a social union (Crick in Scorza, 2004, p. 103).  A “rough civility” is the means 
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whereby a society recognizes divisions and tensions while individuals who exercise 
tenderness working against silence and violence promotes a more durable social union 
and greater harmony.  In this atmosphere, personal freedom, social justice, and civil 
peace are developed and demonstrated in society not constrained (Scorza, 2004).  Scorza 
writes “to be a citizen is to be a friend to an individual” (2004).      
Generosity is part of friendship (Kristjansson, 2006).  Generosity suggests a 
citizen has an obligation to be a friend and also an obligation to be generous in kind and 
spirit.  By being ungenerous one is uncivilized.   Selfishness precludes good government  
(Kristjansson, 2006).  Generosity is an indicator or norm of good citizenship.  This 
generous behavior, part of one‟s character is something to be cultivated through 
education (Kristjansson, 2006).  It is to be established as a political ideal as well as a 
personal one.  If an individual is generous the individual has character.   This enhances 
good government and good community, or good citizens, in a community.  In this state of 
community, there is an element of reciprocity.  It is for the good of the giver and the 
receiver.  Individuals can make their character better by benefitting another individual 
(Collins, 2003). 
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (2004) assert citizenship is an identity, an 
expression of an individual‟s membership in a community.  Citizens are encouraged to 
exercise responsibility and virtue, including self-reliance, participation, and civility 
(Kymlicka, Norman, 1994). There is also a need to encourage a common experience or a 
source of unity in society through friendship (Kymlicka, Norman, 1994).   
Geoffrey Stokes (2004) offers an interesting approach to differentiated citizenship 
where many voices are heard and deliberated.  It is a theory of global citizenship. At the 
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outset, he notes “we should regard all men as our fellow countrymen” (Stokes, 2004, 
p.19).  He looks to global citizenship as a type of civic identity and practice that goes 
beyond national citizenship and boundaries of the nation state.  The interest goes beyond 
the narrow interest of the nation.  The problems or challenge of the world beyond the 
nation is the responsibility of all people and citizens.  There is a broad range of moral and 
political norms that encompass rights and obligations to humanity sometimes even 
beyond the environment (Stokes, 2004). 
Stokes (2004) credits the Greeks with this view toward global citizenship.  
“Diogenes, the Cynic” (412-333 BC) called himself a “citizen of the world” (p.19).  The 
idea was the cosmic polis, a city or universe where all human beings could live in peace 
under universal law (Heater in Stokes, 2004).  According to Stokes, there was a notion of 
a common humanity where citizens of the world could put universal loyalty above their 
own.  It was a given that citizens had dual obligations or duties and rights to be a citizen 
of the state and a citizen of the world.  This idea has become popular since the 1960s with 
movements such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross.  
Critical for the study is how the common experience or source of unity suggested 
by the literature is formulated or in the case of Hobbes and Kant, avoided?   If this 
common experience encourages citizenship how is it constructed?  Further, how can 
diverse groups exercise citizenship?  Regrettably, the history of citizenship reveals 
iniquities amongst peoples that build barriers to dialogue and friendship. 
Any nation can have citizenship, but a citizenship that exudes a dialogue and 
friendship that begins in the secondary school will sustain the citizenship ideals rooted in 
American History.   
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Given ethnic diversity and multiculturalism in the United States, my study reveals 
the Peaceable Schools, with roots in Greek and American History, as an appropriate 
citizenship model that creates a bond, friendship amongst all individuals to construct a 
common experience with a vision toward the community.   
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Chapter 2 
The History of Citizenship 
 
Different concepts of citizenship require different political arrangements.  Some 
view citizenship as “possession of private rights against the state and against other 
citizens.”  Others view citizenship as it regards the individual “who shares the obligation 
to govern” (Schwartz, 1985, pp. 530-531).  In each of these ideas there is a common area 
for citizenship.  It is the city or the community.  Western political theory that grew out of 
city states in ancient Greece treated citizenship as one activity that occurred in a social 
setting, the city.  Particular social conditions were significant: wealth, birth, merit, and 
unity (Schwartz, 1985).  Classical liberal democratic theory born in the late 17
th
 century 
values individual natural law (rights are a priori in humans) and natural rights.  This 
theory is the basis for citizenship and government in the United States.  In a reciprocal 
relationship, individuals seek natural rights and the government assures the security of 
body, person, and property.  Where citizenship and equality are linked together, 
individuals experience equality in all matters.  
What is citizenship?  In our democracy, citizenship is defined by equality, 
dialogue and friendship amongst individuals.  Individuals are self reliant with a 
willingness to engage in a reciprocal relationship with others.  The virtuous ideals of 
responsibility, respect, trust, truth, honor, wisdom, autonomy, and integrity of the self, the 
other, the community, and to the nation are consequential.    The history of citizenship 
identifies a distinct evolution of active citizenship.  Active citizenship is not, however, 
without challenge.  For each challenge throughout history, dialogue and friendship 
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underscores and strengthens resolution, implementation, and progression for individual 
citizenship in our democracy.     
This section surveys the history of citizenship in five areas:  first, the history of 
citizenship and citizenship theories shows a tension between the recurring idea of 
citizenship as a shared and active life and citizenship as a passive status.  Second, it 
reveals the spirit of individualism injected into the concept and workings of citizenship 
and how this transforms citizenship into a vehicle of “liberation.”  Third, challenges to 
the modern civic model of the liberal civic state and citizenship that arose in the 17
th
 
century are discussed.  Fourth, liberal democratic principles may be at odds with other 
models of civic belonging.  The history of the United States suggests claims of liberalism 
and democracy has been at odds with the exclusionary, boundary-staking functions of 
citizenship laws and policies.  The historical evolution of citizen practice conflicts with 
classical liberalism and democracy.  For example, marginalized groups such as women, 
African Americans, Native Americans, and ethnically diverse groups have had to struggle 
to gain citizenship rights.  Finally, some countries that do not live in a classical liberal 
democracy presently seek this model as their form of government.  In particular, the 
recent unrest in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya illustrates the desire of individuals to express 
their voice in government. 
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Part I  
Active and Passive Citizenship 
 
 Citizenship as a shared and active status and citizenship as a passive status 
describes individuals who in the former participate in political life, and individuals who 
are indifferent or non participatory in the latter.  Non participatory or passive citizenship 
indicates status only.  Individuals are without participatory rights and privileges; they are 
citizens in name only.  These are used interchangeably.  The tension between passive and 
active political life was evident throughout the ancient citizenships of Greece, Rome, and 
the Middle Ages.  The effect of this tension was really two forms of citizenship that 
influenced unity and loyalty of government, but more importantly, the sovereignty or 
autonomy of the individual as it pertained to rule.  Better said it was a reflection of citizen 
as ruler and citizen as subject.  The individual participated not from a subjective 
standpoint of his own needs and desires but rather with a view toward the good of the city 
as determined by those in power.  
In Greece, not everyone was a citizen.  It was a status for an elite group of men 
who, based upon their economic status in the polis, were eligible for citizenship.  The 
polis or the Greek city state was a political community that provided economic conditions 
to people who could take care of their own needs.  Activity in this town or polis was 
synonymous with one‟s citizenship status.  Individuals participated in the public life of 
the city.   For Greek citizens, participation was essential.  Pericles suggested if there was 
no interest in the public or life of the city, one was considered isolated from public 
service of the polis.  Individuals were active because they contributed to the common 
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good separate from their private needs.  In his funeral oration, he claimed that a 
democracy offered an equal justice to all, regardless of economic differences, social 
standing, or class considerations.  Equal justice extended to all, regardless of economic 
differences or social standing, brought about an active citizenship (Pericles, The Funeral 
Oration in Clark, 1994).   
Overall, citizenship in Greece was taken quite seriously.  Not to be among men (a 
citizen) was not to be a human.  It (citizenship) was a way of being, a way of life.  To be 
an Athenian citizen was a privilege and Athenians regarded this as very significant and 
integral to their culture.  A mere fraction of the diverse Athenian population that included 
foreigners and traders and slaves were citizens.  Foreigners had a special status, some 
with a legal identity, some rights and an obligation to serve in the military and pay taxes.  
They could not participate in government.  Women and children were not citizens but 
enjoyed the legal protection of Athens through their husbands and fathers.  Overall, the 
active citizen class (16-66 years of age) was no more than 18% of the population (Clark, 
1994, p. 85).   In Athens, this small select group defined an active participatory 
democracy. 
Active citizenship bred equality and tolerance in the personal life of the citizen 
and adherence to law in the public life.  There was to be a distinction private from public 
but the public was the priority.  An active citizen in the public sphere or polis engaged in 
discussion as preliminary to any wise action. 
 Political bonds grew but Greece still clung to the citizenship notion of jus 
sanguine or citizenship through blood relation. Those of “unpure birth” were removed 
from registers and often sold.  The punishment for murdering an Athenian was higher 
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than that for a non Athenian.  Given the virtuous philosophy of government that 
Athenians advanced, this is harsh by contemporary standards (Clark, 1994). 
 Greek citizenship changed with Kleisthenes (600 B.C.) when the “demes” or 
small social communities or units were part of the city state.  These demes brought about 
a solidarity that transformed citizenship from tribal to political (Clark, 1994).   A new 
political bond between an individual and the state emerged.  Jus sanguine, or citizenship 
through blood relation, was shifting to jus soli, or citizenship through place of birth or 
birthright.  This shift became a practical measure to provide justice and assure morally 
grounded citizens.  While it had its limitations, it provided the basis for active citizenship. 
 In Plato‟s (427-347 B.C.), “The Crito”, the dialogue between Crito and Socrates 
illuminates the ideal citizen in Athens.  Socrates was imprisoned and sentenced to death.  
Crito informed Socrates of his opportunity to escape to Phthia and live the remainder of 
his life in exile.  Socrates explained to Crito that he could not leave Athens.  To leave 
would be unjust.  To avoid his punishment (evil) by another evil (to violate the law and 
escape) does no service to citizen or country.  A man must be truthful to himself, do the 
right thing and not betray what is right.  If Socrates was to escape Athens he would 
escape the very principles which he acknowledged to be just in the first place.  The 
decisions of law were not to be overthrown.  There was evil in avoiding the sentence of 
the state (Socrates in Plato in Somerville & Santoni, 1965).  Why?  The state nurtured 
and educated the citizen.  To avoid the sentence was a violation of the state‟s good faith.  
If an Athenian did not like what he had experienced throughout his years as a citizen in 
the state he was free to leave and “take his goods with him” (Socrates in Plato in 
Somerville & Santoni, 1965, p. 55).  The individual who had experienced the manner in 
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which Athenians ordered justice and administered the state and remained through “an 
implied contract” wrongs his parents, “authors” of his education and the state (Socrates in 
Plato in Somerville & Santoni, 1965).   
 Socrates took this view and his contract with the state seriously.  He was just and 
faithful to virtues of wisdom, temperance, and courage throughout his life.  To depart 
after he had the opportunity to choose banishment rather than death at his trial was to 
forget the sentiments and respect for law and go “running like a slave” (Socrates in Plato, 
p. 56).  The dialogue between Socrates and Crito helps to define the active citizen as one 
nurtured and educated by parent and state with political virtues of wisdom, temperance, 
and courage.  These virtues were lived and exampled through man‟s will.  To lose sight 
of these virtues was to violate one‟s citizenship.  For Socrates to have lived outside or 
without the polis or the city was to violate these virtues.  
 Plato sought to instill in the individual a sense of responsibility and consciousness 
with regards to the city.  In each social class, from lower to upper, the individual 
performed his job or fulfilled his station.  The individual also had affection for one‟s 
peers as citizens.  Individuals learned this through education.  Beyond one‟s job or 
station, however, the individual was non participatory in an undemocratic society.   
Plato‟s student, Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.) expounded the notion of virtue and 
citizenship.  He wrote that the citizen had a responsibility to the city.  He also 
acknowledged that while the citizen had a responsibility to the city, the city also had a 
responsibility to the citizen.  It was a reciprocal relationship.  The individual participated 
as one who ruled and as one ruled.  Citizen served on juries, assemblies, in the military, 
or in general discussion (Schwartz, 1985).  The city consisted of a partnership of citizens.  
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Whether or not the citizens were similar in their task, they had an obligation to preserve 
their partnership and their city (Aristotle).  The virtue of the citizen was with a view 
toward the city and the regime.  In Aristotle‟s view, the governed could participate in 
political decisions but the goal was the welfare of the state.  This was the essence of 
citizenship.   As Plato before him, Aristotle asserted that virtue was significant for the 
citizen.  Men could be good, but that was not the same as the excellent citizen in all states 
or regimes.  The active citizen practiced virtue with a view towards the city during the 
Athenian age.  The partnership of citizens, the shared life was typical of citizenship in the 
city (Aristotle).  This notion of active citizenship changed with the advent of the Roman 
Empire. 
 The early Roman government was monarchical but by 509 B.C., Rome was a 
republic.  There was a shift toward greater exclusivity or a thin, shallow citizenship.  
Class status or patricians and plebeians characterized Roman citizenship.  Both were 
citizens but religious and social restrictions confined the lower class, the plebeians, from 
achieving the high offices that patricians could attain.  Because of this, plebeians were 
not able to participate in the republic.  This was an early example of active and passive or 
participatory and non participatory citizenship in the Roman Empire.  Patricians were 
clearly active citizens.  Others shared only a status.  Unlike the Greeks, where citizenship 
was a way of life, Rome‟s was a citizenship based on class.  There was a shift from the 
community nature of the polis toward a less intimate way of life.  An individual‟s 
concern with particulars of public life such as how politics affects their life (res publica) 
rather than simply political life was evident in the community.  Herein lay the beginning 
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of the tension that was characterized as sharing a political life (active) and sharing a 
status (passive).   
 In its early history, Rome was surrounded by Latin nations.  Rome formed an 
alliance with the Latins and a dual identity evolved.  Latins had a broad Roman identity 
and a Latin identity.  “Citizenship” was separated from the tribal and consanguineal 
community.  Roman citizenship extended to the Latin population.  New citizens were not 
ethnically Romans.  There was a separation of the political from the ethnic.  While 
alliances were made, citizens did not acquire full rights, thus the non participatory citizen.  
Revolts arose and the question of “that we are called Romans ensued” (Clark, 1994, p. 
31).  The ethnic citizenship created bond and loyalty.  The political bond with the Roman 
Republic created duties, responsibilities, and sacrifices.  There was citizenship without a 
vote.  Their citizenship was dual and passive.  It was as Clark asserted, “a contradiction 
of close association, alliance, and incorporation” (Clark, 1994, p. 37).   
 As Rome acquired a variety of nationalities into a multiethnic or civic state, it 
became politically expedient to create citizenship.  It created a device for ethnic diversity, 
an association of free citizens and diverse ethnicity.   In the Roman Empire (31 B.C. to 
the latter part of the 5
th
 century A.D.), nearly the entire civilized world was politically 
united and generations of peoples experienced internal peace (Palmer, 1995).  Rome was 
the center around which lay the “circle of lands” or the known world in the west (Palmer, 
1995, p. 14).   Dual citizenships or multiple identities defined identification with the state 
and a particular ethnic community.  This dual citizenship was of a passive nature in 
contrast with the citizen of Rome, an active citizen.  What was important for the passive 
citizen was a simple adherence to Roman law.   The result of this passive citizenry was a 
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lack of unity and loyalty that eventually led to the demise of the long standing empire and 
contributed to the establishment of Medieval cities and citizenship. 
 As the Medieval cities developed, an active citizenry developed in some but not 
all cities.  They were “islands” of civic and urban freedom within feudal society.   They 
were independent and democratic.  The goal was not to create war and conquer lands but 
rather to create economic growth through trade or capitalism.   A town economy emerged 
with the domination of the guilds (craftsmen/artisans who shared a common skill or 
craft).  There was a share of government in the „urbs” or urban areas, personal liberty and 
active membership.  A civic identity was extended to all members irrespective of origin 
and identity.  The citizens of the burghers were as free as participatory citizens were in 
Rome.  There was a broad territorial solidarity.  It was based on jus soli.  Individuals 
were members of the urban community who participated in guilds, voted in 
administrative government, and even though foreign born, were active members of the 
community.  The goal for this citizen was to maintain access to their occupation and 
livelihood and restrict competition from other areas.  Further, to create a more democratic 
community, individuals were compelled to serve in the military.  This according to 
Weber, brought about the control of the non aristocratic masses.  By putting arms into 
their hands they also put political power into their hands (Weber, 1998, p. 46).  This 
resulted in democratization in the cities.    
 The active or participatory citizen stood in contrast to serfs who were subjects to 
the king and part of a passive hierarchy of God-King-Knights-Nobles-Women.  Status in 
this regard indicated where an individual stood in society.  This was different in the city 
states where they held on to their autonomy and cities acted as refuges for those seeking 
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freedom.  The clash between the two, passive and active was eventually absorbed by the 
nation-states (Gross, 1999).  An active citizenship ultimately emerged with the French 
Revolution. 
 Prior to the revolution in France, the nation state was divided into three estates: 
first, the clergy, second, the nobility, and third, the business and professional classes, the 
peasantry and city workers.  Rights and privileges depended upon the class or estate to 
which one belonged.  Church bodies owned between 5 and 10 percent of the land.  They 
were the greatest of the landowners.  The nobles were exempt from most taxes simply 
because of their position in society.  The third class or estate, the commercial and 
professional classes were not well off compared with the church and the nobility (Palmer, 
1995).  The ancient regime was stratified, fixed, and unequal.  There was no universal 
bond.  The monarch was the supreme arbiter of a society divided into privileged and 
disadvantaged sections (Gross, 1999).    This was an indicator of passive or non 
participatory citizenship, which ended with the French Revolution.   
 In August 1789, national unification came to fruition and a Declaration of Rights 
precipitated the French Revolution.  Active citizenship was associated with the people, 
patriotism, liberty, and democracy.  Active citizenship grew with the rise of nationalism.  
Citizenship was extended to all.  It was a symbol of freedom (Gross, 1999).  In essence, 
“citizenship” was associated with interest in law, social contract, and government.  The 
idea of republicanism and citizenship became conversation amongst the debating republic 
and in the mass media.  Finally, a state governed by representatives of men who enjoyed 
equal rights and were not divided by status manifested itself in a legislature.  An active 
citizenry had evolved and a civic life was significant (Gross, 1999).  Citizenship was 
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associated with French nationality and French culture.  It was a citizenship established by 
jus sanguine. Here, the modern national state developed.   Evident and complimentary to 
nationalism were patriotic symbols, verses, art, and messages of freedom. 
 In Great Britain, individual and political rights were an essential part of the 
modern concept of citizenship.  They were established through bargaining or political 
struggles.  The English people have been credited with “committee sense”, a desire to 
discuss until compromise and agreement was reached.  Gradually, the Parliamentary 
power was extended and the monarchy‟s power diminished.   A House of Lords and a 
House of Commons had a greater balance of power.  Consequently, individuals had 
greater individual, civil, and political freedoms (Gross, 1999). 
 Unlike the Romans where the result of civil wars was slavery, in England, the 
result of conflict was liberty (Gross, 1999).  The Great Charter or the Magna Carta of 
1215 gave evidence of this.  The power of the Prince had the “force of law” (Gross, 1999, 
p. 87).  National representation in Parliament was slowly being established.  There was 
not total representation of the nation, but there was an adherence to the principle of Rule 
of Law.  There was a relentless process toward a society governed by the will of the 
many and toward individual and political rights for all. 
 In Britain, early representation began in the 13
th
 century.  Shires, or territorial 
units of government had elections of knights, two citizens from each city, and two 
burgesses from each burrough.  In each, there was self government and election of 
administrators.  The citizens assessed their taxes by a jury of neighbors and by the 14
th
 
century, money grants and taxation was initiated by their peers in the House of Commons 
(Gross, 1999).  There was a view towards protecting individual and political rights of 
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citizens.  These citizens exercised active citizenship and with a fidelity or loyalty to the 
political system continued to advocate these rights.  While “paying taxes” is not 
participatory assessing them is participatory.    
 The tension between active and passive citizenship was evident in participation 
and status.  The exercise of rights (political and individual) and the commitment to the 
general good was reflected in each.  One or the other did not make an individual a better 
citizen.  It was a matter of the level of participation.  One‟s class status indicated the level 
of participation.  The idea of subject and sovereign was evident.    Individuals seeking 
political and individual freedoms caused repercussions between subject and sovereign by 
the beginning of modern citizenship.  While individuals noted the difference between 
subject and sovereign, they were beginning to acknowledge the significance of their own 
individualism in citizenship practice.  As a result of this, the individual began to think of 
his morality, needs, and desires. 
 
 
Part II 
The Spirit of Individualism and Citizenship 
 
The spirit of individualism and citizenship began as an idea with the “City of 
Man, City of God” written by St. Augustine and evolved as an expression of citizenship 
through the guilds of the Middle Ages and finally as a means to govern during the 
Enlightenment and early nation-states.  
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In St. Augustine‟s “City of Man, City of God”(354-430 A.D.) it was written that 
man must render unto Caesar that which is Caesar‟s and render under God that which is 
God‟s (St. Augustine, 1984).  Here, Christians became dual citizens.  There was 
citizenship in the real world and more importantly an awareness that in this world, this 
earthly city could not take away or claim anything that was God‟s.  The significance of 
this was the rise of subjectivity or the acknowledgement of the individual, the eternal 
over the temporal.  The emphasis was on the individual self.  This emphasis became 
apparent because, of course, the individual sought salvation in the heavenly city which 
was with God.  In the Roman Empire, this was particularly appealing for slaves and for 
women who were not considered citizens, which caused much concern in Rome.  St. 
Augustine, through his writings, made citizenship available not only to the individual but 
to the downtrodden as well.  Yes, people could give service to country, but they also had 
to think of the larger picture which was the heavenly city.   
 
Even the heavenly city, therefore, while its state of pilgrimage avails itself 
of the peace of earth, and so far as it can without injuring faith and 
godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men 
regarding the acquisition of the necessities of life and makes this earthly 
peace bear upon the place of heaven; for this alone can be truly called and 
esteemed the peace of reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the 
perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in 
God…when we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give 
place to one that is eternal  (St. Augustine, 1984, pp. 877-879).     
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An individual lives his life as a self sacrificing individual and with a vision 
toward the eternal life.  This serves a twofold measure for the individual.  Man sought to 
live a good life on earth, one that was virtuous and with good citizenship as St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1224-1274 A.D.) wrote (St. Thomas in Clark, 1994).  Individuals followed laws 
that were virtuous.  If citizens were virtuous, the common good of the state flourished.   
By being virtuous, the individual was not only living in a meaningful way but he was his 
own object of attention.  He forsook his own selfish needs and desires for the ultimate 
heavenly city.  In this citizenship practice, the individual might not be participating in 
government as an individual participated through a social contract, but he was at least 
thinking of the justice that can be achieved in the end for himself.  Human Law was 
synonymous with Divine Law.  Divine Law dictated a Natural Law (or derived through 
the senses) which resulted in Positive Law or Human Law.    In this aspect of dual 
citizenship advanced by the City of God, the individual was beginning to think of his 
actions on a personal level.   An individual stake in citizenship practice had taken shape 
that was not earlier apparent (Clark, 1994). 
As civilization progressed, the Roman Empire fell and the Middle Ages were 
taking shape.  Roman Law and tradition survived in areas that were one with the Roman 
Empire and spread throughout universities and cities with great enthusiasm.  Citizenship 
once established in Rome continued into the Middle Ages.  Politics that were thought of 
during the Roman Empire (res publica) were also thought of during the early Middle 
Ages.  Individuals pondered government administration and their part or function within 
it.  Christianity prevailed and brought about a new sense of unity.  This unity was 
grounded not in jus sanguine but in values.  In the Middle Ages, however, citizenship 
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was not in the tradition of Rome.  There was no universal institution of free inhabitants. 
The very definition of citizenship varied from country to country.  Craftsmen formed 
guilds in cities.   The spirit of individualism became part of the concept of citizenship 
(Gross, 1999).  These cities were centers of urban and civic freedom.  They had limited 
autonomy but they fought for their rights and legal and administrative autonomy.  
Individuals ruled through the theory of natural law and a simplistic version of a social 
contract (Gross, 1999).   They were sovereign.  Citizenship in the cities meant a share in 
government, personal liberty, and active membership in the urban political community.  
There was solidarity and identity (a bond) that was extended to all members irrespective 
of origin and ethnicity.  Burghers or inhabitants of cities were free as were participatory 
citizens in Rome (Gross, 1999). 
Fugitive serfs sought cities as a refuge.  “The air of the city makes you free” 
(Gross, 1999, p. 57).   Birth meant little and however stigmatized the child was at birth, 
this stigma vanished in the city.  Cities were centers of liberation because they were 
foundations of freedom, equality, and a market economy.  The city‟s aim (a growing 
economy) blended with the individual aim to seek freedom and contribute to the 
economy.   Yet, this aim was not the end result for all.  Not all cities could boast this 
objective.  For the successful tradesman, the city was a source of wealth and culture.  For 
the unsuccessful serf mired in poverty, the city was symbolic of exploitation and 
oppression.  The cities marked the beginning of alienation.  Self worth diminished as 
individuals became objects of trade rather than directly responsible for production.  Still, 
however, an urban solidarity evolved because many cities were islands of toleration.  Not 
only were citizens tied economically, they were tied in terms of defense.  Defense of the 
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cities was tied to the guilds.  Individuals usually lived in the same area.  Therefore, it was 
their obligation to defend the city.   
Not only was the individual part of the defense of the guilds, the wealth of the 
guild and culture, he was also part of the administration or governance of individuals, 
individual citizens, and burghers.  There was a voluntary agreement amongst citizens or 
individuals.  This city was a distinct corporation.  It had its own pride and identity where 
public property was distinguished from private property.  In the city, citizenship was a 
thriving political institution, not based in consanguineal communities but in territorial 
solidarity.  Yet, it wasn‟t universal as it was in Rome.  Citizenship was limited to an 
estate.  It did not embrace all inhabitants as a right but was a privilege.   Clark (1994) 
wrote that cities were springs of western culture.   This references the theory and idea of 
government by consent advanced by Marsalis of Padua in the 14
th
 century who wrote the 
will of the people was the only legitimate source of rule.  Marsilius challenged the 
church‟s political power.  He claimed it was in conflict with the state of nature (Marsilius 
in Clarke, 1994, p. 70).  Centuries later Johannes Althusias wrote of a “community of 
men living together and united by real bonds which a contract of union, expressed or 
implied institutionalizes” (Althusias in Clark,1994, p. 63). 
In England, individual rights were part of modern citizenship.  In the 12
th
 century, 
shires were units of territorial government or a self government.  Burroughs had self 
government as well and elected their own administration.  Citizens were here, as they 
would be in France, subjects as well as rulers.  Laws were based on consent. 
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After the Magna Carta or the Great Charter of 1215, the power of the crown was 
limited and the personal and civil rights of the individual were extended.  The king lost 
his power to rule by his whim or pleasure (Gross, 1999). 
In England, representation in Parliament had legitimacy of law.  Authority was 
given to “the consent of the majority of all free men and the principle of government by 
consent had been slowly but firmly established” (Gross, 1999, p. 88).  This was not the 
same as 21
st
 century universal suffrage.  One of the key features of the successful British 
model was simply “Fidelity to the political system” (Gross, 1999, p. 88).  Englishmen 
called for legitimacy and stability in Parliament.  Ancient traditions and customs were not 
to be discarded.  Adherence to their heritage contributed to the stability of the English 
monarchy (Gross, 1999). 
The birth of English territorial representation dates back to the thirteenth century.  
“Shires” or units of local government had characteristics of self government.  Eventually, 
these shires formed a House of Commons.  The connection of these formed a united 
representative institution (Gross, 1999). 
During the 12th century, taxes were assessed by a “jury of neighbors” or 
representatives of taxpayers.  The notion of taxation and representation was born.  By the 
14
th
 century, no tax could be imposed without the consent of Parliament, in particular, the 
House of Commons (Gross, 1999). 
Europe‟s history does not mirror England‟s.  Parliaments, particularly in Poland 
and Hungary, represented the nobility and the clergy and not the common man.  The 
peasantry was harshly treated and oppressed over time.    The limitation of the power of 
the state or crown was outlined in the British and English Parliaments. Major principles 
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in the Bill of Rights were discussed in Parliament.  The brief Cromwell Era (1649-1660) 
disrupted liberal ideals.  After beheading the crown, hopes of constitutional and 
parliamentary government were dashed.  Cromwell opposed religious toleration and 
eventually placed England under military rule.  Malcontents, vagabonds, and “bandits” 
were repressed.  The eleven year reign was a mix of “moral Puritanism” and political 
dictatorship where religious toleration and free speech was absent (Palmer, 1995, p. 175).  
When the crown was restored in 1660, the restoration of pre Cromwell liberal ideas were 
in place.  Representation and freedom of speech avowed early in the 15
th
 century were 
acknowledged.  Humanitarian efforts were established as well prohibiting cruel and 
unusual punishment and protection from arrest and excessive bail (Gross, 1999).  The 
creation of a humane government and political institution eventually inspired political 
and social philosophers to contemplate democratic rule and citizenship. 
Citizenship was expressed in the will of the individuals.  It was an early form of 
the social contract or expression of the general will that identifies the Enlightenment 
period in the 18
th
 century.   As earlier noted, the sovereignty of the individual was evident 
in citizenship.  This sovereignty was liberating from monarchy and from church rule.  It 
lent itself to fairness, personal, and economic liberty.  Even in its narrowness, these city 
dwellers (citizens) were vehicles of democratic government.  The equalization of classes 
and removal of restraints on freedom became a central focus in the development of the 
dominant city (Weber, 1998). 
At the end of the Middle Ages, a “megaculture” covered the nation states of 
Europe.  A civic bond in cities or “urbs” was prevalent.  Moral autonomy and 
individuality evolved in accordance with Divine Law.  Individuals concerned with the 
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eternal life over the temporal life developed political thinking that stressed respect and 
responsibility in government amongst men.  Adherence to Divine Law guided political 
thinkers in their autonomous development of the Social Contract, notions of consent, 
rights of man, equality, and liberation or liberal thinking.  Divine Law was the foundation 
of moral autonomy.  Moral autonomy and individuality evolved into liberal thinking.  As 
mentioned earlier, in city states individuals retained their autonomy.  These city states or 
local urbs were replaced with nation states.  Through Natural Rights theory, rights had 
been established a priori.  With this in mind, citizenship and equality and liberation were 
linked together. 
During the Enlightenment or the period during which these nation states evolved, 
civil society or civil persons evolved.  At this time, the idea of good government through 
a liberated citizenry was invoked.  Individuals were “liberated” when the nation, the 
source of sovereignty, was not with any authority that was not expressly derived from it 
(Paine, in Clark, 1994, pp. 123-125).  This became clear when the individual (through 
Liberal Theory) realized that he was part of his government.  He, through a social 
contract, decided what was best for governance and because of a general will, which 
would be a will for all, for the maintenance of peace or for common defense (Rousseau, 
1964, Hobbes, 1996, Clark, 1994).  Locke asserted a social contract was an agreement 
where men consent to make one community or government and  
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create a body politic where the majority have a right to act and conclude 
the rest…  By doing this, “every man by consenting with others to make 
one body politic under one government, puts himself under obligation to 
everyone of that society to submit to the determination of the majority and 
to be concluded by it…or else this compact would signify nothing   
(Locke, 1952, pp. 54-55).   
  
Locke‟s works resonated throughout the modern world.  France applied Locke‟s work in 
the aftermath of 18
th
 century revolution. 
In the days following the French Revolution, all authority would be subjected to 
reason.  Individuals or citizens sought a government that respected reason.  Individuals 
were morally sovereign.  They would be politically sovereign as well.   Individuals 
became subservient through a general will to the state (Rousseau, 1964).  Through the 
general will there was a sense of belonging of people who shared a territory with 
common norms, principles, and ideas.  Also, individuals or citizens became part of a 
contract to rule and be governed.  This was an individual and liberating act.  There was 
no hierarchy in France.  All were free, equal citizens in a republican democracy.  
Citizenship through this contract or a submission to a general will was a citizenry based 
on the individual and extended to all based on loyalty and nationalism.   “Each of us 
places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general 
will; and as one body we all receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole” 
(Rousseau, in Somerville & Santoni, 1965,  p. 214).   Montesquieu wrote that this was a 
time when individuals were interested in government, natural law, and social contract.  
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Discussion was alive and well not only in France but in Europe as well.  A new concept 
of citizenship was sought (Clark, 1994). 
The term “citizen” was defined as a positive norm, associated with a free society.  
It eventually became a symbol of freedom and equality before the law.  With these ideas, 
a government ruled by representatives who enjoyed equal rights was a real possibility 
(Clark, 1994).  In 1789, French citizenship rights were stated in a declaration that would 
eventually become law.  Citizenship was associated with the people and nationalism, 
patriotism, liberty, and democracy.  Privileges were abolished and rights were 
proclaimed.  There was equality amongst citizens.  Its simple language or form appealed 
to all individuals.  This republican democracy recognized government by consent, by the 
will of the people.  The citizen herewith was a symbol of equality and freedom, a subject 
and a sovereign.  Hobbes wrote there was no difference.   The citizen was a sovereign 
because he governed and a subject because he submitted to authority, the rule of his 
government (Hobbes, 1996).   
From the City of Man, City of God to the nation states of the Enlightenment the 
individual had become synonymous with citizenship.  This citizenship was one of 
liberation from monarchy and oppression and integral to republican government.  The 
very infusion of the individual into citizenship practice liberated him from being subject 
only to subject and ruler.  The very notion of a contract, compact, or general will assures 
that individuals obeyed no one but themselves or their own will.  This was the essence of 
liberation for the individual.   
The individual now defined membership in the nation state.   Yet for all the worth 
of his part, the nation state was challenged as a center of citizenship. 
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Part III 
Challenges to the Civic Model 
of  
Citizenship 
  
The modern, civic model of citizenship arose in the 17
th
 century in the midst of 
protracted class, religious, and ethnic conflict.  From the 1700‟s to the present, the liberal 
civic state has established itself as the appropriate unit of organization and membership.  
Yet for a variety of reasons, both practical and philosophical, the nation state, as the locus 
of citizenship, has been challenged and the nature of membership contested from within 
and without.   
Since the 17
th
 century, the civic model of citizenship evolved in light of social 
class, religious, and ethnic conflict.  This was best exemplified by the works of Marx and 
the Jewish question (a critique of liberal democratic citizenship) (1843) and T.H. 
Marshall (1992) and notions of social citizenship juxtaposed against Marx‟s critique of 
democratic citizenship.  The religious and class conflict was addressed by Karl Marx and 
T.H. Marshall during the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century.  Liberal democratic theory, the nation 
state, and traditional models of citizenship that were challenged by Marx and 
thoughtfully resolved by Marshall have been challenged by multiculturalism, 
globalization, and questions of integration and belonging or identity.  For all the efforts of 
theorists, the challenges are still evident with no real means to overcome them.  A brief 
historical analysis of early challenges follows.  These helped to determine the nation state 
as appropriate.  Also discussed are challenges to the nation state since World War II.   
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Coming out of feudalism or a hierarchic society, democracy developed gradually.  
There were elements of capitalism amongst workers in burroughs or shires and an 
element of free contract where individuals had the freedom to make their own contract in 
the economic realm.  Individuals wanted the same freedom in the political realm and so 
democracy developed.  Free workers emerged to make their own contract.  For those 
individuals who sought to create business and spend capital in the marketplace, this was 
very liberating.   Yet, the distribution of resources was not equal even though the 
opportunity was equal.  Individuals sought the same distribution at least as the 
opportunity presented itself.  Equality of opportunity implied equality of outcome.  Marx 
did not see this in the development of the modern market.  He saw social division.  He 
also saw religion as contributing to societal conflict.   
Marx was averse to capitalism.  Historically, he did not acknowledge equal 
opportunity as it related to equal resources.  He described a complicated arrangement of 
society, characterized by class antagonisms, new forms of oppression and struggle. He 
viewed cities as arenas of struggle and exploitation of one class to another.  They were 
not only internally divided amongst industrialists, merchant, and farmer, they were 
antagonistic without any opportunity for balance.  The city was ever changing.  Cities 
were areas that appropriated goods with a view towards preservation of self and world.  
These did not necessarily coincide, but had a view towards preservation of self and world 
(Marx in Schwartz, 1985).   
Marx described the ancient city and medieval city.  In the ancient city, rural land 
and houses as well as urban houses and markets made up the city.  There was unity.  In 
the medieval city, rural territory was not part of the city.  The city consisted of rural 
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householders who owned private property in land.  Householders chose to come together 
for specific communal purposes.   Private ownership existed before communal.  Later, 
urban burghers separate from the land voluntarily associate as individuals to form a 
communal association.  Other associations (particularly, by class) were separate.  The 
city was not a community, but only a variety of associations in the city (Marx in 
Schwartz, 1985).    
To be a citizen was to own property.  Citizens who owned property attained 
economic gain through capitalism.  Marx viewed this as an opportunity for economic 
exploitation.  Two groups eventually defined the struggle as being between those with 
advantage, and those susceptible to exploitation and oppression, the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat (Marx in Someville and Santoni, 1963).  Defined particularly, the bourgeoisie 
referred to the class of modern capitalists, owners of social the means of production, and 
employers of wage labor.  By proletariat, Marx referred to modern wage laborers who, 
having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor in order to 
live (Marx in Somerville and Santoni, 1963).  Because of the ongoing intense 
revolutionary or better said reactionary struggle between the two, Marx asserted the 
victory of the proletariat who sought to restore the vanished status of the individual 
workman of the Middle Ages as inevitable.  This, of course, because of dialectical 
materialism was neither practical nor reasonable.  There will be ongoing struggle 
between the two so long as capitalism was the economic standard for growth.  The 
primacy of the individual prevailed.  His particular characteristics, such as socio 
economic class and religion, in a capitalist state were priority rather than the state‟s good 
as priority.  The reality that one‟s equal opportunity prevailed for one‟s own 
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aggrandizement first, and for the state second ensured dialectical materialism.  Dialectical 
materialism was simply incompatible with a dictatorship of the proletariat, typical in the 
communist state.  Therefore, a communal citizenship or communism was Marx‟s ideal.  
Individuals came together with an ideal utopian vision of the good of the state.  There 
were no distractions or what Marx termed “bourgeois prejudices” (Marx in Somerville 
and Santoni, 1963, p. 352).  Law, morality, and religion were secondary to the overall 
view of the state.  Marx revealed his view of the religious distraction in a critique of the 
Assimilation of Jews in German society in the 19
th
 century.  Marx‟s critique of liberal 
democratic citizenship with respect to the Jewish question not only described his view of 
citizenship, it addressed conflict and inequality in the liberal state.   
Marx critiqued Bruno Bauer‟s position on the assimilation of Jews in German 
society in the 19
th
 century.  In “Salvaging Liberalism from the Wreck of the 
Enlightenment,” Bridges asserted that  
 
members of a liberal political community must, to some extent, come to 
see themselves as free and equal individuals, not entirely encompassed by 
family, ethnic, or religious identification.  They…should put aside 
measures of human worth based on family, ethnic, and religious 
identifications and adopt a very different ranking system, one based on 
identification as citizen.  Distance from ethnic life, class, and religious 
community is significant, if not critical.  Liberal democracy must 
“generate” some form of civic culture or civic identity (Bridges, 1997 
Modern liberalism and its consequences, p. 15).   
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For Jews, in particular, this was difficult, if not impossible.  In “Die Judenfrage”, 
Bruno Bauer wrote that the Jew could not abandon or give up his religion.  What is the 
significance of this for citizenship?   Bauer asserted that for the Jews, they need to 
“emancipate themselves before they emancipate others” (Bauer in Marx, 1994, On the 
Jewish question, 1843, p. 28).   
 In this regard, the question arises of the relation between religion and the state.  
The Jew was not be emancipated because he was a Jew but rather, the idea of Judaism  
took second place to citizenship.  While the Jew sought to be Jewish, this was a private 
matter not a civic matter.  Bauer asserted that the nature of Judaism or the bias of Judaism 
could not overcome the political obligations of the state.  If an individual wanted to retain 
his essential characteristics as a Jew, he could not be a truly emancipated citizen.  His life 
in the political realm would be a “semblance or momentary exception to the essential and 
normal” (Bauer in Marx, 1994, On the Jewish question, 1843, p. 28).  Bauer asserted that 
France best exemplified this notion. 
 In France, the Jew would cease to be Jewish.  Essentially, in renouncing religious 
privileges, church, and practices the Jew became a true citizen.  Religion was an 
“absolutely” private matter.  Something akin to the American model of citizenship was 
useful.  No privileged religion or religious practice prevailed.  No religion has any power 
to “excommunicate” or influence in such an extreme one‟s way of life in the public or 
political realm.   
 If one‟s religion is a private matter and not a public matter then individuals may 
achieve political emancipation.  The political emancipation of the religious man, in 
general, was the freeing of the state from religion.  If the individual was able to liberate 
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himself politically from his religion he would, according to Bauer, free himself within the 
realm of human emancipation.  Religion was private; it neither dictated the spirit of the 
state nor dictated behavior.  It was not as Bauer asserted the essence of “community” but 
rather the essence of “differentiation” (Marx, 1994, On the Jewish question, 1843, p. 35).    
It separated man from his community and from his fellow man.  Yet, if man separated his 
religious life and political life into private life and public life, he would truly find 
political emancipation.  Marx held that while this was political emancipation, it was not 
human emancipation. 
 Political emancipation did not address the idea of equality in the private and the 
public realms.  Political emancipation for Marx was not the same as human 
emancipation. Marx, unlike Bauer, wanted to eliminate religion altogether.  Even though 
religion was private in America, Marx judged it too strong an influence.  Marx asserted 
that because an individual who was emancipated politically and did not renounce his 
religion did not yield human or full emancipation.  It rather created a dualism.  It divided 
people.  In the public life, the government assured equality amongst individuals.  In the 
private life, there was self interest, conflict, and competing interest or divisions.  In other 
words, there was inequality in the private life (Marx, 1994, On the Jewish question, 1843. 
p. 50).    The democratic equality in the public realm was not evident in the private realm.  
According to Bauer and Hegel (Marx, 1994, On the Jewish question, 1843) the state 
mediated collisions because of its autonomy.  Yet Marx disagrees.  The border between 
the two (private and public) was impermeable.   Rather, the private realm absorbed by 
self interest captured the public.  In the private realm, individuals used their citizenship to 
reinforce their own self interest.   
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 Citizenship confers equal rights but individuals used equal rights to reinforce their 
own self interest.  Marx held that individuals used rights for their own gains. 
 This critique used Jews as a scapegoat for Marx‟s attack on liberal democratic 
citizenship in the 19
th
 century.  This was how Marx addressed conflict or inequality of 
opportunity.  The world was better served if the private realm (family, schools, the 
economy) was politicized.  This politicization made for full emancipation.  Rid the 
society of self interest or capitalism and society was emancipated.  In other words, rid the 
society of conflict or capitalism and man achieved human emancipation.  For Marx, 
politics should not include conflict.  The liberal view advanced that conflict (albeit if 
controlled) was acceptable but Marx found this unacceptable.  Marx‟s rejection of the 
liberal view was the architect of social inequality according to T.H. Marshall (Marshall, 
1992).  It was also one of the earliest challenges to liberal democracy in the state.    
Marx‟s view violated equality of opportunity.  Marshall‟s attempt at resolving social 
inequality and creating equality of opportunity countered Marx‟s concerns for social 
inequality.  Marshall developed a social citizenship for individuals. 
 T. H. Marshall (1992) believed that the drive toward social equality began or has 
been in progress for the last two hundred and fifty years, beginning around the mid 18
th
 
century.  Given capitalism, Marshall sought to rid society of the conflict Marx 
illuminated.  Marshall did not want citizens to have a dual existence.  He created a 
framework on the evolution of the social welfare state.   The market place was a place of 
struggle.  Marshall agreed with Marx in this regard.  He believed the working classes in 
England were ostracized from the culture and were denied access to a “common 
civilization which should be seen as “a common possession and heritage” (Marshall in 
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Shafir, pp. 172-173).  Class lines were distinct in England with little interaction amongst 
members of different classes.  Also, resources were in short supply for lower classes and 
women.  Marshall accepted Marx‟s assertion but he did not accept Marx‟s remedy to 
politicize the private realm.  Marshall created a social citizenship which had as much 
legitimacy as civic and political.   
The original source of social rights was a membership of a local community and 
functional associations.  This was ultimately replaced by a Poor Law and a system of 
wage regulations which, in England, were nationally conceived and locally administered.  
The Poor Law was incompatible with civil rights in the economic sphere in the 19
th
 
century with its emphasis on the right to work at what you chose to do.  Wage regulation 
infringed on this individual principle.  Conflict began by the end of the 19
th
 century.  The 
Poor Law sought to preserve the existing poor.  As the competitive economy grew, the 
idea of social rights under the law drained away because of demands for progress that 
superseded social rights.  A struggle ensued between a planned society and a competitive 
one.  Social rights sided with the old patterned society and civil sided with the new 
society (Marshall, 1992). 
 The Poor Law championed social rights of citizenship.  Income was adjusted to 
the social needs and status of the citizen, not to the market value of his labor.    Relief 
was offered only to those who through age or sickness were incapable of working and 
sought mercy.  Claims were met only if claimants ceased to be citizens.  Paupers forfeited 
in practice the civil rights of liberty, internment in the workhouse and any political right 
they might possess.  A stigma clung to the poor who expressed feelings of resentment and 
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understood that relief separated the community from the outcast.  This was the case until 
1918 (Marshall, 1992). 
 The Poor Law wasn‟t the only law that terminated one‟s citizenship.  The Factory 
Acts terminated citizenship as well.    Work conditions and a reduction of hours were 
given to those who needed it but not to citizens of excellence.  If women, children, and 
advocates of women‟s rights were given protection they had to forego citizenship.  This 
changed by the end of the 19
th
 century but became an edifice of social rights.   
Marshall affirmed education was a service of a unique kind.  Marshall did not see 
education affecting the status of citizenship for children because children could not be 
citizens.  Marshall did feel, however, that children‟s education had a direct bearing on 
citizenship.  It fulfilled the requirements and nature of citizenship.  It stimulated the 
growth of citizens in the making.  The right to education was a social right of citizenship.  
It aimed to shape the future adult citizen.  Education was a prerequisite of civil freedom 
(Marshall, 1992).  By the end of the 19
th
 century, education was compulsory.  Free choice 
was a right only for mature minds.  There was a public duty to educate children because 
they were unable to appreciate their own interests.  Democracy needed an educated 
electorate and scientific manufacture needed educated workers.  Education was the first 
step to the establishment of social rights of citizenship, which was another challenge to 
the formidable nation state.   
For Marshall, education created a social solidarity.  Unlike Marx, Marshall didn‟t 
want to destroy capitalism or the nation state.  He wanted to enhance it or at the least 
subordinate the market to social justice.  The less well to do were able to enjoy a material 
civilization unlike before.  Social integration spread from one of sentiment into material 
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enjoyment.  As individuals began to share material goods in the state, more effort was 
directed towards social welfare (Marshall, 1992). 
 These aspirations suggested a universal right to income which was not 
proportionate to one‟s market value.  Marshall suggested a “guaranteed minimum” 
supply of certain essential goods (medical attention, supplies, shelter, and education) or a 
minimum supply of money available to be spent such as old age pensions, insurance 
benefits, family allowances (Marshall in Shafir, 1998).  Marshall affirmed this was a 
general enrichment of civil life, a reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization 
between more and less fortunate, between healthy and sick, unemployed and employed, 
old and active.  Equality of status for the individual emerged through the ultimate service 
right of education.  Despite hereditary difference, it allowed for progress.  Education was 
a right of Citizenship.    
Marshall closed his argument asserting “social rights imply an invasion of 
contract by status, the subordination of the market place to social justice, the replacement 
of the free bargain by the declaration of rights” (Marshall in Shafir, 1998, p. 110).  This 
was a milestone for the downtrodden or disadvantaged.  However, there is concern that 
social rights contributed to the welfare state.  Inequality can be tolerated in an egalitarian 
society so long as individuals continue strive towards progress in society and not simply 
give up because of hardship in life.    
Social rights were efficient only with administration.  They were expensive and 
required bureaucratic oversight.  It allowed for individuals to be part of a national 
citizenship, but Marshall did not anticipate a broadened culture defined by 
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multiculturalism, globalism, or dual citizenship.  With whose culture did people identify?  
How were individual cultural rights assured during the post WWII era?   
 The United Nations provided a declaration of human rights based on liberal 
Enlightenment theory or nation state sovereignty.  Enlightenment theory stressed 
individual rights and a social contract between ruler and subject.   National state 
sovereignty assured the nation state was autonomous in its exercise of power.  Yet, 
beyond this, the social rights or social citizenship that Marshall (1992) asserted was the 
task of the 20
th
 century was to be replaced with the task of multiculturalism, integration, 
and belonging as the task of the 21
st
 century. 
 Given multiculturalism, how did the question of identity find answer?  
Interestingly in “Salvaging liberalism from the wreck of the Enlightenment”, Bridges 
(1997) asserts in a liberal democracy free and equal individuals and those who regard 
themselves as such and behave as such are made rather than found.  In liberal 
democracies where citizens fail in sufficient numbers to achieve a particular identity 
thereby bound in their self definitions to particularistic cultural values, liberal 
democracies can loose their legitimacy.    Therefore, according to Bridges, the success of 
a liberal democracy depended upon the adherence or allegiance of the constituency it 
served (Bridges, 1997).   
Bridges asserted citizens were not born, they were made through education.  
Citizens with diverse backgrounds deserved tolerance and respect.  As it applied to 
citizenship, distinct cultures or those in opposition with others deserved recognition.  
Individuals could not absorb solidarity, they learned it.  This applied to multiculturalism.  
How did this stand juxtaposed to liberal democracies?  Bridges wrote liberal democracies 
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defined citizens as free individuals who were only incidentally members of a particular 
ethnic, class, or religious community.  Hierarchies generated by such communities were 
irrelevant to the state and its relation to and treatment of citizens.  So, public education 
produced persons who saw their membership in communities subordinated to their 
membership in the broader community (Bridges. 1997).  Public education created 
citizens, or persons who identified themselves as free and equal individuals.  This was 
civic education.  It not only reproduced and strengthened a culture, it developed attitudes, 
dispositions, and values proper to full citizenship.  This modernist liberalist civic culture 
was challenged by geographic mobility in particular.  Different degrees of support to the 
creation and for the support of a civic attitude contributed to a short life span.  When 
ideas specific to a civic culture lost their enthusiasm or zest, the culture lost its capacity 
to form habits of citizenship.  The incapacity to form habits of citizenship has occurred in 
post enlightenment liberal civic cultures (Bridges, 1997). 
 What caused this demise or challenge to the nation state?  A cultural neutrality or 
objectivity was sought through the scientific method.  For many, this was license for 
western imperialism.  The notion that cultural neutrality was an option was an 
oversimplification.  With international communications and migration, the view of 
cultural neutrality was not only an oversimplification, it was impractical and parochial 
(Bridges, 1997).  The challenge for liberal governments to work is for citizens to identify 
themselves both as members of a particular class, ethnicity, and religious community and 
as members of a civic community.  This was particularly evident as migration and 
immigration increased.  Migrants and ethnic minorities contributed to an erosion of 
nation sovereignty which is the post national challenge (Koopmans, Statham, 1999). 
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The rise of new forms of citizenship eroded a national citizenship or at the very 
least made it insignificant.   Additionally, increased diversity in nation states led to the 
development of a multicultural citizenship.  Further, there are studies that reaffirmed the 
importance of national models of citizenship and affirmed inclusion and exclusion of 
migrants and ethnic minorities (Brubaker 1992, Castles and Miller 1993 in Koopmans, 
Statham, 1999).  Many theories abound in this regard, but the common ground for all is 
to take a culture bound to its tradition (usually its family, ethnic, and religious tradition) 
and create a new civic culture.  Through a set of institutions, representations, and a wide 
means of persuasion, individuals ideally create a bond, a new identity that is either 
separate from their own or in association with their own.  Where is the persuasion?  Is it 
based historically, economically, religiously, or geographically?  The biggest concern is 
social cohesion and individual rights.  There are huge clashes regarding language rights, 
autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, naturalization policy, symbols, 
and immigration policy (Koopmans and Statham, 1999).  This is with application to the 
European Union in particular as a starting point. 
 The EU can best be described as an area with plural nationalities.  How does one 
construct citizenship? Weiner (1997) writes citizenship is a dynamic, not simply a status 
based on rights.  The dynamic should have as its most definitive norm a sense of 
belonging.  Is the belonging based on legal linkage or jus solis or jus sanguinis?  Is 
identity based on residence, the workplace, culture (Weiner, 1997)?  The EU sought to 
answer these questions with the Maastricht Treaty of February 7, 1992.     The idea was a 
community that would transcend the nation state.  The treaty includes a set of rights for 
students and workers.  Individuals belong in terms of social labor but not political rights.  
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Large numbers of people do not live in their native state.  They do not seek naturalization 
and, therefore, are without political rights.  Why?  According to Hammar (1985), people 
fear loss of rights in country of origin, seek a return to their homeland, and are bound by 
homeland ties, or realize few gains. 
 Having members of the EU who are not willing to become naturalized citizens 
seems an affirmation of the sovereign nation state or a multicultural nation state where 
citizens enjoy a national citizenship and a form of belonging.  For the multicultural nation 
three models are of interest.   
Will Kymlicka, advocate for a communitarian citizenship, suggests a mosaic, or 
model of shared values.  These values include equality and fairness, consultation and 
dialogue, accommodation and tolerance, diversity, compassion, support for the 
environment, commitment to peace and freedom (Kymlicka in Shafir, 1998).  Kymlicka 
asserts this in light of the fact that migrants with strong ties to the homeland are not 
assimilating into the traditional state (Kymlicka in Koopsman and Statham, 1999).   A 
shared conception of justice is significant as well (Rawls, 1998).   
The shared conception of justice is not only formidable, it serves as foundational 
for other values to fall into place.  Where multinational groups share a historical 
resentment, a common conception of justice is important.  This nurtures their national 
identity.  It doesn‟t simply subordinate identity.  A shared concept of justice can be 
difficult to determine.  Justice is based on universal truths.  How does one define a 
universal truth in this regard?  It is very difficult to ascertain.  Ayelet Schachar‟s article 
on cultural vulnerability is a case in point.  Schachar (2000) asserts that when various 
cultural groups attain citizenship their own cultural communities or identity groups are 
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put at risk because while the law allows individuals to participate as citizens within the 
state, different communities continue to be governed by their own institutions and 
traditions.  Groups are exempt from certain laws or allowed some degree of autonomy 
over the identity group participants.   Schachar (2000) notes specific group members 
(Muslim, Christian) who may be subject to mistreatment or abuse by those who try to 
enforce a hierarchical element of culture.  In particular, she cites the plight of Muslim and 
Christian women who seek divorce in Israel.  These religious courts have a broader scope 
of jurisdiction over personal affairs than Jewish courts.  Women are left no choice but to 
accommodate these religious courts.  The Israeli government recognizes the right of each 
religious community to mark its membership boundaries by its own family law codes and 
lineage rules.  No state mandate can challenge these laws.  So, whether or not the state 
grants divorce, the religious law prevails.   
Contrary to communitarian models of citizenship, Michael Walzer (1995) asserts 
closed borders.  Closed borders are necessary and legitimate to defend the shared 
meanings, values, and civic culture of nation states.  In this way, a collective political 
identity and attachment precipitates a cohesion and solidarity (Walzer in Bader, 1995).  
This asserts an ethnocentric political model that is not popular.  Ethnicity and citizenship 
can, however, separate and be replaced with a democratic community of consent.  
Identity is found not in ethnicity but in democratic procedures, talk, and decision-making 
(Habermas in Bader, 1995).  There is no former bond or affiliation to a state integrated by 
descent, shared tradition and common language.  This is not workable.  Elements of 
cohesion are not strong enough without a shared tradition.   
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Iris Marion Young (1998) suggests a universal citizenship realizing the common 
ground of groups and not the differences.   She asserts this is the best way to realize 
inclusion and participation of everyone for full citizenship.  Diverse groups exercise 
citizenship through what Iris Marion Young (1998) calls “differentiated citizenship.”  In 
this concept, groups draw rights or exemptions from law as they apply to their own 
culture.  Young advances this approach to citizenship as a response to oppression, i.e., 
exploitation, powerlessness, random violence, and harassment.  This is important, 
according to Young, for union, community, and common purpose.  Young also proposes 
a citizenship that asserts the right to remain different and express disagreement. 
Differences are “publicly recognized and acknowledged as irreducible” (Young, 1998).  
Everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves openly and differently.  A 
commonness of society is cautioned.  Young implies difference might work more 
efficiently (Young, 1998).  There is a commitment to tolerance, responsibility, 
accountability and public participation in public life.   
 The nation state has faced numerous challenges since the 17
th
 century.  Efforts by 
Marx (1994) attempted to deal with the religious question and citizenship was better 
described as Marx‟s critique on liberal democratic citizenship and capitalism.  This 
model does not enhance equality but rather squelches equal opportunity.  T.H. Marshall 
(1992) brought a social citizenship to light with rights provided to an underprivileged 
class particularly the right of education.   Education is the key to opportunity and 
equality.  Concerns about an expanding welfare state and bureaucracy are credible, 
particularly with regards to cost.   The national identity or consciousness that Marshall 
asserts as a result of social citizenship is not with a vision towards migration. 
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By the middle of the 20
th
 century, the liberal nation state founded on 
enlightenment theory was fraught not with cultural unity but cultural diversity given 
globalization and multiculturalism and immigration.  Policy asserted by the UN for 
universal rights is well intended but it lacks enforcement.  The EU has not seen the 
naturalization of its citizens due to cultural ties to the homeland.  How is identity 
established?  How can individuals naturalize and ultimately vote?  Multiculturalism 
scholars such as Hammar (1985), Young (1998), Weiner (1997), and Kymlicka (1998), 
have attempted models of community and differentiated citizenship.  Rawls‟s (1998) 
concept of justice is credible, but the challenge of a universal truth is hard to overcome.  
Shachar‟s (2000) illuminating multicultural vulnerability signals a violation of individual 
rights when religious affiliations challenge what could be understood as universal truth or 
law.  Anti communitarians such as Walzer (1998) assert the notion of closed borders and 
Habermas (1995) suggests a nation of citizens established in democratic procedure, not in 
ethnicity.  However each of these attempts suggests a new and responsible innovative 
direction for the nation state, practical membership that creates a new civic culture is still 
seeking direction.  There is, as of the present, no answer.  This suggests in the long term, 
the vitality of a given sovereignty of the nation state in spite of its challenges which is 
rather paradoxical.  Individuals migrate to and from their geographic area but do not 
change their citizenship with the same zeal. 
Sovereign nations and cultural diversity both prevail through education, dialogue, 
and friendship.  Social cohesion and individual rights are secured through dialogue and 
friendship.  If individuals take efforts toward fruitful dialogue and openness, 
understanding, and awareness, the clashes regarding language rights, representation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
88 
immigration policy, symbols, autonomy, and a shared concept of justice are overcome.  
Individuals experience a democratic community of consent and a bond amongst 
themselves.  Individuals have opportunity to openly express themselves reciprocally.  A 
commitment to tolerance, responsibility, and public participation in political life that 
Young purports is achieved dialogically.  A curriculum rich in character and a concept of 
social justice appropriates itself to resolve challenges.  Laws and amendments are helpful 
in the short term, but dialogue and friendship is the key to understanding and creating 
community and citizenship.  Until individuals find a common understanding amongst 
themselves through dialogue and friendship, the sovereign nation state will continue to 
face challenge. 
 
Part IV 
The History of Citizenship in  
The United States 
 
           Liberal democratic principles have been at odds with other models of civic 
belonging and citizenship.  The history of citizenship in the United States demonstrates 
that the universalistic claims of liberalism and democracy have been at odds with the 
exclusionary, boundary-staking functions of citizenship laws and policies that have 
periodically prevailed in US history.  Liberal principles of national civic belonging are 
increasingly criticized by formerly excluded sub-groups themselves, which seemingly 
want to reinstate a status-based notion of belonging.  How does the historical evolution of 
citizen practice conflict with classical liberalism and democracy? 
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              Historically, United States citizenship in practice does not align with liberal 
democratic citizenship principles advanced by Enlightenment thinkers.  This suggests 
that liberal democratic citizenship does not apply in reality, but rather serves as a 
backdrop for rights and obligations of citizenship.  Not only have claims been at odds 
with the exclusionary boundary-staking functions of citizenship laws and policies, the 
very groups that have been excluded seek a status based notion of belonging.  In 
particular, women, racial minorities, and religious groups seek status in a supposedly 
liberally based non status notion of citizenship.  The fact that sub groups seek a status 
notion of belonging suggests that the liberal model espoused by the founders does not 
apply in fact.  The liberal democratic citizenship model is the theoretical framework and 
not the practical framework for US citizenship.  The ideals of the liberal democratic 
citizenship model, however, are evidence of the goal of US citizenship in a changing 
society.     
          According to Kerber (1997), a citizen is one who rules and is ruled in turn by 
consent.  Rights, and obligations apply in egalitarian terms and citizens pledge allegiance.  
All individuals regardless of race, gender, and ethnicity are eligible.  Kerber (1997) 
suggests a braided citizenship, different groups who in their own way contribute to an 
unstable citizenship.   These groups include women, African Americans, Native 
Americans, immigrants, non citizen nationals (those in territories that never became 
states, voluntary immigrants, some eligible (from Europe) and some ineligible from Asia 
for naturalization, refugees who never return to their homeland, and those refugees who 
seek asylum or have been uprooted by disruption.   Kerber (1997) weaves these groups in 
three ropes of race, gender, and class.  This does not include ethnicity, or religion which 
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will be discussed later in this section.  These groups that form a braided citizenship 
experience not inclusivity but exclusivity in citizenship practice.   
          The first group/case of exclusivity is with regards to women.  Historically, women 
have been destined to the domestic realm.  The husband controlled the physical body of 
the wife.  A system of coverture that asserted the woman‟s civil identify was determined 
or “covered” by her husband (Kerber, 1997).  She had no rights to her property and could 
not make contracts without the consent of her husband.  Throughout US history all 
married women‟s identities as citizens were determined by her husband (Kerber, 1997).  
This aside, rules of naturalization for women were different.  Mothers were different than 
fathers.  Until 1934, children whose fathers were not residents of the United States were 
treated differently than those whose fathers were residents. A legitimate child born 
abroad was a birthright citizen only if its‟ father was a born citizen who had resided in the 
US before the child‟s birth.   
          The Cable Act (1922) asserted independence for American women but 
independence was not evident in practice, particularly when it came to marriage.  
American women who married Asian men lost their citizenship permanently.  Cott 
(1998) writes in vivid detail of the case of Mary K. Das, an American woman who 
married a foreigner.  Ms. Das married an Indian whom she thought was naturalized.  Her 
husband was not considered of white heritage or lineage so his application was denied 
and, therefore, he was not naturalized.  Her citizenship, because of the Cable Act was 
stripped.  Thoughts of “racial homogeneity” (Cott, 1998, p. 1468) are evidenced by the 
idea that “the man has always had his right of citizenship.  The men have dominated the 
thing from the beginning” (Cott, 1998, p. 1468).  This affirms the notion of the man 
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having freedom to create and provide for his family.  A woman did not fill this role.  
Further, the fact that the Quota Act of 1921 was repealed so that a man could bring home 
a wife of any nationality so that he would have freedom to create and provide for a family 
of his choosing gives further affirmation of man‟s role in the liberal model as a provider.  
Nothing is offered with regards to women.  
          At its height in 1922 when the Cable Act was passed, the restriction of Chinese 
immigrants was fueled by anxiety on the part of white Americans that the “true” 
American was being overrun and outmanned, that American standards of life and work 
were undercut by “non-Protestant hordes” from the Mediterranean, Eastern European, 
Russian, and Asian parts (Cott, 1989, p. 617).  Particularly significant was the Asian 
American population.  American women but not American men were punished if they 
married an Asian.  “The ideal of Americanism should keep any American woman from 
marrying any foreigner, particularly an Asiatic” (Cott, 1989, p. 618).  Important in 
national thinking and in immigration policy was the ongoing principle that American 
males ought to be able to create and keep their chosen families.  Preference given to 
males triumphed over racialized nationalism.  To serve the goal of racial homogeneity, 
Congress discarded women out of the American polity for marrying Asian men but 
sought not to restrict the freedom of American men from selecting Asian wives (Cott, 
1989).  Congress not only restricted women‟s citizenship through residence limitations in 
foreign countries, but also refused any citizenship commitment to American women‟s 
foreign husbands (Cott, 1989). 
          Being a “citizen” did not imply women had the right to vote.  In spite of pleas by 
Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton at Seneca Falls, New York, 1848 and 
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later, women do not acquire the right to vote until 1920 with the 19
th
 Amendment.  In 
1867, as the nation struggled to reassert the union during Reconstruction, efforts abound 
with regards to the male franchise.  Opposition to equal female citizenship remained 
widespread.  In spite of the wording of the 14
th
 Amendment, denials of votes to men and 
not to women were penalized.  The 14
th
 Amendment assured the vote to white men and 
Negro men, but not to the Native American nor to women.  In the words of Frederick 
Douglass and Wendell Phillips, it seemed the “Negro‟s Hour” and not the “Women‟s 
Hour” (Smith, 1987).  Constitutional Conventions were held, one particularly in New 
York, to endorse suffrage for blacks but not for women. 
          The 15
th
 amendment was frustrating for women as well.  The amendment 
prohibited the federal government from abridging citizens‟ voting rights on account of 
“race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (Smith, 1987, p. 314).  The amendment 
did not confer any right to vote for women and although it banned racial requirements, it 
did not prohibit the states to enact other restrictions including property qualifications and 
exclusions from office.  It is perplexing to note the inference that while the federal 
government asserts voting rights, the state still had the right to encroach upon voting 
rights as it regarded women and others (Smith, 1987).  The notion of states‟ rights is 
significant given early US History evidenced by the Articles of Confederation (1777-
1781).  States vehemently sought to retain their autonomy in light of the pressing 
challenges facing the new nation after independence.  Also significant was the perceived 
threat to liberty the national government imposed on the states but it seems the states‟ 
rights to encroach upon individual rights already given by the 14
th
 Amendment is a threat 
to liberty as well. 
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         As Cott (1998) writes, marriage and citizenship are not unrelated in U.S. history.  
Marriage found a women‟s identity.  While marriage asserted independence for men 
because he was head of household and needed to provide for his family it made women 
dependent.  Her marriage removed from her the right to her property and income or her 
free will (Cott, 1998).  This dependence, noted earlier, is coverture (Kerber, 1997).  It 
seems though that the legal norm of women‟s dependence was not the case in terms of 
her actual citizenship.  Coverture did not affect her national citizenship.  Yet the states 
could dictate the extent of women‟s dependence or coverture given marriage. 
           A women‟s marriage signaled not only her “dependence” it also signaled her civil 
rights, especially if she married a foreigner.  The fact was that a women‟s marriage 
affected her civil rights.  An American woman who married a foreigner lost her 
citizenship.  Women who married overseas couldn‟t pass their citizenship on to their 
children (Cott, 1998).  Clearly, American men had an advantage here.  This is clear 
example of exclusivity in citizenship rights as it relates to gender.  The fact that some like 
John Stuart Mill (Mill in Cott, 1998) gives refuge to this exclusivity because women 
“consent” to the marriage “contract” does not assuage the condition of exclusivity.  The 
marriage implications placed women in a state of servitude.  Republican Motherhood, the 
women‟s role to teach to children the virtue and worth of the republican government of 
the United States in the days of the Early Republic, and notions of women as a moral 
equal even though they are destined to the domestic sphere does not negate the notion 
that women indeed were disadvantaged if they married.   
           Women‟s exclusivity notwithstanding, the implications for racial exclusion are 
just as disturbing.  The history that tells the story of racial discrimination towards blacks 
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is well known as evidenced by the three Reconstruction Amendments.  (The amendments 
are 13
th
 Amendment that prohibited slavery, 14
th
 Amendment which established 
citizenship rights or due process of law and 15
th
 Amendment or the right to vote.  These 
were passed during the Reconstruction period 1865-1870 following the Civil War.)  
Blacks were considered “hopelessly inferior” (Smith, 1987, p. 293).  The civic 
implications notwithstanding, the biological implications were insultingly tragic.    
Women were subjected to biological implications of inferiority but in the realm of 
discrimination, blacks were more seriously affected.  Inferiority was described as smaller 
brain size when “cranial sutures closed off and cut off brain growth” during puberty 
“unlike white men” (Smith, 1987, p. 294). 
           The issue for citizenship rights for blacks evolves around what W.E.B. Du Bois 
and Eric Foner suggest that blacks and other racial minorities could not contribute to the 
economic growth of the nation through capitalism or free labor.  Laissez faire ideology 
anchored the American system.  Failed efforts of the Freedman‟s Bureau reasserted that 
blacks would not have the economic independence needed for America to survive under 
the liberal model (Smith, 1987).   
           Economic independence is significant under the liberal model.  It stems from John 
Locke (1952) and the notion of valid property rights, rights acquired from rational, 
productive labor.  All human beings are born equal by “virtue of their self ownership”, 
their capacity for productive labor (McDonagh, 2002, p. 548).   If this be the case, it is 
not surprising that the national government allowed states to restrict minority rights 
through measures such as Black Codes and Immigration Quotas.  Readings that reveal 
citizenship rests upon a civic contract through individual rights to property and consent 
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that was violated with ideas of redistribution of land (40 acres and a mule rescinded by 
Andrew Johnson) or the lack of economic independence gives literal understanding to 
measures of exclusivity in the United States.   The reality is a bold commentary (Smith, 
1987).   
           Blacks were not the only minority who experienced exclusivity when it came to 
individual rights.   Indigenous peoples were victims of imperialism and globalization.  
These peoples who inhabited a region or country at the time of colonization or conquest 
suffered at the hands of their conquerors through deculturalization.  Populations were 
forced to give up their cultural identity and assimilate with a leading colonial or imperial 
power.  Civic contracts extended to populations under the 14
th
 and 15
th
 Amendments 
exempted Native Americans as well as Blacks.  
          Native Americans were classified as “domestic foreigners” (Spring, 2010, p. 22).  
The granting of citizenship to all Native Americans did not occur until 1924 when 
Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act.  The United States confiscated their lands 
and forced the adoption of western culture through education.  Thomas McKinney, the 
first head of the Office of Indian Affairs targeted the Five Civilized Tribes for 
deculturalization.  In the 1820‟s, a decade before the common school movement, 
McKinney purported tribal school systems operated by white missionary teachers would 
transform Native Americans in 20 years.  McKinney‟s intentions were without notions of 
Indian resentment and resistance which was not uncommon given the time (Spring, 
2010). 
          Protestant missionaries took the charge of the education process.  A seeming 
violation of the first Amendment, most Americans felt public education and 
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Protestantism was an appropriate partnership.  Protestant missionaries had more influence 
on the leadership of Native American tribes then other missionary educators.  
Presbyterians believed that conversion of the tribal leadership would result in Christianity 
and civilization trickling down to other tribal members.  At issue, was the importance of 
changing the traditional customs of Native Americans while teaching reading (Spring, 
2010). 
          It was hoped that Native American children would transfer their allegiance from 
tribal governments to the federal government and instill a sense of community with the 
white population.  Therefore, at the outset, the “Stars and Stripes” should be a familiar 
object at every school.  Also, principles of US Government and American History were 
included but not the history of Native Americans.  Patriotic songs and public recitation 
was included (Spring, 2010). 
          Missionaries developed written Native American languages not to preserve 
tradition but to translate religious tracts to teach western culture.  It was also vital that 
Native Americans learn English.  Replacing the use of native languages with English, 
destroying Native customs, and teaching allegiance to the US Government, children were 
often isolated from their families, their language and tribal customs.  Boarding schools 
such as the Carlisle Indian School in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, founded in 1879 focused on 
a work ethic for all Native American children and inculcated values of economic 
individualism rather than socialism (Spring, 2010). 
          In 1889, a new education for Indian tribes included tribal control of the Indian and 
seclusion from tribal influences.  In order to “save him, we must take him up into our 
civilization” (Spring, 2010, p. 35).   The Native American was essentially deculturalized.  
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By 1905, twenty-five non reservation boarding schools were opened throughout the 
country.  “Non reservation” is significant.  The philosophy was that children be removed 
from their families and traditional roots.  Educational policies were effective towards 
acculturalization, yet eventually Native Americans demanded restoration of tribal 
cultures and language (Spring, 2010). 
           It is interesting in the scheme of history that the liberal democratic model of 
citizenship has been in tension with individual rights of citizenship as it pertains to race, 
gender, and ethnicity.  In light of a national civic belonging rooted in liberal democratic 
citizenship, today formerly excluded sub groups seek status based notions of belonging 
particularly, as it regards religion.    
           What is citizenship status in terms of religious believers?  To recall the Roman 
model, Augustine implied no earthly government can truly be just.  Therefore, dual 
citizenship evolved.  This dual citizenship was eventually fodder for individual rights as 
part of the liberal democratic model (Clark, 1994).  Religion has become a contentious 
issue with regards to citizenship rights.  It is best described as a conflict of loyalties and 
obligations that McConnell calls “citizenship ambiguity” from Rousseau‟s Social 
Contract (McConnell, 2000, p. 92, Rousseau, 1964).  Religious freedom of expression is 
guaranteed given the First Amendment.  No issue taken here, but when the religious 
expression interferes with the rights of individuals protected under the constitution than 
the rights of the individual supersede religion as doctrine but not virtues and morality 
inherent in religious doctrine.  The individual is protected by the constitution but can lead 
a moral and virtuous life privately as suggested by his religion. 
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          In this regard, Madison‟s “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments” is valuable to religious expression (Madison in McConnell, 2000, p. 92).  
Madison supported religion as an inalienable right.  The duty to a “Governor of the 
Universe” is reasonable.  Yet this is an inherent moral duty.  Religion can “prop” 
democracy because of the “humanitarian ideals” asserted in each denomination.   
 
…And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be 
maintained without religion.  Whatever may be conceded to the influence 
of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience 
both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of 
religious principle  (Washington, 1796, p. 41). 
 
 
However, religious ideals have no place in civil law in a democracy.  One‟s clothing, 
practice and prayer is private, but when the private practice becomes a reason or dictate 
of civil law than the two become separate and the civil or secular law takes precedence.  
Religion can be lived but secularism must prevail in law.  Religious morals can prompt 
deliberation in a republican democracy.  Tocqueville (2000) wrote “Despotism can do 
without Faith but Freedom cannot” (McConnell, p. 98).  One of the privileges of a liberal 
citizenship is that there is no allegiance to any particular religion or religious good.  
Rather, there is a wide array of beliefs and practices (Kahane, 1996).   Status based 
notions of belonging should be granted provided they do not interfere with civil law.  The 
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private and the public are separate.  Religious affiliations are separate.  This is a blessing 
of liberty and individual rights.          
         Republics require a virtuous citizenry.  It supposes some “obligation to mankind 
formed in common with the rest of mankind” (Tocqueville (2000) in McConnell, 2000, p. 
98).  Clearly, these morals are connected to early citizenship ideals.  A tolerance for other 
religious ideals is significant as well.  However, it is also important that these ideals do 
not put civil society at risk of life and limb.  Religious and political neutrality is 
appropriate.  An individual can be moral because of secular motivation.  An individual 
can exercise virtuous conduct that can be colored by religious motivation but, hopefully, 
the secular rationale is powerful enough to not press religious views about the issue.  
Religious convictions are private (Audi, 1989). 
            What then is the meaning of American citizenship?  Ennis (1943) asserts the 
American citizenship derives its power from the greatness of the US and the US in turn 
derives its power in part from the protection of rights of citizenship.  This citizenship 
ideal is with reference to service.  Ennis (1943) asserts naturalization is closely tied to 
service.  There is a “reciprocal gift” implied in the naturalization process and this is 
service to country (Ennis, 1943, p. 6).  The United States opens the naturalization process 
to soldiers because of their service and allegiance to nation.  This gives evidence of the 
duty or obligation implied in liberal democratic citizenship.  Yet, the acknowledgement 
of duty or obligation is absent amongst many individuals.  This is one of the greatest 
challenges of US citizenship.  How can citizenship and civic duty be developed? 
           The US population is made up of diverse backgrounds from other lands.  As 
Wilson asserted in 1916, our country does not depend upon the “multiplication of their 
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own native people”.  Ours depends on those from other lands.  Naturalization should be 
without restriction and all capable should serve.   There are four other obligations for 
citizens significant for citizenship.  They are to be loyal and refrain from treason, to be 
industrious and avoid vagrancy, to pay taxes, and to serve on juries (Kerber, 1998 in 
Perry, p. 646).   
          Status based notions of belonging should be granted provided they do not interfere 
with civil law.  The private and the public are separate.  This is a blessing of liberty and 
individual rights  (Hill, 1924).     
           All human beings have an equal capacity for culture and cultural adaptation 
(Taylor in Barry, 2001).  The notion that cultures and groups are so rigidly locked 
together that they can‟t adapt to other norms is anachronistic and unreasonable.   
Adaptation to common norms can be achieved through education, dialogue, and 
friendship.    Through a virtuous citizenry, a moral citizenry, one that is essential for a 
deliberative republican democracy, there needs to be some common level of 
understanding of good connected to life (Kahane, 1996, Sandel, 1996).  This is the central 
challenge for education and for our democracy.   
           The goal of civic education ideally advances the liberal democratic tradition for its 
students.  There is tension between democratic values and liberal values.  At a glance, 
one doesn‟t recognize this tension.  It would seem the values are the same, but they are 
not.  While democratic values assume a common rights and a general welfare, liberal 
values assume individual rights and welfare.  Democracy without rights implies 
totalitarianism; liberalism without democracy can foster self interest and no active 
participation.  Rather, this is a passive or non participatory citizenship.  Educators aim to 
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promote an active citizenship based upon common good and individual rights and liberal 
values.    Sandel (n.d.) writes, “a liberal conception of freedom…exerts a kind of 
soulcraft”, a way of life (p. 140).  Soulcraft assures the level of understanding that Sandel 
suggests is connected to everyday life.  Indeed, students might be better served if teachers 
assert a “soulcraft by default” (Sandel, n.d. p. 144).  “Soulcraft” is missing in education 
for our students today.   It can be fostered through dialogue and friendship, and the 
inherent skills to engender trust, honesty, and integrity.    These are important to 
liberalism and to democracy.  Given the challenges in our society, it serves community 
and society to imbue these values in education.  “Citizenship in its highest form involves 
something distinct from alert and faithful attention to the immediacies of political events 
and options” (Porter and Vanning, 1984, p. 217).   Civic education suggests virtue and 
regard for others.  It creates character.  These values will help students in schools and 
ultimately participants in society resolve conflict.  As Wesley (1939) writes, the students 
with character in school will eventually come into control of “banks, utility companies, 
and community activities, municipal, state, and national.” (Wesley, 1939, p. 77).  Civic 
education, therefore, teaches citizenship values and not about politics (Porter and 
Vanning, 1984).  Education encourages active citizenship and not passive citizenship.   
Teaching values resonates Aristotle‟s model for citizenship (Aristotle, 1984).    Aristotle 
was concerned about the good of the city and that man be virtuous enough to assert this 
good.   Individuals who engage in dialogue and friendship work towards this end.  This is 
an ultimate guide for responsible citizenship behavior.   
           Ours is a citizenship in progress.  With a changing society that includes different 
lifestyles and increased diversity, a bond or tie keeps us together.  It is a tribute to all 
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peoples to appreciate the diversity that abounds but it is critical that we “rediscover what 
values can bind together „our‟ kaleidoscopic culture” (Higham ,1975 in Smith, 1987, p. 
247).  The foundation of a liberal democratic model will help to rediscover these values. 
            In spite of efforts toward an inclusive liberal democratic citizenship, history 
demonstrates an exclusive US citizenship.    Samuel Huntington asserts that the American 
Creed of liberal democracy defined civic identity (Huntington in Smith, 1987).  It did not 
play out that way as Smith asserts.  However, if policy makers on national, local and state 
levels assert dialogue and friendship learned in education, virtue and community and not 
difference will assure that the backdrop of the goals in liberal democratic ideals may in 
actuality define civic identify.         
 
Part V 
Challenges and Vision  
For Oppressed Regimes 
 
 The backdrop of classical liberal democracy stands as a vision for democratic 
citizenship for existing democracies and oppressed regimes.  While circumstances 
challenge this model, the goal of individual active citizenship for everyone looms largely.  
Important is dialogue and friendship.  The state has some responsibility to create 
conditions which would permit friendship and dialogue to encourage its citizens to 
discuss and participate.  Without dialogue and friendship, the liberal democratic model 
will continue to struggle in those circumstances where oppression and exclusion prevail.  
The quest for liberal democratic citizenship, dialogue and friendship is finding success, 
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however, in areas of the world where dictatorial rule and repression of its people defined 
the leadership. 
 The Middle East has experienced turmoil since December 2010 in when police in 
Tunisia confiscated young Mohamed Bouazizi‟s fruit and vegetable cart.  They charged 
he operated the cart without a permit.  Incensed by the action, Bouazizi stood in front of 
the local governor‟s office, lit a match, and set himself ablaze (Christian Science 
Monitor, 12/17/10).   Bouazizi‟s self immolation ignited protest in Tunisia.  That this 
action in tiny Tunisia could catapult the Middle East in mass protest and demand the 
resignation of the area‟s established dictators leaves spectators in awe of the liberal 
democratic model and the profound worth of dialogue and friendship amongst existent 
liberal democratic citizens and reformers.    
The horrific act of Bouazizi‟s self immolation signaled a wave of protests 
amongst individuals from all quarters of life, social, economic, political, and 
demographic.  Aspiring youths amidst a sea of declining economic opportunity defined 
by political repression and a corrupt ruling family led the movement towards reform.  
“Our social compact failed”, said Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, Economics Professor at the 
University of Tunisia.  “Tunisians sacrificed freedom of expression, association, and 
political participation for prosperity and stability” (NY Times, 12/17/10).   
 Broadcast of protests and alleged massacres were posted on the social median, 
Facebook, where thousands of individuals from around the world cast their support for 
the plight of Tunisians.  Within weeks, the ruling family Ben Ali resigned from power.   
Presently, after 23 years of autocratic rule, Tunisians struggle to establish a democratic 
society.   
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 The tiny country of Tunisia, established in 1956, with a population of 10.6 million 
people, spurred protest throughout North Africa, The Arabian Gulf States (Yemen and 
Bahrain), and Iran.  Protestors share a common theme.  Individuals create dialogue 
amongst themselves.  Through dialogue, they seek liberty.  Individuals seek a voice, a 
reciprocal voice, a dialogue between themselves and with the government whereby 
reforms through democratic government yield freedom of opportunity in the economic, 
social, and political realm.  This is evidence of the significance of dialogue.  It is further 
evidence of the tragic commentary where the lack of dialogue allowed repressive regimes 
to maintain power for decades.  
 Since Ben Ali‟s resignation in Tunisia, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has 
resigned after more than thirty years of dictatorship.  A grass roots movement not an 
extreme group organized the three week protest.  This was not a movement towards 
extremism.  It was a movement for democratic reforms.   People seek basic freedoms, not 
extremism (NY Times, 2/22/11).  After Mubarak‟s resignation on February 11, 2011, 
mechanical engineer Mohamed Aidarus said, “It‟s like a dream…whatever happens, 
we‟ve shown that we can make our voice heard and that no government can do whatever 
they want to us again” (Christian Science Monitor, 2/11/11).    In Bahrain, the ruling 
constitutional monarchy that controls the executive and legislative branches of 
government faces challenge and conflict amongst its people.  A country of 800,000 
people demands a voice in government (Christian Science Monitor, 2/18/11).  Sudan‟s 
President Omar Hassan Al Bashir faces charges of international genocide and repression 
amongst his people.  He has since announced he will not run for re election (NY Times, 
2/21/11).    Muammar Qaddafi, in power since 1969, struggled to hold power amidst 
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protest in Tripoli and beyond (Christian Science Monitor, 2/18/11, NY Times, 3/6/11).   
The dictator was killed on October 20, 2011 after eight months of fighting between 
loyalists and rebels who now run the country (NY Times, 10/23/11). The Green 
Movement, an Iranian based reform movement started in 2009, was quashed after claims 
the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was rigged.  The government jailed, tortured, 
conducted mass trials, and publicly shot demonstrators.  Since the current of reform in 
early 2011 swept through North Africa and the Arabian States, the Green Movement 
resurrected itself (NY Times, 2/17/11). 
Classical liberal democracy has met challenge and conflict since its theoretical 
foundation during the 17
th
 century.    The vision of individual rights through dialogue, 
however, meets head on challenge and conflict and creates a means for classical liberal 
democracy to prevail.  The contemporary conflicts of the early 21
st
 century resonate the 
dream of classical liberal democratic citizenship.  It also assures the worth of dialogue.  
Without dialogue, the reciprocal relationship between individuals and eventually between 
individuals and their community and government will not prevail. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
         The history of citizenship exposes tension between active and passive citizenship, 
the spirit of individualism, challenges to the modern civic model of the liberal civic state, 
and claims of liberalism and democracy in theory that are not the reality.  Significant to 
this challenge is the ongoing vision of liberal democratic theory where individual rights 
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are experienced through natural law and protected by the government.  A reciprocal 
relationship exists between the individual and the government.   
        For this relationship to exist fruitfully, a discourse of friendship established with 
dialogue exists.  In this regard, individuals experience self reliance and engage in a 
reciprocal relationship with others.  The relationship resonates the richness of Plato‟s and 
Aristotle‟s call for virtue.  Rather than for only a few, however, the discourse of 
friendship through dialogue assures the equality of opportunity and resource in liberal 
democratic theory.  The discourse is found in the writings of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. 
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Chapter 3 
Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson 
In Context 
 
The works of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson are responses to challenge and 
change in society.  Epicurus wanted to alleviate man‟s turmoil in the wake of war.  
Emerson urged man to find his place in society given the demands of industrialization in 
the early American republic.  Each man is credited with contributions to friendship based 
upon inner content and self reliance.  
Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) was founder of a movement that lasted seven hundred 
years throughout the Mediterranean region.  He was a reactionary and a reformer.  He 
sought to bring happiness back to a war torn Greece fraught with civil strife.  The cultural 
context of this movement was the Athenian debate on the ideal state and the martyrdom 
of Socrates.  Epicurus wanted to spread personal contact by example and persuasion.  He 
wanted to spread friendship, the essence of man.  As a movement, Epicureanism attracted 
intellectuals and the general populace (Farrington, 1967).  Because of war, many people 
had struggles and challenges that were assuaged by Epicureanism (DeWitt, 1954).   
Epicurus sought pleasure as the end of life, but not pleasure in the sense of 
overindulgences such as eating, drinking, and making love.  For him, it was a large, more 
profound pleasure.  It was simple, sober reasoning. 
 
When I maintain that pleasure is the end, I do not mean the pleasures of 
profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some 
                                                                                                                                                 
108 
people who are either ignorant, or disagree with me, or do not understand; 
I mean freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.  It is 
not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor 
the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which 
produce a pleasant life; no, it is sober reasoning, searching out the motives 
for all choice and all avoidance, and banishing mere prejudices, to which 
the greatest disturbances of the spirit are due (Freeman, 1938, p. 158). 
 
Epicurus sought happiness for man.  He rejected the notion of destiny or 
determinism.  “Necessity is an evil; but there is no necessity to live under the control of 
necessity” (Freeman, 1938, p. 160).  He sought man‟s freedom of will.  Men could come 
together by chance and find happiness.  Happiness was determined through friendliness 
or affection.  The relationship was possible, however, only in a small, closed community.  
The community, for Epicurus, allowed man to live a quiet, retired life away from the 
conspicuousness of power and fame in the cities and towns.   The quiet, secluded 
community that described the Garden allowed man to take careful inventory of himself 
and that around him.  He took account of that which endangered his peace and sought to 
make the situation less hostile.  The most efficient way to ensure that this could continue 
outside of the secluded community of the Garden was to live in a community where help 
and support was always available (Freeman, 1938).  A community of this nature was 
devoid of leisure, praise, and self righteousness.  The community was characterized by 
isolation and security.  Yet, this is not in the actual sense of isolation and security in the 
literal sense.  Rather, this condition allows the human “free play” (Freeman, 1938, p. 
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163).  It allows the individual to experience “self development” and “self-realization” or 
the “complete life” and sustain this realization as definitive of his character in the larger 
community (Freeman, 1938, p. 163).   To sustain the happy life, man is mindful of choice 
and avoidance.  Pleasure should not be taken for pleasure‟s sake.   Man is mindful of the 
advantages and disadvantages of judgments.  Life‟s journey is filled with virtuous 
pursuits.  Virtuous pursuits have no aftermath of pain.   Wisdom and virtue guide one‟s 
existence.  One‟s health of body and peacefulness of mind lie in the reciprocal self 
realization of the self and the other.  Interactions are virtuous and sincere.  The sharing of 
friendship was sharing in the awareness of the goodness of the other (Farrington, 1967).  
Man lives well, free of the “subtle antagonisms” that Emerson describes in a superficial 
relationship that is not friendship.   
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), like Epicurus, was a reactionary and a 
reformer.  He was the leading voice of Transcendentalism, a movement that stressed 
happiness and a complete life was sensory and empirical.  Historically, transcendentalism 
came about during a shift in thought and sensitivity in American life.  The Calvinism of 
the Puritan Era was replaced by less fearful, more humanized religious practices.  The 
role of intuition played a large part in the re-evaluating classical literature of the 
Transcendentalist movement.  A newness of thought in the air was evident.  Most 
transcendentalists were ministers, as was Emerson.  The idea of a “mental calm in the 
clergy…where difficulties were ignored, doubts were a waste of thought, nothing exacted 
solution” (Emerson, Letters, in Myerson, 2000, pp. 412-413).  Transcendentalists sought 
dialogue amongst individuals after established tenets of religion were sealed with no 
opportunity for further discussion.    Religion was democratized.  Individual 
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interpretation of religious texts through one‟s intuition was encouraged.  
Transcendentalists prized individuality.  They did not dictate what was acceptable or 
proper (Myerson, 2000).   Transcendentalists emphasized education.  The goal was to 
create a new generation that was free of the restraints and conventions of older 
generations and present generations.  Reform movements centered on self improvement 
were necessary (Myerson, 2000).  Emerson‟s surroundings, the Concord community once 
fraught with revolutionary fervor from 1775 and beyond were filled with the same 
enthusiasm and challenge that Transcendentalists expressed.  In this atmosphere, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson began his journey for the self improvement of mankind (Gross, 1976).  
          Emerson reached maturity as industry and labor had begun to specialize.  The early 
Industrial Revolution was in progress.  The factory system had begun.  The transportation 
revolution was in full swing with the Erie Canal and the railroad, and immigration was on 
the rise.  The self sufficient agricultural village was beginning to fade into a bygone era 
(Buell, 2003).   
Emerson did not share the vision of growth and progress in the United States in 
the same way as its innovators.  Where industrialists saw wealth and prosperity, Emerson 
saw a fragmentation of social unity with divisiveness.  He saw a division of labor as a 
signal of oppression.  The loss of economic individuality or the self was troubling 
(Myerson, 2000).  Man was not able to fulfill himself emotionally (Buell, 2003).  “The 
age of severance of dissociation, of freedom, of analysis, of detachment…everyman for 
himself…there is universal resistance to ties and ligaments once supposed essential to 
civil society.  The new race are fanatics in freedom” (Emerson, Collected Works Van 
Cromphout, 1999, p. 92).  Emerson tried to reconcile this void.  His philosophy was 
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characterized by oneness, universality and morality.  He felt man and nature were one 
and the same.   Every individual‟s being is one with others.  It is immortal and universal.  
The individual embraced thought and energy in total.  An individual was reborn in this 
regard (Padover, 1959).     
Emerson saw evil and selfishness in the world.  Man must realize this evil and 
selfishness and lessen it or at least deal with it.  Evil and selfishness brought cynicism 
and materialism.  He sought to reform the nature of man and make him capable of 
brotherhood.  Emerson wanted to replace selfishness and materialism with love and 
sharing.  How could the finite and the ordinary relate to the infinite and the extraordinary, 
reconcile evil with good, pain with joy, death with birth?  The reality is dynamic, not 
fixed.  Man is always involved in death, and death is from another point of view, life.  
Death is not the end for man, but a new relationship.  A dialogue or the dialectic occurs 
(Sebouhian, 1989).   Emerson saw this as answer to death, despair, and stagnation.   
Emerson was a man with personal dignity, very delicate in nature, and with a 
demeanor that while pronounced and decided was modest (Muzzy in Myerson, 2003).  
His purpose, according to Elizabeth Peabody, active in the Transcendentalist Movement, 
was to minister the living spirit whom he sought alike in the material universe and in 
human history, in literature, and in ethics, in art, and, in his own heart and imagination.  
He felt it his duty to affirm for the individual all that his experience was proven true.  He 
had faith that all growing experience would contain the solution of all questions, the sum 
of all hopes, the satisfaction of all unselfish desires.  Emerson was not arrogant, but 
humble (Peabody in Myerson, 2000).     
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His daughter, Ellen Tucker Emerson noted lecturing was his passion and his 
business.  He sought to benefit and teach his country and make a living (Tucker in 
Sanborn, 1885).  Early on, he possessed a love of country and the hope of the new 
tomorrow.  No remnants of yesterday‟s ills or mistakes would be carried throughout 
today.  “We may have failed yesterday, but we would never think of it again and start 
right today.” (Tucker in Sanborn, 1885, p. 171).    Emerson had a vision of hope for the 
individual with each new day and everyday thereafter.  He stressed the significance of 
sensed and observed experiences (Padover, 1959).  Many challenges faced man.  
Emerson sought to reconcile man in the present with man in the past.  He sought to 
promote reason so that man could find a place for himself in the new and tumultuous 
world of the early Industrial Age.  
Both men, Epicurus and Emerson sought a content, happy, contemplative 
individual in the face of strife and questions of belonging.   Dialectical determinism was 
absent.  The individual was urged to find comfort and self reliance in a new and evolving 
society.  The most fortuitous opportunity for this was friendship. 
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Chapter 4 
Epicurus and Friendship 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Friendship 
 
This chapter explores the works of Epicurus and Friendship and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson‟s works on Self Reliance and Friendship.  Each of these works reveals the 
critical self awareness and reciprocity in a relationship necessary for friendship, 
community, and the good ends of government to evolve.  Individual experience freedom, 
liberty, humanitarianism, and understanding amongst people.       
 Epicurus sought a happy and contented man.  He defined the happy man as one 
who had a healthy mind and a healthy body (DeWitt, 1954).  Epicurus did not see a 
distinction between political and social contexts.  He felt man should have the same 
happiness in both realms.  He disagreed with Plato that virtue or that which contributed to 
happiness (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice) was defined within a political context.  
He also disagreed with Aristotle that happiness as it contributed to the best life in politics 
was in the social context.  Epicurus believed the political and the social were one in the 
same.  These views evolved because of civil strife in Greece.   Free Greek cities fell to 
Macedonian rule in 400 B.C. (Farrington, 1967).     Epicurus was angry that man was 
oppressed and stripped of his freedom.   Because of this, he favored minimal government 
and looked upon men as free individuals in society that transcended political boundaries 
(DeWitt, 1954).   
 Not only did Epicurus favor minimal government, he did not advocate public 
service.   His goal was not to produce a good citizen.   Like Socrates, Epicurus felt 
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politics was an unsafe business (Farrington, 1967).    Life in public service was 
competitive.  Competitive activities placed happiness at the mercy of others.  The 
avoidance of political careers would preserve liberty.  In Vatican Saying 67, Epicurus 
writes, “A life of freedom cannot acquire great wealth because of success in this being 
difficult apart from servitude to mobs or monarchs (i.e. democracies or royal courts).”  
Rather he begs man to “escape and make haste before some major emergency should 
arise and deprive him of the liberty of withdrawing (DeWitt, 1954, p. 186).  Visions of 
civil strife lingered for him.  Even though Epicurus did not favor government, he 
understood government was a necessity in society.  The most advantageous government 
for man was democracy (DeWitt, 1954). 
 In society, however, there were demands for virtue that allow men to be contented 
and happy.  For Plato, a happy contented man was a just man.  Aristotle believed the 
good man was a happy man.  Epicurus believed the road to happiness and contentment 
was through friendship.  Friendship was a way to create happiness.  It would recreate 
Greek life based upon current conditions.  Friendship would be spread in Epicurus‟s 
Garden.  
 In the Garden, the principle which bound the community was friendship or 
affection (philia).  There was a trust amongst people (Freeman, 1938).  The Garden was 
adjacent to Epicurus‟s house.  He resided with his friends in his home beside the Garden.  
The two were distinct but closely associated.  This was not unusual in the Greek city.  
Outside the Garden, man was thought a suspicious character (Wycherly, 1959).  He was 
perceived to be a threat to the sanctity of the Garden.  What men wanted, therefore, was 
protection from this threat.  To ensure their safety, they formed a compact amongst men.   
                                                                                                                                                 
115 
 Epicurus was a contractarian.  He sought a voluntary acceptance of a contract of 
friendship (Farrington, 1967).  Each individual was obligated to behave rightly for the 
good of himself and for each other.  This compact was not perceived as a service towards 
others, but rather as an individual proclamation or manifestation of their way to promote 
happiness (Freeman, 1938).   The social contract or compact was not a man made 
contract in the Hobbesian or Lockean sense.  Rather, it was a natural contract.  In 
Authorized Doctrine 31, Epicurus writes “the justice of nature is a covenant of advantage 
to the end that men shall not injure one another or be injured” (DeWitt, 1954, p. 295).  
Therefore, there is an obligation to cultivate good will and love toward mankind.  This is 
love of justice and love toward man.  
 Epicurus felt the Garden experiment could only be carried out in isolation.  
Individuals were able to express themselves openly.  Human faculties or thinking 
processes were allowed “free play” (Freeman, 1938, p. 163).  The goal was self 
realization.  Individuals found happiness within themselves.   Not until they found 
happiness within would they find happiness with others.  Epicurus called this the 
“complete life” (Freeman, 1938, p. 163). 
 The pursuit of this philosophy, friendship, was a matter of individuals living their 
lives together, not simply getting together for an ad hoc conversation or discussion.  The 
goal was to trust, to create an intimate sharing of life, a friendship (Wycherly, 1959).  
Friendship was in an ethical and political context.  Friendship would be cultivated and 
shared in the Garden and ultimately shared in the community outside of the Garden 
where it held them together. 
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 Friendship in the Garden and eventually in the community led to the happy life 
and harmonized with other ends in life.  The particular choices made in a friendship are 
attentive to ethically relevant circumstances of a person‟s life (Sherman, p. 592).  
Ethically relevant circumstances are dialectical.  Friendship allowed individuals to live 
not as isolated individuals but as an extended self, a person with attachments to others.  
The link or attachments led to happiness.  Relationships were dependent upon and 
interwoven with others.  To enjoy peace, a man should make as many friends as possible.  
Friendships are not left to chance but diligently cultivated and evolving through time.  If 
friendship prevails, it is without greed or antagonism (DeWitt, 1954).   
 Friendship is an immortal good.  Hostility amongst men is alleviated.  This is not 
to suggest that friendship is Darwinian or a means of self preservation.  Rather this 
suggests man is in a social state where there are open, civil, and honorable exchanges.    
Friendship through the social or natural contract that Epicurus suggests maximizes 
happiness.     
 Epicurus describes the contract of friendship in the following ways.  He writes the  
natural contract provides that man loves his friends as he loves himself.  He also writes 
even though individuals provide material help through friendship, friendship provides 
confidence between and amongst individuals.  Confidence suggests there will be help or 
aid if one needs it.  Confidence is more significant than the actual physical help 
(Freeman, 1938).  This can be interpreted as trust amongst individuals.  “It is not so much 
our friend‟s help that helps us as the confidence of their help” (Turner, 1947, p. 353).   
 Of course, friends should not be parasites.   
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He is no friend who is continually asking for help nor he who never 
associates help with friendship. For the former barters gratitude for a 
practical return and the latter destroys hope of good in the future (Vatican 
Saying 28 in DeWitt, 1954, p.310, Turner, 1947, p. 353). 
 
 Epicurus suggests friendships are equal.  “Any right thinking individual, man, 
woman, free, slave is acceptable” (Rist, 1980, p.125).  Epicurus‟s contract is non 
political.  All can live equally and happily if they live in the spirit of friendship.  
Friendships have a high regard of loyalty.  Relationships are not broken unilaterally (Rist, 
1980).  If so, confidence is broken amongst individuals and also questions the reliability 
and worth of future friendships.   
 Affection amongst friends is significant.  Affection or philia in this regard, 
however, does not suggest a passionate love.  Epicurus used passion without with a 
sexual connotation.  As a matter of fact, he disapproved of passionate love.  He 
considered it “a vehement desire after sexual pleasure accompanied by goading 
restlessness” (Turner, 1947, p. 352).  Epicurus was not an advocate of marriage or a 
passionate partnership.  Epicurus felt that love was a natural desire.  The lack of it 
brought no pain.  The benefits of it brought pleasure. 
 Friendship filled the gap between marriage or companionship and security needed 
by man.  Epicurus insisted that this leads to a complete life.  Friendship was a reciprocal 
relationship, not exclusive to a few, and not formed in haste or slowness.  Friendship was 
mutual. 
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We must not be critical either of those who are quick to make friends or 
those who are slow but be willing to risk the offer of friendship for the 
sake of winning friendship.  The tie of friendship knits itself through 
reciprocity of favors among those who have come to enjoy pleasures to the 
full  (Vatican Saying 28 in DeWitt, 1954, p. 310). 
 
 
Epicurus wanted individuals to share a fellowship of friendship that was embraced and 
maintained in the community. 
 
Friendship too has practical needs as its motive.  One must indeed lay its 
foundations (we seed the ground, too) but it is formed and maintained 
through community of life among those who have reached the fullness of 
pleasure (Epicurus in Turner, 1947, p. 354). 
 
 In the community, individuals are perpetually grateful for their friends.  They are 
to be spoken well of and defended when others speak ill of them.  Friendship provided 
peace and safety, an essential prerequisite of the happy life, and for good companionship, 
an essential component of happiness.  
 
 Friendship has its origins in human needs.  It is necessary, however, to 
prepare the way for it in advance for we also sow seed in the ground, but it 
crystallizes through a reciprocity of benefits among those who have come 
to enjoy pleasures to the full (Diogenes Laertius in DeWitt, 1954, p. 324). 
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Human needs change over time and friendships are developed with expediency.  They are 
to ensure peace and safety. 
 
Friendships are reciprocal also.  
 
 The good and wise man declares himself willing to assist the deserving 
and I, too, shall show myself deserving in proportion to the merit of my 
benefactor (Diogenes Laertius in DeWitt, 1954, p. 324). 
 
Finally, friendships are cultivated wisely. 
 
The wise man alone will know through gratitude and with respect to 
friends whether present or absent, and will be of the same mind 
throughout the whole journey of life (Diogenes Laertius in DeWitt, 1954, 
p. 324). 
 
Only a fool will be ungrateful to his friend and so he would not be a friend.  This 
connotes despicable dishonesty, which Epicurus abhorred.  Honesty was virtuous.  By 
being honest, the wise man will always be loyal.  Ethics between and amongst friends 
were critical.  With awareness of self and other, affection, loyalty, trust, and honesty, 
friendships evolve and continue to adapt to the needs of the individual.  Emerson‟s view 
on friendship mirrors Epicurus‟s view. 
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 Ralph Waldo Emerson was a pastor by profession.  He attended fashionable elite 
schools, Boston Latin, Harvard College, and Harvard Divinity School.  After his wife, 
Ellen Tucker died of tuberculosis, he left the Boston pulpit in 1831.   He traveled to 
Europe in search of solace.  By his nature, he was opinionated, resolute, and dogmatic.  
Early on, one senses his dogmatism and resoluteness when he refused to administer the 
Lord‟s supper to his parishioners.   
 
Freedom is the essence of Christianity…its institutions should be as 
flexible as the wants of men.  That form out of which the life and 
suitableness have departed should be considered as worthless in its eyes as 
the dead leaves that are falling around us (Emerson in Buell, 2003). 
 
The divine was not to be found strictly in a spiritual being.  Emerson affirmed the 
divinity of the self.  Freedom of expression helped shape man. 
 
You can never come to any peace or power until you put your whole 
reliance in the moral constitution of man, and not at all in a historical 
Christianity.  The belief in Christianity that now prevails is the unbelief of 
men.  They will have Christ for a Lord, and not for a brother.  Christ 
preaches the greatness of man, but we only hear of the greatness of Christ  
(Diary, March 5, 1835 in Padover, 1959). 
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Emerson was a religious man but he distrusted religious sects and the routine of worship. 
He felt man would be best served if he disconnected himself from established churches.  
He believed, 
 
I suppose it not wise not being natural to belong to any religious party.  In 
the bible, you are not directed to be a Unitarian or a Calvinist or an 
Episcopalian.  Now if a man is wise, he will say to himself, I am not a 
member of any party.  I am God‟s child, a disciple of Christ.  As fast as we 
use our own eyes, we quit these parties of Unthinking corporations, and 
join ourselves to God in an unpartaken relation.  A sect or party is an 
elegant incognito devised to save a man from the vexation of thinking  
(Diary, June 20, 1831 in Padover, 1959). 
 
Still profoundly religious, Emerson‟s conception of God was not institution like.  God 
was an all pervasive force in every man. “The purpose of life seems to be to acquaint a 
man with himself.  The highest revelation is that God is in every man” (Diary, September 
8, 1833, in Padover, 1959). 
 Emerson preached in American Lyceums.  These were town and city based 
forums for lectures, debates and other modes of instruction of character.  Lyceums were 
popular between 1820 and 1865.  As Epicurus used the Garden, Emerson used the 
Lyceum.  Emerson spoke on behalf of representative democracy.  He was an advocate of 
an informed citizenry in the public sphere motivated by voluntary participation (Buell, 
2003).   
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 The Lyceum allowed individuals to challenge circumstance with an opportunity to 
express themself.  Topics and responses varied from the inspiring to the insulting.  
Emerson had faith in the reasonableness of his audience.  He realized the Lyceum could 
be their connection to society (Padover, 1959).   
 Emerson was practical in his message.  Fixed intellectual assumptions were a 
denial of his philosophy.  An openness of mind was significant for Emerson (Padover, 
1959).  Man lived, according to Emerson, in a fluid or transitional world that was always 
becoming (Sebouhian, 1989).  Man‟s world was dialectical.   
 As with Epicurus, Emerson disliked strong government but he had a greater 
toleration for individual participation.  He saw politics on a local level.  It was a 
relationship between neighbors.  Morality was important to this relationship.  Low moral 
character was irksome and intolerable to Emerson.  Epicurus abhorred these as well.  
Man was to be mature, uplifting and with a universal spirit of morality. His character 
base enriched the democratic mind (Padover, 1959).  The individual had an awareness of 
self.  He was self reliant. 
 Significant to Emerson‟s works is Self Reliance.  In this work, he urges the 
individual to find himself, his place, amidst the sea of change in the early 19
th
 century.    
The growth of mass culture, the increasing complexity and interdependence of modern 
life, urbanization, and industrialization all contributed to the fading of self (Van 
Cromphout, 1999).   The individual needs to reclaim his self.   Emerson acknowledged 
this was an ongoing endeavor for man.  “The end of self is indefinite.  It is an end forever 
unattainable: no degree of self realization can ever be assumed to have realized the full 
potential of the self” (Emerson in Van Cromphout, 1999, p. 57).  The individual is 
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steadfast in the dialectical evolution of self.  After this, all other tasks fall into place.  In 
particular, friendship or relationships (that are also dialectical) amongst individuals who 
claim the realization of self can enhance government and citizenship.  To be a friend, 
however, the individual knows himself best of all.  Only then can he truly be a friend. 
 Emerson values the distinctive worth of individuals.  When he suggests they 
should be self reliant, the individual has a full awareness of himself.  He “detects and 
watches the gleam of light from within” and begins to “trust thyself” (Self Reliance, 
Essays:  First Series, 1844, pp.45-47).  Trusting oneself is accepting oneself.  An 
individual can carry himself in the face of all opposition.  One will do what concerns the 
individual to create and sustain personal and ultimately community growth.  Self reliance 
is not easy.   
 
It is the harder because you will always find those who think they know 
what is your duty better than you know it.  It is easy to live after the 
world‟s opinion‟ it is easy to live in solitude to live after our own, but the 
great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with sweetness the 
independence of solitude (Self Reliance, Essays:  First Series, 1844, p. 
53). 
 
It takes courage to be independent in thought and action.  To exude this courage, 
however, is to exude principle.  Ethics was important.  “Nothing can bring you peace but 
the triumphs of principles” (Self Reliance, Essays:  First Series, 1844, pp. 89-90).  
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Emerson was not suggesting a selfish, arrogant self.  He was asserting the worth of the 
self in order to openly accept the worth of others.  This is a criterion for friendship.  
 A nation of friends could devise a good government.  Emerson wrote “the state 
must follow not lead the progress of the citizen…law was only a memo” (Politics, 
Essays: Second Series 1844, p. 562).   The wise man knows that legislation is simply a 
“rope of sand” (Politics, Essays: Second Series 1844, p. 562).  It erodes when 
manipulated.  Do statutes or laws stand the test of time?  They do not.  Nature, asserts 
Emerson, has a way of changing circumstance that is not always fair, not always equal.  
Sometimes nature creates despotic and brutish circumstances for men.  Some 
governments are better than others.  Governments need to fit the needs of men.  In 
America, democracy is best for its people.  Yet, still one must always proceed with 
caution. 
 
Our institutions, though in coincidence with the spirit of the age, have not 
any exemption from the practical defects which have discredited other 
forms.  Every actual state is corrupt.  Good men do not obey the laws too 
well. What satire on government can equal the severity of censure 
conveyed in the word politic, which now for ages has signified cunning, 
intimating the state is a trick? (Politics: Essays: Second Series 1844, p. 
563). 
 
 
We must trust our laws that they will serve men well.  Government has its origin 
in the moral identity of men.  “Reason for one is seen to be reason for another, and for 
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every other…every man finds a sanction for his simplest claims and deeds  in decision 
of his own mind, which he calls Truth and Holiness” (Politics: Essays: Second Series 
1844, p. 566).  Emerson looks to truth and holiness in government.  Government should 
be fair, honest and accommodate the needs of man.  Friends could achieve this end.  
Regrettably, however, government does not work this way.  Occasionally, there is 
corruption.  Governments, however, provide for all not just a few of the best citizens.  
Governments that should invite participation of all invite a participation of a few or to 
one who may establish his “own set of agents” (Politics: Essays:  Second Series 1844, 
p. 566).  Agents are not in a reciprocal relationship with others in society.  Nor are 
agents in government sustaining in law.   
All forms of government symbolize “immortal government” but governments 
are not immortal.  Governments change when laws are inappropriate to all men.  At the 
outset of legislation, Emerson suggests what is “my right and wrong” is their “right and 
wrong”.  “Whilst I do what is fine for me, and abstain from what is unfit, my neighbor 
and I shall often agree and work together” (Politics: Essays: Second Series, 1844, p. 
567).  If, however, one overpowers another in strength or skill who will mediate?  Who 
will protect the disadvantaged?  “Love and Nature cannot maintain the assumption: it 
must be executed by a practical lie, namely by force” (Politics: Essays: Second Series, 
1844, p. 567).  This, Emerson writes, is the blunder of governments.  Laws made by a 
quarter of the population are not suitable for the entire population.  Laws are not 
representative of the people.  This is regrettable history for governments.  “All public 
ends look vogue and quixotic beside private ones” (Politics: Essays: Second Series, 
1844, p. 567).   He does, however, give credit to the notion that the history of 
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governments is one where “one man does something to bind another” (Politics: Essays: 
Second Series, 1844, p. 567).  Therefore, Emerson sees small government as the 
solution to corrupt, selfish, big government.  The solution to the abuse of formal 
government is the growth of the individual, of his character, the end of nature.  Integrity 
prevails.   From integrity and good character “freedom, cultivations, intercourse, and 
revolution form and deliver” (Politics: Essays: Second Series, 1844, p. 568).  Character 
replaces any necessity of state.  The wise man, the conniving, cunning man, not the man 
of character, is regrettably the state.    
 
He needs no army, fort, or navy.  He loves men too well; no bribe, or feast 
or palace, to draw friends to him, no vantage ground, no favorable 
circumstances…he needs no library, he has not done thinking, no church; 
for he is a prophet; no statute book for he is the lawgiver; no money; for 
he is value…he has no personal friend for he who has the spell to draw the 
prayer and the piety to him, needs not husband (Politics: Essays: Second 
Series 1844, p. 568). 
 
 
Emerson finds the abuse of government disturbing and unsettling.  He finds hope 
that society can change because the nation is young.   The “influence of character is in its 
infancy” (Politics: Essays: Second Series 1844, p. 568).     There is time to change the 
direction of government.  If men were sincere there would be no need for corruption and 
an overpowering government.  The idea of self government is popular but no party has 
adopted this revolutionary platform.  Were there to be a valid self government, “a 
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recognition of higher rights than those of personal freedom, or the security of property” 
would prevail (Politics: Essays: Second Series 1844, p. 569).  Emerson asserts love and 
character is the basis of self government.  Could not a nation of friends devise a better 
government?  Yes, they could. 
 Emerson asserts “we are in a low state of the world where we pay unwillingly to 
governments founded on force” (Politics:  Essays: Second Series 1844, pp. 570-571).  He 
woes that there is no sense of moral sentiment or confidence that governments could 
successfully function without artificial corrupt selfish restraints.  He cautions that there is 
no acknowledgement of the reasonable private citizen or the good neighbor who will not 
overstep his boundary.  Individuals are in contempt of the moral sentiment that could 
reshape government.  “It takes only one man to pursue this that the authority of law is 
averse to one man‟s own moral nature” (Politics, Essays: Second Series 1844 p. 570).  
Let one voice speak and others will join.  The result is a fair government, one with a 
regard for each other as though a “knot of friends” or a “pair of lovers” (Politics, Essays: 
Second Series 1844 p. 271). 
 How can friendship contribute to a better state or government?  Emerson writes 
there are two elements of friendship.  These are truth and tenderness. (Friendship, Essays: 
First Series 1841, p. 347).  If these are evident in relationships, the individual who brings 
his own opinion or “definition or partiality” into conversation will not be rebuked but 
rather be welcomed into another‟s life (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 342).  
Truth is sincerity.  Sincerity is not easy to come by in a relationship.  As a singleton, the 
individual is sincere.  When another individual enters his life, suspicion and apprehension 
arises.  There is unease in the relationship.  “We try to get along by means of gossip, 
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amusements, affairs” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 347).  Individuals do not 
reveal their true self but rather a front, a façade, a falseness of self.  Man seldom reveals 
his true self to others.  The true self is not in tandem with the “false age” individuals 
dwell in (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 347).  Emerson realized the coldness 
of friendship and, therefore, sought real friendship.  Regarding his dear friend, Margaret 
Fuller, he wrote, “She would gladly be my friend, yet our intercourse is not friendship, 
but literary gossip.” (Emerson, Letters 1852, 1:202).  He sought to change this and cite 
inclusion rather than solitude.  “We are armed all over with subtle antagonisms.” 
(Emerson, Letters 1852, 2: 325).   Yet “I awoke this morning with devout thanksgiving 
for my friends, the old and the new…a new person is to me a great event.” (Emerson, 
Journals, 5: 278).  Man in this regard embraces the other individual. 
 Truth is difference.  “There must be two before there can be very one…let him be 
to thee forever a sort of beautiful enemy, untamable, devoutly revered.” (Emerson, 
Collected Works 1971, 2:121)  There is resolution of difference through dialogue.  “We 
will meet as though we have not met, and part as though we parted not.” (Emerson, 
Collected Works 1971, 2:126).  “The essence of friendship is entireness, a total 
magnanimity and trust.  It does not surmise or provide for infirmity.  It treats its object as 
a god, that it may deify both.” (Emerson, Collected Works 1971, 2: 127).  Emerson urged 
his readers to engage in dialogue, challenge difference and not remain passive to a given 
or prepared truth.  Openness was significant for truth and ultimately friendship. 
Why does man shy away from such truth?  Everyman has his worth.  Everyman 
requires some “civility…some fame, some talent, some whim of religion or philanthropy 
which is not to be questioned” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 347).  Man 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 
rather withdraws from further conversation.  Fear or risk of openness propels this 
withdrawal or isolation from others.  A true friend, however, would not withdraw from 
conversation but welcome it.  Individuals see themselves in other people.  They 
acknowledge the shortcomings and recognize that they too have the same particularities.   
One infers that the individual find comfort in himself to see the worth of the other.  This 
is the worth of self reliance. 
Emerson cites the second element of friendship is tenderness.   
 
We are holden to men by every sort of tie, by blood, by pride, by fear, by 
hope, by lucre, by lust, by hate, by admiration, by every circumstance and 
badge and trifle, but we can scarce believe so much character can subsist 
in another as to us by love  (Friendship, Essays: First Series, 1841, p. 
348). 
 
Individuals do not value the love or the tenderness that is shown.  Individuals are socially 
hesitant, filled with reserve that tenderness is not appropriate.  This is a troubling 
revelation.  If individuals could acknowledge an appeal based on love, it acknowledges a 
higher sense of self beyond the actual worth of the friendship.  This indicates an inner 
growth of the individual.  This inner growth could only compliment the friendship 
relationship. 
 Tenderness allows individuals to cultivate relationships from the worldly to the 
local. “I much prefer the company of ploughboys and tin peddlers to the silken and 
perfumed amity which celebrates its days of encounter by a frivolous display” 
(Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 348).  The beauty of this down to earth 
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relationship is aid and comfort through all relations and passages through life.  “It is fit 
for serene days and graceful gifts and country rambles, but also for rough roads and hard 
fare, shipwreck, poverty, and persecution” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 
348).    
 Friendships should never be taken for granted but should be “alert and inventive” 
so that when individuals engage in a “discourse” it goes beyond the simple conversation.  
There is no “partiality” but rather a welcome exchange of each other (Friendship, Essays: 
First Series 1841, p. 348).    
The friend should be regarded as a counterpart.  “Are you the friend of your 
friend‟s buttons or his thought” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 352)?  This is 
another indication for the individual to be in touch with self and with others.  After 
individuals accept themselves, they accept and value others for who they are in society.  
Do not be envious of him or devious with his nature.  “Treat your friends as a 
spectacle…let him grow” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 352).  If the 
individual rejoices in the wonders of his friend is he not also rejoicing in the wonder of 
himself?  “I will receive from my friends what they are not what they have…they shall 
give me that which properly they cannot give, but that which emanates from them” 
(Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 352).   
A friendship is the “solidest” thing we know.  It is a strong relationship not made 
of “glass threads…friendships are to be treated with the roughest courage” (Friendship, 
Essays: First Series 1841, p. 346).    Courage does not tempt friendships but rather tests 
the validity and the reliability of the relationship.  Friendship is the “alliance of two large 
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natures mutually beheld, feared, before they recognize the deep identity between them” 
(Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841. p. 340). 
Emerson cites a deep spiritual regard for the individual.  He regards man with an 
inner spiritual conviction privately exampled not publicly practiced with religious rigor.  
The individual with the deep seated moral character and conviction is a friend.  Emerson 
felt character was key to one‟s moral identity.  Character guided individual actions.  
Moral sentiment shaped and measured individual health.  The glory of the human being is 
love, humility, faith, and the intimacy of the divinity.  As soon as man had this within 
him he is like a “ripened flower” (Conduct of Life, 1860, p. 1071).  If man has these traits 
within himself he can “run into flame, bullets, pestilence with duty for his guide” 
(Conduct of Life, 1860, p. 1071)    He can also create the most risky relationship of 
friendship.  Friendship is not only the giving of self.  For it to be a true friendship, the 
acknowledgement of self is significant before any relationship becomes real.  Yet, the 
reality is not fixed or finite.  To suggest a bond that is lasting suppresses change and 
growth.   Suppressing change and growth is a threat to imagination and openness.  
Friendships are, therefore, dialectical.  “I feel how clearly the law of friendship requires 
the grandest interpretation, when I glance from the dearest love to the vast spirit 
impatient of bounds, impatient of persons, foreseeing the fall of every fondness, of every 
speciality” (Emerson, Letters, 1971, 2:326).  Emerson saw unity as harmful, a bondage or 
continuity at the cost of change, and a threat to art, writing, and imagination.  A threat to 
imagination was a threat to life; no friendship or relation was placed before it (Sebouhian, 
1989).   
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Epicurus and Emerson sought friendship amongst individuals that exuded trust, 
honesty, truth, and love.  Each man cautioned that acceptance of self was important 
before they could accept another.  Friendship created no barrier; it was open to everyone.  
It was a tender, reciprocal relationship that constantly experienced growth overcoming 
shallowness and the subtle antagonisms that both Epicurus and Emerson explained were 
not elements of real friendship in the community.  
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Chapter 5 
Martin Buber and Paulo Freire 
Dialogue and Community 
 
Community is vital for democracy to flourish.  Communities do not evolve 
spontaneously.  Communities are spurred by dialogue and friendship.  Dialogue, genuine 
conversation amongst or between individuals is necessary for friendship or reciprocal 
relationships to ensue.  Without dialogue, friendship is a superficial, baseless relationship 
that creates a void between individuals rather than a foundation for community.  The 
focus of this chapter is dialogue as the foundation for friendship and community.  The 
work specifically of Martin Buber, Paulo Freire, particularly, and John Dewey purports 
dialogue essential for community.  Dialogue, if appropriately undertaken, creates an 
awareness of self and the other.  The awareness of self and the other is with a sense of 
dignity, worth, and hope for the participants.  Dialogue in this sense is exchanged with 
regard for responsibility to self and other, and an open, equitable opportunity where all 
are invited to participate in the community discourse.  It is a process of being with self 
and the world.  This is particularly evident in the work of Buber and Freire.   
This chapter first examines dialogue as essential for community.  In particular, 
what are the characteristics of dialogue?  What are characteristics of anti-dialogue?  What 
are the challenges to dialogue?  Secondly, how can dialogue and friendship and 
community be encouraged?  Dialogue as a process of being with self and world is 
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discussed.  Thirdly, what is the role of the educator or the subject in dialogue?   What 
should be included in the education process? 
 
Part I 
Dialogue 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) marveled at the sorts of associations he encountered 
in the United States in the 1840s.  He admired the art of the individual to freely and 
eagerly associate himself to assert a common goal for the community.  Whether the goal 
is political or social, Americans gather to reach a common ground (de Tocqueville, 
2000).  The dialogue or the exchange amongst and between individuals is an art.  To 
create dialogue is to create relationships that sustain the democratic community.  The 
give and take, the reciprocity and regard for these relationships are emblematic of 
democracy.  They are a right and a privilege for the individual.  The dialogue is a mutual, 
reciprocal relationship, a friendship between individuals.  Dialogue and friendship define 
citizenship. 
Dialogue is vital for the democratic community.  Democracy as a government is 
often perceived by its participants as a given form of freedom, equality, and opportunity.  
Characterized by openness and association, a dialogue between individuals exudes a give 
and take of ideas and knowledge to create and maintain a status quo or to relieve the 
tension between two polar opposites.  Vertical relationships are not dialogue.  Vertical 
relationships mask themselves as a reciprocal relationship, but these are not dialogue.  
The subject subverts the other or the object.  Absent is reciprocity and regard for the 
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other.  Dialogue is not hierarchical.  Dialogue is a horizontal relationship that creates 
engagement and openness to change.  Vertical relationships are evidence of oppression.  
They create a “twisted democracy” (Freire, 2010, p. 9).  The elite or sectarians speak for 
the people to “protect the people.”  This type of social interaction asserts the need to 
protect the people from “foreign ideologies” or anything that could create or stimulate an 
active thinking of the people (Freire, 2010, p. 11).  This is anti-dialogic.  It does not 
create or enhance community.  Rather, this form of interaction asserts a vertical 
relationship. It preserves a social order where there is a dominant subject and a 
submissive recipient.  The quest for control precludes any reciprocal exchange.  
Dialogue, in contrast, is a dynamic activity where participants share information with the 
goal of some transformation.  Individuals through dialogue learn together.  Immersed in 
the reality of each other‟s presence, individuals not only acknowledge each other‟s ideas, 
they recognize the worth and perspective of the idea.  Through basic characteristics of 
respect and trust, dialogue is welcome and creative.  This is the notion put forth by both 
Buber and Freire. 
Anti-dialogical practices are not conducive to democratic life.  How can 
democracy survive if anti-dialogical practices are the norm?  Dialogue is essential for 
democracy to thrive.  It celebrates a way of living.  Democracy celebrates dialogue.  It 
“encourages all citizens to actively construct and share power over those institutions that 
govern our lives” (Giroux, 1993, p. 12-13).  It allows for questioning, rather than 
subordinate obedience.  This, one could argue, is an element of patriotism.  Dewey 
(1927) wrote “only through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by 
citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and usefulness” (p. 69).  The state is not 
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only maintained in integrity and usefulness, the state is also open to change.  Dialogue 
amongst all groups assures this. The only hope for democracy is to encourage 
marginalized groups to develop the power and will to effect change (Henckley, 2004). 
 
Part II 
Encouraging Dialogue and Friendship 
Martin Buber and Paulo Freire 
 
How can individuals promote and encourage dialogue?  The individual is 
particularly noted as the subject or the initiator of the dialogue.  Individuals engage in 
dialogue and are responsible to engage the other in dialogue.   
 Martin Buber is a twentieth century educator philosopher who sought to establish 
genuine dialogue and therefore community.  Buber (1996) wrote of the relationship of “I 
and Thou.”   This, his central work, focused on the tremendous value of dialogue.  It 
suggests that reality is not oneself, not the world and not God.  The strength of his 
argument suggests man needs to turn with his whole being to the other; to relate to the 
other as a thou, and then establish a new reality or an aspect of reality that had not existed 
for the individual.  Buber focuses on the openness, the trust, the readiness to speak and 
respond and confront fellow man, the world, and ultimately God (Glatzer, 1981).  
Buber‟s emphasis on this results from his life experience.  
  
 At an early age, Buber was estranged from his mother.  This may have ultimately 
contributed to thoughts of the alienation between humans in his later years.   In addition, 
Buber writes of the encounter with a young troubled man who came to see him post 
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World War I.   Regrettably, after the encounter, the young man committed suicide.  
Buber acknowledges that he really hadn‟t heard what the young troubled man was trying 
to say to him.  He realized that conversation was not dialogue.  Buber realized that he had 
not responded to the entire man.  He did not hear the words which were not being spoken.  
As a result, he came to see dialogue as responding to the whole person.  Communication 
or the response to the whole man was dialogue (Glatzer, 1981).  Thus, I and Thou was 
drafted in 1916 and 1919.   
 Buber writes the world is twofold according to man‟s two fold attitude, I- Thou 
and I-It.  He notes a relationship between men is open, direct, mutual, and present.  He 
wrote of two relationships:  “that in which I recognize It as an object, and that in which I 
respond with my whole being to you” (Buber, 1947, p. 16).  In the I-Thou, the dialogue 
between them is an expression of inclusion.  One experiences the other being in the 
relationship.  Towards this end, one realizes their own being prior to this.   This 
realization is not empathy, it is the Thou (Buber, 1947, p. XII-XVII).  In order to 
establish the I-Thou relationship man needs to acknowledge the presence of the You in 
his life. 
 There are two relationships, I-You and I-It.
1
  In the I-You relationship, the I is 
different from the I in the I-It (Buber, 1996).  You is spoken with one‟s whole being.   
 
Whoever says You does not have something for his object.  For wherever 
there is something there is also another something; every It borders on 
other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on others.  But where You is 
said there is no something.  You has no borders. 
                                                 
1
 In the Kaufman translation, Buber uses “You”.  In the Smith translation, Buber uses “Thou”. 
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Whoever says You does not have something; he has nothing.  But he 
stands in relation (Buber, 1995, p. 55) 
 
The I is totally immersed in the end of the You.  Buber wrote:     
 
--What, then, does one experience of the You?  
--Nothing at all.  For one does not experience it. 
            --What, then, does one know of the You? 
--Only everything.  For one no longer knows particulars (Buber, 1996, p. 
61). 
 
If one enters into the I-You it is with no preconceived notions.  The You encounters the I 
with no imagination or memory or means.  It is with openness not condition that the 
encounter occurs.  The fullness of the other person is felt.  The I should feel “addressed 
by the human” or the You.   Two relations occur.  When the I-You occurs with no 
preconceived notions or memory there is not only openness and acknowledgement of the 
other person, there is also an openness and acknowledgement with a willingness to 
contribute to community.  Individuals engage in a discourse which seems basis for 
community.  The result is the association of two and then additional persons who 
naturally view the good ends of democracy. 
For Buber, human relationships are created and shared through language.  They 
are undertaken with and received with goodness and love.   The third relationship lacks 
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language but one hears language.  There is the presence of You, the basic word is You 
but unable to literally say You (Buber, 1996).  This, then, is the first challenge, the 
greatest challenge of dialogue.  How is You found or as Buber asks, “How can we 
incorporate into the world of the basic word what lies outside our language?” (Buber, 
1996, p. 57). 
When individuals encounter one another as You or with openness, all aspects of 
his physical being are absent from perception or literal observation.  One does not see 
things or experiences, tangibles or characteristics.  If the individual acknowledges or 
defines the other with his physical characteristics, he establishes the realm of It.   If, 
however, the presence of You “is spread over me, the tempests of causality cover at my 
heels and the whirl of doom congeals” (Buber, 1996, p. 59).  The relationship is not with 
a purpose or a cause.  Buber is relating to the reader that if one comes to dialogue with 
openness and seeks openness and a sense of being with the other, fruitful dialogue will 
ensue.  Humans will find renewal in the encounter.  Buber acknowledges this is not easy 
to bring to actuality.  There are causes or changes in the world that tempt this presence.  
He realized genuine dialogue was not always attainable.  “This, however, is the sublime 
melancholy of our lot that every You must become an It in our world” (Buber, 1996, p. 
68).  Once the relationship or encounter is permeated by particulars or experiences the 
You becomes an object.  That reciprocal openness is no longer.  It is, however, necessary 
if I am to gain a full understanding of Thou.  The particular phenomena of everyday life 
define and describe world‟s evolution.  These cannot be discounted.  The physicalities of 
society‟s institutions will not and cannot change.  This is critical for world growth.  To 
eliminate these phenomena voids the world of change; stagnation occurs.  What is 
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significant is that the reciprocal openness in dialogue be a part of this so that individuals 
do not succumb or only acknowledge the “It” but rather put it into perspective.  The You 
who was once “devoid of qualities, not at hand, but only present not experienceable, only 
touchable (fulfillable) has again become a He or She, an aggregate of qualities” (Buber, 
1996, p. 69).  Dialogue is a process.  The ultimate encounter, however, is possible.  
Despite change in the world, it is important that the spirit remains alive and actual. 
 
Whether the institutions of the state become freer and those of the 
economy juster, that is important, but not for the question concerning 
actual life that is imposed there; for they cannot become free and just on 
their own.  What is decisive is whether the spirit, the You-saying, 
responding spirit remains alive and actual; whether what remains of it in 
communal human life continues to be subjected to the state and the 
economy or whether it becomes independently active; where what abides 
of it in individual human life incorporates itself in communal life.  But that 
certainly cannot be accomplished by dividing communal life into 
independent realms  (Buber, 1996, p. 99). 
 
 
Further, Buber acknowledges the worth of the It world particularly as it orders nature.  It 
is not evil.  It is necessary.  Its potential oppressiveness, however, is limited by the 
individual who can step into the relation of the  I-You. 
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The unlimited sway of causality in the It world which is of fundamental 
importance for the scientific ordering of nature is not felt to be oppressive 
by the man who is not confined to the It world but free to step out of it 
again and again into the world of relation.  Here I and You confront each 
other freely in a reciprocity that is not involved in or tainted by any 
causality; here man finds guarantee the freedom of his being and of being  
(Buber, 1996, p. 100). 
 
 
What needs to be “given up” is not the I but that “false drive for self affirmation, which 
impels man to flee from the unreliable, unsolid, unlasting, unpredicatable dangerous 
world of relation into the having of things” (Buber, 1996, p. 126).  Finally, the You is in 
man by his very nature, “only our nature forces us to draw it into the It world and It 
speech” (Buber, 1996, p. 148).  Yet, these are rare moments.  Not all will find the “You.” 
(Haim, 2001, p. 118).  In order to find the “you”, one must live wholly in the present, not 
the past.  The past is the “It”(Haim, 2001, p. 119).  If man acknowledges this, the three 
spheres of relation are acknowledged.  This is dialogue. 
The life of dialogue is a relation of men to one another.  Where there is dialogue, 
there is a genuine responsibility to respond to what happens, what is seen, heard, and felt.  
Where and to whom is this responsibility? One would think it is to the other but the 
responsibility is to the true self.  Once the individual becomes the “true self” and when 
the outside world confronts the individual as a “thou” or as a “You” the ethical situation 
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arises.  At this point, the “responding” is undertaken with genuine dialogue (Vogel, 1970, 
p. 173).  Once this is established, the individual enters the reciprocal relationship. 
The importance of dialogue in human relationships and its connection to political 
participation is re-emphasized by Paulo Freire.  Freire sought to create adult literacy 
throughout Brazil prior to the military coup in 1964.  Born in 1921, the Brazilian 
philosopher of education dedicated his life to oppressed peoples.  He developed methods 
of teaching adult illiterates to read and, therefore, become politically aware and challenge 
their status.  His efforts resulted in his imprisonment and exile in 1965 (Betz, 1992).   
There was no democratic experience in Brazil.  Colonization stripped them of this 
opportunity in spite of claims that democracy was evident.  Rather, a slavocracy existed.  
A commercial enterprise with large estates and plantations gave no sense of community 
or a middle class.  Individuals experienced no civil rights.  They remained at the margins 
of society.  A “Europeanism” overtook the masses with the characteristics of a dominant 
culture including class, forms, and ideology discussed in the first section (Freire, 2010).  
Clearly, a “culture of silence” described a dispossessed population (Freire, 2009).  
Change was difficult to come.  To precipitate change, Freire argued a critical 
consciousness between men creates a world where man can relate to man and work to 
solve a problem. 
Individuals must engage in dialogue with people. If this be undertaken, the 
oppressed will unveil their world of oppression and commit themselves to transformation 
and a liberating practice becomes a practice for all individuals (Freire, 2009).  Imagine 
this in the face of the oppressors who, as part of the dominant culture, have wealth and 
material to sustain themselves.  Oppressed peoples undergo self depreciation and become 
                                                                                                                                                 
143 
emotionally dependent on the oppressors.  When oppressed peoples undergo self 
depreciation or dehumanization, how is transformational dialogue or a critical 
consciousness initiated?   
The process of humanization may be blocked by oppressive structures.   
Individuals are dehumanized by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and violence.  History 
creates oppression or human distortion but oppression or human distortion is not history‟s 
fate or destiny.  If there is dialogue, there is the possibility of liberation.   Eventually, the 
distortion of being more human propels the oppressed to struggle against the 
dehumanizers or the oppressors. (Freire, 2009).   Through dialogue, oppressed peoples 
restore humanity to the oppressors. The dialectical is driven by the dialogical.   As 
individuals fighting for generosity and humanity, oppressed peoples are in an ideal 
situation to do this.  Freire asks, “Who are better prepared than the oppressed to 
understand the terrible significance of an oppressed society?  Who can better understand 
liberation?”(Freire, 2009, p. 45).   
To undertake the struggle, however, is a process.  In the beginning oppressed 
peoples accept their status.  Their thought has been conditioned by their existence, 
dictated or shaped by their oppressors.  Oppressed peoples adopt an attitude of 
“adhesion” to the oppressor (Freire, 2009, p. 45).  To answer “who am I outside of this 
situation?” is impossible.  Individuals cannot see outside themselves.  They are not aware 
of the struggle for liberation.  Instead, they see themselves as ultimately oppressors 
themselves.  For example, the peasant does not see freedom first and then land but land 
first and then what they perceive as freedom later.  If they have land or become an 
overseer or become an overseer of land, they seem free.  The peasant, however, is still 
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oppressed.  He must be as rigid in function and message as his oppressor.  In this regard, 
Freire writes the oppressed find their model of “manhood” (Freire, 2009. p. 46).   
For years, oppressed peoples adapted to their condition. Changing this is a risk. 
 
…what happens to a greater or lesser degree in the various “worlds” into  
which the world is divided is that the ordinary person is crushed, 
diminished, converted into a spectator, maneuvered by myths which 
powerful social forces have created.  These myths turn against him; they 
destroy and annihilate him.  Tragically frightened, men fear authentic 
relationships and even doubt the possibility of their existence.  On the 
other hand, fearing solitude, they gather in groups lacking in any critical 
and loving ties which might transform them into a cooperating unit, into a 
true community.  “Gregariousness is always the refuge of mediocrities,” 
said Nikolai Nikolaievich Vedeniapin in Dr. Zhivago.  It is also an 
imprisoning armor which prevents men from loving (Freire, 2009, p. 5). 
 
 
In society, groups (be they social, ethnic, or racial) are often unable to assimilate.  
Different customs and traditions, as well as language, separate individuals.  Ethnicity or 
race, not friendship and citizenship, define group behavior and conversation.  Dialogue is 
absent.  There is no interaction with other groups.  A growing divisiveness amongst 
groups evolves. 
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 Divisiveness threatens dialogue and community.  Separate individuals and groups 
do not dialogue with each other and create community.  There is no spirit of association 
that de Tocqueville marveled at as one of democracy‟s finest and most genuine traits.  
Rather than exalting citizenship and democracy, isolated groups, limited by their own 
“gregarious refuge” withdraw from the very possibility of democratic association. 
 Individuals listen to others in their group or oppressed state and to their own 
consciousness.  This action is continued conformity in their oppressed state (Freire, 
2010).  Even though ethnic and racial groups form and engage with each other in their 
groups, there is no freedom or liberation in society.  Individuals continue to adapt to their 
oppressed condition.  Dehumanization continues.  This creates a “closed society” (Freire, 
2010, p. 7).  Individuals unable to change the reality of divisiveness adjust themselves to 
the reality within their own ethnic or racial group.  They are eventually dominated by it 
and unable to actively engage or intervene in the reality of community.   
 In a closed society, the meaning of democracy is “twisted.”  Popular participation, 
freedom, and friendship are absent.  If individuals do not exercise these characteristics, 
society cannot evolve and democracy is at risk. 
 
How is it possible to enjoy a liberating dialogue with the oppressed?  First, there 
is an awareness or acknowledgment of oppressor and oppressed.  It takes into account 
each other‟s behavior, view of the world, ethics.  Secondly, the old order myths or 
prescriptions are expelled from society (Freire, 2009).  Dialogue is carried on at each 
stage.  Dialogue allows each to be a subject with reflective participation in accordance 
with historical conditions.  Reflection leads to action.  A humanizing pedagogy is 
significant.  Individuals do not manipulate (Freire, 2009).  They create a consciousness 
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that represents “things and facts as they exist empirically, in their causal and 
circumstantial correlations (Freire, 2010, p. 39).     
A critical consciousness evolves as a dialectical relationship with social reality.  
Epicurus and Emerson emphasized the significance of man‟s reflection and self reliance 
that eventually opened the means to participation, dialogue, empathy, and friendship.   
Buber and Freire echo these sentiments.  Each of these philosophers asserts the dialectical 
relationship or the causes of reality that bring about division, oppression, and exclusion.  
When the causes of reality are acknowledged, understanding and dialogue will ensue.  
This lay the groundwork for a critical consciousness.   As Freire writes, “what is true 
today may not be so tomorrow” (Freire, 2010, p. 39).  A horizontal relationship evokes a 
critical consciousness of and on material conditions.   It is a relationship that is nourished 
by love, humility, hope, trust, and good criticism.  Dialogue that results  
 
…is the only way, not only in the vital questions of the political order, but 
in all the expressions of our being.  Only by virtue of faith, however, does 
dialogue have power and meaning: by faith in man and his possibilities, by 
the faith that I can only become truly myself when other men also become 
themselves (Freire, 2010, p. 38). 
 
In this regard, Freire suggests a “culture circle” (Freire, 2010, p. 38).  Instead of a 
teacher, there is a coordinator; rather than a lecture, there is dialogue; rather than pupils, 
there are group participants (Freire, 2010).  Each participant is a subject of knowledge, 
not a receiver of knowledge.  Between subjects, there is a relation of “empathy” between 
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two “poles” who are engaged in a joint endeavor or search of each other‟s perspective.  
Subjects join in a search for the other (Freire, 2010, p. 40).  This dialogic exchange is the 
antithesis of an anti-dialogic exchange or a vertical relationship nourished by loveless, 
arrogance, hopelessness, and mistrust.  A dialogic encounter acknowledges or recognizes 
the active role of men in and with reality, mediation in relationships and communication 
among men, culture as a consequence of man‟s efforts to “create and recreate” society 
(Freire, 2010, p. 41).  Man as a subject in the world and with the world is acknowledged.  
Man as a subject makes culture. 
Freire suggests the culture circle evolves from the discussion of a series of 
existential situations.  In the circle, individuals discuss what or who people are not what 
other people think and want or demand from them.  This allows individuals to reflect 
about their position in the world, their work, their contributions to the world and so their 
power to transform the world.  It is an encounter of consciousness or a creation from 
within. 
During the encounter or visualization of the existential situations, a number of 
elements are “decoded” or identified by participants (Freire, 2010, p. 42)  The once 
excluded oppressed individuals begin to integrate themselves in the picture and in 
culture.  Individuals see the value or worth of their contribution to culture. 
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For example, see Figure I 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I. Man in the World and with The World, Nature and Culture 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
From Freire, P. (2010) Education for a critical consciousness.  London: Continuum. p. 56.    
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In Figure I, a coordinator presents a “situation”, a peasant homestead with a well and a 
small patch of farmland.  He asks questions such as “Who made the well?  Why did he do 
it?  How did he do it?  When did he do it?” These questions are repeated to evoke a 
conceptual understanding of necessity and work.   The individual needs the well for his 
necessity and for his work.  The additional conceptual understandings as they relate to his 
house, his clothes, and his tools create a relation to not only other subjects but to culture 
(Freire, 2010, p. 57). 
 As the discussion continues, individual realize their connection and their worth to 
their culture.   This is significant for the discourse or the dialogue to continue.  The 
exchange instills confidence in the individual and a willingness to continue with 
dialogue.   
 A sense of worth is important in democracy not only for the individual but 
eventually for the democratic community.  If individuals do not feel that they can 
contribute to the community, they will remain isolated in their groups.  No outside 
exchange will be present, there will be no existence with society.  There will be no 
democratic community.   
 Dialogue in the community brings together not only diverse ethnic and racial 
groups but also different socio economic classes, walks of life, and professions.  The 
reciprocal exchange and the consequential recognized worth of the individual cannot be 
minimized.   
 The individual‟s worth is further explained in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Man Transforms the Material of Nature by His Work 
________________________________________________________________________ 
From Freire, P. (2010) Education for a critical consciousness.  London: Continuum. p. 66.     
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In Figure 2, the individual acknowledges the transformation of materials of nature by his 
work.  Individuals working with clay eventually create an object of culture, “a vase, jug, 
or pot.”   The individual realizes a conceptual understanding of the connection to culture 
(Freire, 2010, p. 67). 
 
Eventually, in another, the individual realizes: 
I make shoes, and now I see that I am worth as much as the Ph.D. who 
writes books. 
Tomorrow, I‟m going to go to work with my head high.  I know now that I 
am cultured.  Because I work, and working, sic I transform the world 
(Freire, 2010, p. 42). 
 
Individuals recognize the democratization of culture and the perspective of acquiring 
literacy.  Literacy in this regard is more than reading and writing.  It is an “attitude of 
creation and recitation, a self-transformation producing a stance of intervention in one‟s 
context” (Freire, 2010, p. 43).  The self transformation that produces a stance of 
intervention in one‟s context carries over into the democratic community.    As 
individuals recognize their worth in culture, a positive attitude unfolds.  In a democracy, 
the individual‟s positive attitude characterizes a willingness to engage with others, to 
dialogue and sustain friendship.  Ideally, with an awareness of self, the individual exudes 
confidence and reacts to the other with honor, integrity, and love.  A reciprocal 
friendship, an association evolves.  
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The role of the educator is to enter into dialogue.  The educator shares concrete 
situations and offers a means where the participant can teach himself to read and write.  
What is essential is an instrument for both learner and educator where “learning content” 
is identified with “learning process” (Freire, 2010, p. 43).  Therefore, manuals that cast 
the participant as an object rather than a subject are inappropriate.  Instead, “generative 
words” are offered.  These words are not the educator‟s choice but are rather appropriate 
to the language culture.  Further the creation of “codifications” or existential situations is 
made available for discussion and contribute to a critical consciousness.  These familiar 
situations open perspective for analysis of regional and national problems (Freire, 2010, 
43-45).  These create an atmosphere with regard and acceptance. 
 Individuals learn to read and write about the world they are a part of, the culture 
they create.  Reflecting on the world they are a part of is a transformation.  It prompts 
communication of knowledge between individuals, rather than an extension of 
knowledge.  Communication encourages understanding between individuals; extension of 
knowledge negates the individual as capable of transforming the world.  The individual 
(the oppressed or the peasant) is not educated but is treated as a depository for 
propaganda. 
Extension is the transmission of knowledge by one active subject to a passive 
object.  The result is not a communication of knowledge but a cultural invasion of the 
chosen receiver.  There is no regard for the recipient‟s world.  They are instead, forced to 
make knowledge “resemble their world” (Freire, 2010, p. 89).  Individuals are 
transformed into things and negated as subjects or beings who can transform the world.  
It is not liberating.  There is no developing consciousness.  “Extending subjects are active 
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in that they are actors in the presence of spectators in whom they deposit what they 
extend” (Freire, 2010, p. 92).  The spectator is forced to substitute one form of 
knowledge for another.  There is no reflection. 
 
Knowing, whatever its level, is not the act by which a subject transformed 
into an object docilely and passively accepts the contents others give or 
impose on him or her.  Knowledge, on the contrary, necessitates the 
curious presence of subjects confronted with the world.  It requires their 
transforming action on reality.  It demands a constant searching.  It implies 
invention and reinvention…In the learning process the only person who 
really learns is s/he who appropriates what is learned, who apprehends and 
thereby re-invents that learning; s/he who is able to apply the appropriate 
learning to concrete existential situations.  On the other hand, the person 
who is filled by another with “contents” whose meaning s/he is not aware 
of, which contradict his or her way of being in the world, cannot learn 
because s/he is not challenged (Freire, 2010, p. 82). 
 
It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, 
nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the 
people about their view and ours.  We must realize that their view of the 
world, manifested variously in this action reflects their situation in the 
world (Freire, 2009, p. 96). 
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 If the individual is treated as a depository or an object, “dialogue is subverted and 
education is changed to deformation” (Freire, 2010, p. 45).  However, if reflection is 
present, it allows individuals to understand dialectically the different capacities when 
humans know their relation to the world.  As a person becomes consciously aware of his 
surroundings as a subject, he becomes politicized.  An I-Thou relationship occurs, a 
relationship between two subjects.  Reflection recognizes the “raison d‟etre” of the 
subject, not an object (Freire, 2010, p. 93).  It is a horizontal not a vertical relationship.  
Reflection allows for a dialectical exchange, a reflection upon material conditions.  The 
reflection upon material conditions is the art of freely associating with another as a 
subject and asserting a common goal for the democratic community. 
 
As Buber noted, dialogue is an encounter in a democratic community (Buber, 
1947).  Dialogue is an encounter between individuals that stimulates knowledge.  Freire 
writes ethics are important for dialogic thinking.  Dialogue is not the depositing of ideas 
but rather the stimulation of ideas through love, trust, and hope.  Ideas are not deposited 
or banked.  They are encouraged through awareness inspired by openness to the other.  If 
individuals share these ethics in dialogue, a respect for and realization of others becomes 
apparent.    Man looks to himself with no preconceived notions.  With openness of mind, 
he moves beyond the past without rejecting it.  Man puts his own view into perspective 
and listens to his counterpart.  If man does this, he exists with the world (Freire, 2009).  
Beyond existing with the world, he is “becoming with the world” (Freire, 2009, p. 98). 
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People aware of their activity and the world in which they are situated, 
acting in function of the objectives which they propose, having the seat of 
their decisions located in themselves and in their relations with the world 
and with others, infusing the world with their creative presence by means 
of their transformation, they effect upon it unlike animals, not only live 
but exist  (Freire, 2009, p. 98). 
 
 The dialectical relationship inherent in communication generates new ideas and 
solutions.  It liberates individuals with new awareness of themselves and their changing 
world.  Through reflection it lifts the silence of the oppressed and reveals new ideas or a 
real consciousness.   
 
Real consciousness (is) the result of the multiple obstacles and deviations 
that the different factors of empirical reality put into opposition and 
submit for realization by (the) potential consciousness (Goldman in Freire, 
2009, p. 113). 
 
This consciousness is a means for new knowledge.  It calls to mind the “untested 
feasibility” that is particular to man‟s reason.  Opportunity for answers from different 
perspectives allows individuals to exercise their autonomy, their reason.  This dialogic 
exchange fosters movement and then change.  If this exchange is denied then 
revolutionary change, cultural change is denied.   
                                                                                                                                                 
156 
Dialogue has four challenges to its proper exchange.  Freire refers to these as four 
anti dialogical theories.  The first is conquest.  Conquest, simply put, aims at overcoming 
the other.  An individual imposes his will or thoughts upon another.  This reduces the 
other to a non thinking being, a thing.  It not only is debilitating, it is lifeless.  The second 
is divide and rule.  Overbearing individuals, a singleton or a group oppresses any action 
that awakens or vitalizes thought.  Unity, organization and struggle are labeled as 
dangerous.  Those in charge, the oppressors, do not favor community but rather they 
select leaders or those who lead thought.  While unity and harmony of thought is 
impossible, leaders assert there is, in fact, a harmony amongst them.  Third, manipulation 
of the other conforms thinking to their own (the leaders) objectives.   Regrettably, the 
more innocent or “immature” the group or individual is, the more easily they are 
manipulated.  Emerging critical consciousness in the people or the group is necessary to 
avoid manipulation.  For obvious reasons, the oppressors try to prevent the emergence of 
critical consciousness.  Finally, cultural invasion destroys attempts at dialogue.  A 
dominant culture is established.  Thoughts are molded and ideas are chosen.  Community 
dwellers have no choice but to follow the dominant culture or thought pattern.  
Individuals have the illusion of participation but through manipulation, inflated 
assertions, and propaganda their participation is a falsehood (Freire, 2009).  These four 
anti dialogical theories operate historically, as well as in the simplest of encounters.   The 
everyday partnership, the teacher, the preacher, the parent-child relationship each has the 
potential to reduce or prevent dialogue.   
 Critical consciousness is the foundation for cooperation and unity in dialogue.  
Cooperation is necessary for dialogue.  Individuals are willing to cooperate with others 
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with a commitment to freedom or liberation of thought and status.  “Cooperation leads 
dialogical subjects to focus their attention on the reality which mediates them, and which 
posed as a problem challenges them” (Freire, 2009, p. 168).  The response is dialogue.  It 
is “critical analysis” of a problematic reality (Freire, 2009).  A communion of the people 
is evident with elements of trust and love.  Communion elicits cooperation, unity, and 
humility (Freire, 2009). 
 Unity is the participatory practice of dialogue.  Individuals have been divided in 
this oppressed state.  To come together, to be united in the pursuit of dialogue is 
important for dialogue to ensue.  To transform ideas, individuals need to unite to the 
common cause (which can be large or small).  “The methods used to achieve unity of the 
oppressed depend on the latter‟s historical and existential experience within the social 
structure” (Freire, 2009).  Individuals are subjects.  There is no sense of domination. 
 In all, participants synthesize their thoughts and objectives.  These are 
thoughtfully exchanged with no imposed models, with creative guidelines for action, and 
acknowledgement of differences.   
 
Revolutionary leaders commit many errors and miscalculations by not 
taking into account something so real as the people‟s view of the world: a 
view which explicitly and implicitly contains their concerns, their doubts, 
their hopes, their way of seeing the leaders, their perceptions of 
themselves and of the oppressors, their religious beliefs (almost always 
syncretic), their fatalism, their rebellious actions  (Freire, 2009, p. 182).   
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Knowledge of this totality is vital for change or cultural synthesis.  This not only ensures 
cultural synthesis, it avoids the transformation of the I into the Thou, or where the anti 
dialogical I transforms the dominated into a mere “it” or “thou” (Freire, 2009, p. 167). 
 Buber (1947) sought dialogue through an internal transformation.  Freire (2009) 
sought a dialectical approach to dialogue.  Each man hoped for the individual‟s being 
with another and the world.  Dewey, half a century earlier sought man‟s and democracy‟s 
survival as well.  He, however, sought this through education.  Educating individuals in a 
democratic society was paramount to his goal.  The school is the social institution, the 
community life where children are encouraged to share in the resources of race and are 
enabled to use their powers for social ends.  The school (education) is a process of living 
(Dewey, 1897).  Were it not for the acknowledgement of school as a form of community 
life, education fails.  He understood class was an issue but he felt the school community 
would breakdown race, gender, class, religion, ethnicity, and all/any other barriers to the 
common experience.  Dewey does not advocate special interests or what he called an 
“anti social spirit” (Ravitch, 2001).  Dewey wants to overcome any element of division 
amongst people with public education.  To do this in the school community is a social 
affair.   
 In the school, communication is important.  Dewey wrote when “communication 
occurs all natural events are subject to reconsideration and revision” (Dewey, 1971, p. 
138).  Reconsideration and revision resonates in the work of Buber where dialogue 
engenders transformation of the individual and Freire who professed a dialectical 
approach.  For communication to engender this transformation, the individual looks to his 
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private realm of events or “his own soliloquy” (Dewey, 1971, p. 141).  If the individual 
encounters the other with an openness of mind and with no preconceived notions of his 
own experience, as Buber and Freire would advance as well, a “mind” emerges (Dewey, 
1971. p. 141).   
    
If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to 
and with ourselves.  Because of converse, social give and take, various 
organic attitudes become an assemblage of persons engaged in converse, 
conferring with one another, exchanging distinctive experiences, listening 
to one another, over-hearing unwelcome remarks, accusing and excusing.  
Through speech a person dramatically identified himself with potential 
acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive states of life but in a 
contemporaneously enacted drama.  Thus mind emerges  (Dewey, 1971, p. 
141).   
 
 
Through language, individuals react upon other events and give them meaning.  New 
interpretations and perspectives evolve.  Language brings an associative quality for the 
individual.  An association is not simply two or more individuals coming together to 
converse.  Both or all participants share the consequence.  Language is communication or 
cooperation, a partnership.  Individuals are subjects.  When individual subjects converse 
new meanings are consequential to the conversation.  The dialectical experience 
generates new perspective and interpretation.  “All discourse, oral or written, which is 
more than a routine unrolling of vocal habits, says things that surprise the one that says 
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them, often indeed more than they surprise anyone else” (Dewey, 1971, p. 160).  New 
combinations of meanings evolve and an essence or significance becomes evident.  A 
thought is made common between two people.  Essence is not existence; it is the meaning 
of existence (Dewey, 1971, p. 148).  “An expert in thought is one who has skill in making 
experiments to introduce an old meaning into different situations and who has a sensitive 
ear for detecting resultant harmonies and discords” (Dewey, 1971, p. 161).  Dewey‟s 
thought echoes Freire‟s (2010) dialectical approach.   
 
As men amplify their power to perceive and respond to suggestions and 
questions arising in their context, and increase their capacity to enter into 
dialogue not only with other men but with their world, they become 
“transitive.”  Their interests and concerns now extend beyond the simple 
vital sphere.  Transitivity of consciousness makes man “permeable.”  It 
leads him to replace his disengagement from existence with almost total 
engagement.  Existence is a dynamic concept, implying eternal dialogue 
between man and man, between man and the world, between man and his 
Creator.  It is this dialogue which makes of man an historical being 
(Freire, 2010, pp. 13-14). 
 
If individuals find essences in communication new meanings are found which can 
generate harmony and discourse.  In this regard, Dewey felt education was not a process 
of prescribed meanings for students. 
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 Dewey felt education prepares students for a life where the students had command 
of themselves.  The only way this is achieved is through constant regard of the 
individual‟s powers, tastes, and interests (Dewey, 1997).  The individual is a social being.  
This social capacity cannot be ignored. 
 
If we eliminate the social factor from the child, we are left with an inert 
and lifeless mass.  If we eliminate the individual factor from society, we 
are left only with an inert and lifeless mass (Dewey, 1927, p. 3). 
 
The powers and interests of the student are continually interpreted.  Educators strive to 
understand their meanings and help students reach their capacity in terms of what they 
are capable of doing.  
  
If he is an educator, be able to judge what attitudes are actually conducive 
to continued growth and what are detrimental.  He must, in addition have 
that sympathetic understanding of individuals as individuals which gives 
him an idea of what is actually going on in the minds of those who are 
learning  (Dewey, 1997, p. 39). 
 
Dewey sought a constructive education where there is no succession of studies in the 
ideal curriculum.  “If education is life, all life has a scientific aspect, an aspect of art and 
culture and communication” (Dewey, 1927, p. 7).  Education is too removed from 
“conditions of everyday life which will generate difficulties” and overemphasize 
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“listening, reading, and what is told and read” (Dewey in Boisvert, 1997, p. 105).  Dewey 
saw education tied to growth, “a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience” 
(Dewey in Boisvert, 1997, p. 106).  For individuals, education is an activity of the 
present.  If education is prescribed with set studies, there is no worth of present 
experience (Dewey, 1927, p. 7).   
Education with a blueprint for study disengages students as subjects.  The 
opportunity for fruitful dialogue is absent.  Absent is the culture circle that evokes 
reflection.  Reflection or critical consciousness necessary for openness and 
acknowledgement of the other is replaced with rubber stamp or deposits of education that 
are tailored not for the individual but for the massification of society.  The worth of 
consciousness is discarded.  It is replaced by an unthinking, manageable group that does 
not contribute to society in transition but to society fixed in epoch.  A dialectical 
relationship in communication that liberates individuals with awareness of their world 
and real consciousness is woefully missed.  The human spirit, the worth of man‟s 
autonomy to reason and to act in community is violated. 
 In a democracy, individuals are credited with the ability to reason their existence.  
As subjects, they interact with each other to adapt to society in transition.  If dialogue is 
encouraged in education, relationships and friendships form.  A friendship formed with a 
critical consciousness is expressed with truth, honesty, integrity, respect, and regard for 
self and other.  As Epicurus and Emerson will assert, the relationship between two and 
extended to others in community maintains the democratic spirit (Epicurus in DeWitt, 
1954, Emerson, Essays, 1896).  This is the meaning of citizenship.  The discourse of 
friendship that results from the reflection or critical consciousness cultivated in the 
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culture circles or the I-Thou relationships so profoundly asserted in Freire and Buber and 
exampled in Emerson and Epicurus is a mandate for citizenship in a democratic society.  
Without this discourse and friendship, all other efforts at democratic citizenship will fail.  
The discourse of friendship is the foundation for scaffolding a democratic society.  The 
absence of discourse that starts in education discredits the contribution of the active 
citizen.   Like Freire (2010), Dewey (1897) asserts an evolving or dialectic experience.   
We note this in the study of Epicurus and Emerson as well. 
  Buber (1947), Dewey (1897), and Freire (2010) all view human interaction as the 
source of knowledge.  Human dialogue plays a critical role for each thinker‟s landscape.  
It is the great challenge for the educator to implement each theory.  How can the teacher 
utilize this notion of dialogue? 
 
Part III 
The Educator or Subject 
In Dialogue 
 
 What is the role of dialogue in education?  John Dewey‟s view is that individuals 
engage in orderly and ordered activity, and in a democracy, individuals share common 
values in order for the community to function with a purpose or a vision of a good life.  A 
functioning dialogic community is the goal of instruction.   
 Dialogue is significant in order for individuals to acknowledge common values 
and recognize the vision of a good life.  If dialogue is absent, individuals will isolate 
themselves from others and share only their distinct ethnocentric values.  There is no 
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opportunity for individuals from varied backgrounds and abilities to realize a common 
vision.  Individuals will live in their own group but not exist with society.  If individuals 
engage in dialogue, the good life inherent in a democratic society is found.  The 
educator‟s task is to aid the individual, the student in the development of dialogue. 
 Various philosophies have been adapted as methodologies or tools for instruction.  
The history of educational philosophy shows an evolution of thought in teaching or 
determining appropriate epistemology for the student.  What is the best way to determine 
and acquire knowledge is front and center in educational methods.  More appropriately, 
however, given that individuals seek common values and a vision of the good life in a 
community, how can educators encourage horizontal dialogue?   
Depending upon one‟s individual philosophy of education, instruction varies.   
Over the decades of public and private instruction, educators have delivered curricula 
through core subject areas and student centered discoveries of knowledge as they relate to 
the subject area.  Whatever the philosophy the teacher decides to employ in everyday 
delivery, the teacher is critical in the learning setting.  With this in mind, early 
philosophies of essentialism and perennialism are discussed.  Additionally, existentialism 
and social reconstruction are included.   These are written as historical venues for 
education.  Finally, as it relates to a philosophy of education and the relationship of 
teacher and student, this section discusses the contributions of Freire, Buber, Dewey, and 
others.   
 Essentialism is based on the belief that there is a core curriculum that all students 
should learn.  This curriculum can change in response to societal changes, but should 
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always be basic and rigorous.  The concept “back to basics” helps to explain essentialism 
(Powell, 2009, p. 276).   
 An essentialist philosophy of education places the teacher at the center of 
instruction.  The teacher is the quintessential role model and dispenser of knowledge.  In 
a serious atmosphere, direct instruction involves memorization of material with proven 
methods at hand.  A vertical relationship, teacher to student, is evident.   Students‟ 
interests are not priority.  They are disciplined with an emphasis on hard work and 
mastery of the core curriculum (Powell, 2009). 
 Perennialism is similar to essentialism in that it suggests a core curriculum.  The 
difference, however, is what constitutes the core curriculum.  Perennial means 
“everlasting” (Powell, 2009, p. 276).  A perennialist advocates a curriculum with themes 
and questions that stand the test of time.  Even with societal changes, the essence or real 
substance and truth remains the same.  There is no choice in curriculum.  Perennialists 
ascribe to a rigid curriculum for schools (Powell, 2009). 
 The perennialist teacher is in control of the classroom.  Differences in students are 
rarely considered.  All are expected to learn the prescribed curriculum with little or no 
consideration of particular student interest.  Traditional methods of direct instruction 
including lecture or a depositing of knowledge are evident.  The goal is a state of 
excellence based upon intense, rigorous, focused teacher centered instruction (Powell, 
2009).  Horizontal dialogue is absent.  A vertical exchange between teacher and student is 
apparent. 
 Focused teacher centered instruction shifted to a more student centered instruction 
in the early 19
th
 century.  Principles of progressive education, particularly constructivism, 
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were becoming popular for educators.  Gone was the notion of “silence is golden” for 
students. A vertical relationship became anachronistic.  Students are encouraged and 
challenged to construct, or discover, knowledge about their environment.  The process of 
discovering knowledge is valued more than the product.  Why?  Construction of 
knowledge leads to problem solving, a skill that appropriately prepares students for 
society (Powell, 2009). 
 Teachers act as facilitators of critical thinking for students.  They serve as guides 
and resources to promote student development.   The classroom is an atmosphere of give 
and take.  It is based upon democratic principles that include active engagement, 
cooperative learning, and interaction amongst students.  The goal is student discovery and 
problem solving complete with critical thinking skills.  The successful student brings 
these achieved goals into society (Powell, 2009).  Horizontal dialogue is encouraged. 
 Rather than simply learning about society, social reconstructionsts seek to change 
society.  This philosophy seeks to educate students in ways that move beyond elements of 
racial and ethnic divide, environmental issues, and class struggle.  The notion of a social 
revolution that brings equality amongst individuals is popular in the 20
th
 century but its 
roots are found as early as the ancient Greek civilization (Powell, 2009). 
 In the classroom, teachers promote student involvement in society‟s problems.  
With elements of constructivist pedagogy, students explore issues, engage in critical 
thinking and problem solving each with respect and regard for others.  Social 
reconstruction avoids the demoralization of person or group.  These skills are usefully 
incorporated into reading, research, analysis, and writing.  The teacher promotes active 
engagement, a sense of responsibility, respect, and regard for the individual and 
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community (Powell, 2009).  Educators purposefully promote dialogue between teacher 
and student. 
 As it regards the individual, existentialism focuses on the whole person.  The 
existentialist purports the whole person, not a particular subject, is important.  If, while 
learning takes place, the student becomes particularly adroit in a given discipline, it is 
worthwhile.  Compulsory education, standardization, tracking, and testing are not 
accepted tenets for the existentialist educator.   Traditional education is not the norm.  
The classroom presents choice and promotes responsibility for students.  Teachers and 
students together participate in the classroom.  As an existentialist proponent, the teacher 
is a role model who demonstrates self discipline, an awareness of self and pursuance of 
academic goals.  Students‟ goals are personal awareness and freedom with personal 
responsibility.  However, it is not freedom without limit.  It is freedom with responsibility 
to others as well (Powell, 2009).  Self awareness and freedom with responsibility toward 
self and others evolves through a reciprocal relationship between educator and educatee.  
The reciprocal relationship is horizontal dialogue. 
In the classroom, the student is a participator not a spectator.  Knowing and doing 
is a partnership between teacher and student.  It is a practice related to actions and guided 
by thoughtful preparation.  The teacher is not magistrate but co partner and guide for all 
students of all levels.   The teacher and student work together to formulate problems and 
solutions in society.  They are not separate entities.  Together, they problem solve with 
elements of critical thinking towards that end.  Dewey (2006) implied a philosophy of 
education should include a social aim.  Progress (industrial and technological) can create 
harsh social divisions.  Elements of class division are evident with advancements of 
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industrialization.  Some individuals feel a sense of abandonment.  Buber would agree 
seeking man‟s survival in a world that abandons him in its quest for progress and power.  
Freire would affirm this, albeit more conflicting, noting a class distinction of oppressors 
and oppressed.  Democratic schools, therefore, seek to overcome racial and national 
prejudice.  Schools can rebuild a spirit of common understanding and good will.  Schools 
can foster understanding of human nature so that people do not disregard another‟s 
nature.  Educators are privileged to be part of this process.  
 Martin Buber (1947), an existentialist, asserted the primacy of doing in education 
not having.  This is a praxis that implies growth.  The “thou” is present for communion in 
education.  The educator‟s role is not to dominate or bank (as Freire (2010) says) but to 
experience a communion with the other so that critical thinking skills are bred and 
articulated.  “Allow the child to venture out…and establish a reverence for thought or 
form and be educated” (Buber, 1947, p. 105).   
 The educator, for Buber, has lost the ability to embark upon shared knowledge or 
the mystery of the personal life that was exchanged and learned in the days of the 
“philosopher, coppersmith with journeymen and apprentices” (Buber, 1947, p. 107). 
 Buber (1947) disdains compulsory education.  This is a catalyst for disunion, 
humiliation, and rebellion.  If communion was to define education, there would be a 
means for students to be drawn in to education.  This negates old education (Freire‟s 
(2010) banking) that assured only the educator was the bearer of values and tradition who 
represented the world of them and us, an antagonistic world devoid of a “spirit” (Buber, 
1947, p. 107-108). 
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 Buber (1947) cautions the educator to be present among all students in all 
situations.  The educator is to be present in the reality of the situation.  If this be done, 
trust evolves and a dialogue ensues.  Buber affirmed the educator needs to be there for 
the individual.  He/she should one, gather the child‟s presence into his own, two, put 
himself/herself “over there” to see from the child‟s perspective and three, create a 
friendship or a mutual experience of inclusion of the other‟s soul (Buber, 1947, pp. 116-
119).  Freire (2010) noted this as well. 
 Buber (1947) felt education was to instill character growth.  Therefore, ethics was 
critical.  The educator should be “alive” and able to communicate.  “Impression” is 
important.  It is the link between man‟s being and his appearance, the connection between 
what he is and how he feels.  Being aware of this, the teacher exudes his character with a 
responsibility to guide the individual through all circumstances to assert for himself and 
the individual what is right and wrong.  This can be done only if there is confidence 
between educator and educatee (Buber, 1947, pp. 120-127).   The teacher acknowledges 
his character and that which shapes his character, in particular for Buber, house, street, 
culture, media (Buber, 1947).   Students, through dialogue, question and interact with the 
teacher and the material and draw conclusions about important issues.  Therefore, 
situations demand presence, responsibility, the You in life.  Still, however, Buber 
acknowledges the acceptance of norms and responsibility.  Discipline and order in one‟s 
life are starting points for responsibility.  Buber felt education for character was 
education for community and unity.  It brought the individual to the spiritual state 
necessary for fullness of being, and therefore, community (Buber, 1947). 
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Paulo Freire, (2010) a social reconstructionist, writes, “democratic educators can 
only see the acts of teaching, of learning, of studying as serious, demanding tasks that not 
only generate satisfaction but are pleasurable in and of themselves.  The satisfaction with 
which they stand before the students, the confidence with which they speak, the openness 
with which they listen and the justice with which they address the student‟s problems 
make the democratic educator a model (Freire in hooks, 2003, p. 42).  Their authority is 
affirmed without disrespect of freedom.  “Because they (democratic educators) respect 
freedom, they are respected” (hooks, 2003, p. 42).  Conversation fosters community.  
Thoughtful dialogue that is conversation fosters closeness and connection.  This notion 
applies to communities world wide.  
 
 In a true dialogue, both sides are willing to change.  We have to 
appreciate that truth can be received from outside of, not only within our 
own group…by engaging in dialogue we have the possibility of making a 
change within ourselves that we can become deeper 
 (Thich Nhat Hanh in hooks, 2003, p. XV). 
 
 Education is a gnosiological situation.  It is a study of knowledge similar to 
epistemology.  To implement this, a partnership and, therefore, an exchange between 
educator-educatee and educatee-educator exists (Freire, 2010, p. 133).  This relationship, 
asserts the human in the world.  “Ideas, convictions, aspirations, myths, art, science” are 
discussed openly and critically.  There are not static; they are dialectical (Freire, 2010, 
pp. 136-137).  Anti dialogical educators sometimes resist this, regrettably.  Resistance is 
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motivated by fear of losing authority or respect in the classroom or school community.  
Freire suggests teachers be open to a praxis that creates critical thinking.  How?  Rather 
than depositing or “banking” knowledge in students through a narrative education, the 
teacher poses questions and methods where students begin to problem solve.  If a teacher 
banks or deposits education, the students‟ creative power is squelched.  This is counter to 
the purpose of education stated in the beginning of this section (Freire, 2009).  Banking 
education rebukes the notion that acquiring knowledge and applying it is a dialectical 
endeavor.  Banking is “necrophylic” not “biophilic” (Fromm in Freire, 2010, p. 77). 
 
 
While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, 
the necrophilous person loves all that does not grow, all that is 
mechanical.  The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform 
the organic  into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as all living 
persons were things…Memory, rather than experience; having rather than 
being, is what counts.  The necrophilous person can relate to an object…a 
flower or a person…only if he possesses it; hence a threat to his 
possession is a threat to himself; if he loses possession he loses contact 
with the world…He loves control, and in the act of controlling, he kills 
life (Fromm in Freire, 2010, p. 77). 
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This necrophylic characterization negates the wonder of education for both the teacher 
and the student.  There is no dialogue, only monologue.  There is no I-We or I-Thou, only 
I.  There is no reflection, no hope.  There is no praxis.  Dialogue is praxis (Freire, 2004).   
 Friere suggests teachers face their educational autonomy or authority with 
freedom.  This sounds contradictory, however, teachers face their autonomy with a 
freedom to acknowledge that education as a dialectic is positive.  Educators can do this 
not by ridding themselves of all traces of their particular baggage, but rather by putting it 
into perspective.  “I cannot be a teacher without exposing who I am” (Freire, 1998, p. 
89).  Exposure to self and acknowledgement of self is liberating.  This is a common 
denominator for dialogue and for teaching.  “We are subject to genetic, cultural, social, 
class, sexual, and historical conditionings that mark us profoundly and that constitute for 
us  center of reference” (Freire, 1998, p. 91).  If teachers acknowledge self, they 
acknowledge others as well.  This breeds respect and openness in education that propels 
understanding and decision making in individuals.  Individuals view freedom not as 
without limits but with self imposed venues to accommodate a dialectical world. 
 Teachers can create an atmosphere to speak with and listen to their students.  
Hearing an individual is not listening.  Listening is openness to the other‟s gestures and 
differences.  It is respectful; it is generous.  If does not negate one‟s autonomy but creates 
an atmosphere where others can disagree, oppose, or take position.  It enhances critical 
thinking…dialogue to educate (Freire, 1998).  Listening creates openness to the world of 
others with whom one shares their pedagogical undertaking.  Teachers become 
acquainted with their students and listen to their voice.   
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 Freire stresses an “open minded teacher.”  This teacher cannot ignore anything 
that concerns the human person.  A teacher‟s work is with people, it is a human act 
towards individuals of all ages, no matter their endeavor.  A teacher has high standards of 
responsibility of themselves and for others.  Simply stated, the teacher needs to care for 
students.  Teachers look at their students not for what they are simply in the moment but 
what they can become. 
 If teachers substitute this (what this writer terms) biophylic education, education 
that is liberating and democratic will spill into the community.  Human ethics learned in 
the classroom become universal ethics of the democratic community (Freire, 2004). 
 John Dewey‟s educational practice advances the fulfillment of common 
democratic values though individual practice cultivated in the classroom.  A 
constructionist, Dewey asserted the responsibility of the teacher to facilitate instruction 
but also to allow the student to grow (Dewey, 2009).  Dewey‟s methods seem more 
perfunctory than thoughtful or evocative of the individual self evidenced by Freire (2010) 
and Buber (1947).  He looks to the individual rather Darwinian like as an organism 
perfunctory in manner rather than in the thoughtful or evocative manner of the individual 
self evidenced by Freire and Buber.  He looks to the individual rather Darwinian like as 
an organism in its environment, one that reaches perfection through doing.  Problem 
solving results (Betz, 1992). 
 Dewey, (1997) like Freire (2010), saw the teacher as a moderator, facilitator in a 
school that was a form of community life.  School is a place where certain lessons are 
learned and habits are formed.  It is a form of community where “all agencies are 
concentrated bringing the child to share in inherited resources of the race and to use his 
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own powers for social ends.  I believe education, therefore, is a process of living and not 
a preparation for future living” (Dewey, 1897, p. 3).  Indeed, it is for the present, but the 
effects are for the future.  The teacher “looks ahead” (Dewey 1997, p. 76).   This cannot 
be discounted.  A school community engenders the child, it cultivates growth for the 
democratic community.  There is no succession of studies in the ideal school curriculum. 
 
If education is life, all life has, from the outset, a scientific aspect; an 
aspect of art and culture and an aspect of communication.  It cannot, 
therefore, be true that the proper studies for grade are mere reading and 
writing, and that at a later grade, reading or literature, or science, may be 
introduced.  The progress is not in the succession of studies, but in the 
development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in experience…I 
believe…that education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction 
of experience; that the process and the goal are one and the same thing  
(Dewey, 1897, pp. 7-8). 
 
Education is therefore dialectic.  Freire (2010) and Buber (1947) would concur. 
 The teacher is an ostensible authority, is moderator, but not a banking or old 
educator.  The authority is a gift of freedom for the teacher.  It is generous.  The teacher‟s 
self confident authority breeds respect born of “just, serious, humble, and generous 
relationships in which both the authority of the teacher and the freedom of students are 
ethically grounded” (Freire, 1998, p. 86).  Freedom for teacher and student creates not a 
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“classroom” but a center for sharing and learning.  This assures education is a process of 
development.  Respect for self and for student is significant.    
It is vital that a spirit of dialogue, a free communication of interchange of ideas, 
suggestions, results, both successes and failures of previous experiences, becomes the 
dominating note of the recitation (Dewey in Kosnoski, 2005, p. 665).  Education is 
participatory.  If a child is inundated with deposited knowledge, “the child is thrown into 
a passive, receptive or absorbing attitude, the conditions are such that he is not permitted 
to follow the law of his nature; the result is friction and waste” (Dewey, 1897, p. 8).  
Further, “image is the great instrument of instruction.  What a child gets out of any 
subject presented to him is simply the images which he himself forms with regard to it” 
(Dewey, 1897, p. 8).  Education is, therefore, not only participatory, it is in partnership 
with the teacher who looks to every child in a unique situation, to consider the differences 
among children. In Democracy and Education, Dewey asserts acknowledgement of 
difference in education is analogous to the farmer who needs to plant certain crops in 
particular soils.  Schools (educators) cannot ignore characteristics. 
 
The educator, like the farmer, has certain things to do, certain resources 
with which to do, and certain obstacles with which to contend.  The 
conditions with which the farmer deals, whether as obstacles or resources, 
have their own structure and operation independently or any purpose of 
his.  Seeds sprout, rain falls, the sun shines, insects devour, blight comes, 
the seasons change.  His aim is simply to utilize these various conditions; 
to make his activities and their energies work together, instead of against 
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one another.  It would be absurd if the farmer set up a purpose of farming 
without any reference to these conditions of soil, climate, characteristic of 
plant growth, etc…It is the same with the educator, whether parent or 
teacher.  It is absurd for the latter to set up his own aims as the proper 
objects of the growth of the children as it would be for the farmer to set up 
an ideal of farming irrespective of conditions…Any aim is of value so far 
as it assists observation, choice, and planning in carrying on activity from 
moment to moment and hour to hour; if it gets in the way of the 
individual‟s own common sense (as it will surely do if imposed from 
without or accepted on authority) it does harm (Dewey, 1914, pp. 106-
107). 
 
To acknowledge the other, the teacher is open to self first.  Otherwise, acknowledgement 
of difference is difficult.   
 Dewey‟s (1914) message is similar to Freire‟s (2010) and Buber‟s (1947)  To 
encourage dialogue and so community, teachers and schools are areas of community 
themselves that are identified by a partnership between educator and educatee.  This 
partnership is formulated to inspire understanding and acknowledgement of difference. 
 Dialogue and community inspires and sustains community and democracy.  For 
its part, education is sine qua non to lay foundation for a discourse that supports dialogue 
and community.   
 In Deborah Meier‟s (2002) The Power of Their Ideas, the Central Park East 
School, a model for schools, celebrates public education.  The model is based upon the 
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relationships students build with their peers and the adults throughout the school, the 
school‟s respect and nourishing of students‟ personal interests and passions, and finally 
the strong ties that the school maintained with the students‟ families (Meier, 2000).  A 
critical aspect of this model stands out for deliberation.  It is the teacher (Meier, 2002).    
The significant elements of class size, a curriculum that “kids fall in love with” (Meier, 
2002, p. 21), parent involvement, collegiality amongst the staff, and small schools, each 
important, the teacher and ethics stand significantly amidst these elements.   
Not all teachers are able to teach in a modeled Central Park East school.  Yet all 
teachers can share in the power of their ideas, in the wonder of their students in their own 
classroom.    All teachers need to be caring and compassionate.  They need to be open to 
student ideas, to experience the “You” in their students.  Small schools are idyllic for 
dialogue as Meier suggests.  However, not all educators are part of a small school setting.  
The catalyst for dialogue is the teacher, whether the school or class is large or small.  A 
teacher is a subject who does not look at students as Its or as objects.  Teachers as subject 
look to their students not as they are in the moment but for what they can become.  The 
works of Buber, Freire, and Dewey can resonate in all teachers as subjects in relation to 
their students.  Teachers can get to know their students if they make a concerted effort to 
do so. . 
  Meier asserts small schools are safer because teachers know their students 
(Meier, 2002, p 107).  However, all schools can be safe if teachers get to know their 
students, share in their lives and create a model ethic or model character.  Clearly, 
however, if the school staff exerts genuine action towards students, such as sharing in 
their lives and modeling ethical behavior in whatever means appropriate, all schools can 
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be safe.  What happens in the classroom can extend into the school community.  Teachers 
wield an enormous amount of influence in this regard.  Further, teachers and parents can 
share the common interest that is the student regardless of class or school size.    The 
obstacles to this such as “the smell of who‟s the boss,” who is the principal or the 
superintendent or the School Committee, and the need for teacher respect 
notwithstanding is evident in all schools (Meier, 2002, p. 124).  Yet, teachers can get 
beyond this.  Is this easy?  Indeed not.  It takes tenacity of spirit and awareness and 
comfort with the self.  This is the wonder of Freire‟s (2010) and Buber‟s (1947) message 
as it relates to dialogue. 
If teachers in all schools, regardless of school size, socioeconomic makeup of 
student body, and curriculum open themselves to the awareness and respect for their 
students, then real dialogue can occur.  Freire (2010) aptly wrote that teachers face their 
educational autonomy or authority with freedom.  To engage in this freedom, teachers are 
aware of themselves and so open to others.   
The critical issue for Freire (2010), Buber (1947), and Dewey (1897) is that the 
teacher treats students as subjects. But in order for the teacher to engage in the wonder of 
the dialogue he must know who he is.    Dialogue begins with an awareness of self and 
openness to others.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 To imagine community and citizenship without dialogue is to negate the essence 
of democracy.  If dialogue is present, individuals will acknowledge self and others 
through friendship.  Real friendship established through dialogue contributes to 
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community.   Community is essential to democracy.  At the outset of this chapter, it was 
noted Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) marveled at the sorts of associations he encountered 
in the United States in the 1840s.  He admired the art of the individual to freely and 
eagerly associate himself to assert a common goal for the community.  Whether the goal 
is political or social, Americans gather to reach a common ground (de Tocqueville, 
2000).  This is a remarkable trait.  It is a characteristic that gives all groups, regardless of 
background, opportunity to engage in community.   
To establish a community, the real dialogue that is suggested by Buber (1947), 
Freire (2010), and Dewey (1897) begins with acknowledgement of self and the other.  
The acknowledgement of self presents an opportunity of acknowledgment of the other 
without pretension or circumstance.  If this exchange is appropriately undertaken, 
dialogue will ensue. 
The rewards of dialogue are without limit.  The human exchange in community 
and ultimately in a democratic society is without measure.  As it relates to citizenship, the 
possibilities for growth are endless.   Democracy rests upon the backs of its people.  Real 
dialogue allows friendship in the manner of Epicurus, Emerson, Peaceable Schools, and 
citizenship to flourish.  
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Chapter 6 
Peaceable Schools  
And Philosophical Foundations of Friendship 
In the Works of 
Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
Can secondary institutions teach or create a discourse that contributes to one‟s 
civic identity?  The school is arguably the first public institution where children 
experience a civic disposition.  Individuals learn to share, make choices, become 
responsible, and accountable.  The school embodies democratic norms and values along 
with practices.    These norms are not dictatorial.  They are part of the school‟s mission 
statement to promote responsibility amongst students. Norms, supposedly, contribute to 
character building, but not always. 
The advent of technology and advancements in mechanization has brought the 
global realm into every national culture in the world.  The effects are astounding and 
awesome.  Across America, public and independent or private schools are no longer 
populated homogeneously.  School cultures are identified with multi cultural 
backgrounds including race, ethnicity, and socio economic backgrounds.  Diversity, or 
the broad based pan cultural characteristics of the population, is a key word to describe 
differences amongst the masses.  Some differences (for example:  one‟s color, language, 
religion) are more or less than others depending upon one‟s own cultural acceptance of 
others.   
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Individuals from every walk of life can recall a situation that brings question to 
mind in terms of “belonging.”    Imagine the young student who at sixteen moves from a 
major city filled with the wonders of her culture, Jewish, Moslem, Roman Catholic, or 
other with striking characteristics of feast days, clothing, traditions, and indigenous food.  
She moves to a new region where her culture is “other” to the endemic or particular life.    
Soon, our young student is called hurtful names and she learns through the vicious chain 
of gossip that town officials sought to keep her family out of town because of their 
background.  Catapulted from the comfort zone of the big city and sameness of culture 
back home, she now faces stares, innuendoes, and insults.  
The story is a mere dot, a tiny atom amidst infinity.  This story pales in experience 
to other harrowing stories of exclusion.  Exclusion for the young girl is a new experience.  
More significantly for this situation, it results in the lingering questions of self.  “Who am 
I?” and “Where do I belong?” and “How come they don‟t like me?” and finally, “How 
can I change to be accepted?”  The last question is the most wrenching of all.  Rather 
than have pride in oneself or the realization of self, one seeks to be like the other to be 
accepted.  Participation in community is limited by exclusion and domination.  How can 
this change? 
Schools have been charged with the task of addressing the ills or woes of society.  
Events ranging from teen-age pregnancy to drugs to school violence to discrimination 
and citizen apathy demand a solution from education.  Curriculum writers agonize over 
effective models where students develop the skills to graduate and live an equitable, free, 
participatory, and happy life.  Individual teachers are consumed with academics.  Yet if 
schools truly seek to manifest the skills needed to assuage challenge and conflict in 
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society, they need to live these skills daily (Meier, 2002).  Inclusive rather than exclusive 
practices are important.  Meaningful dialogue regarding how atmospheric infractions are 
disruptive the individual and community are more important than punitive measures that 
respond to infractions (Meier, 2002).   Curriculum models are traditionally driven by a 
hierarchy of administrators and staff who dominate and control the student body 
(Caulfield, 2000).  This suggests an atmosphere that is neither progressive, nor in keeping 
with democratic ideals and a civic life.  It is critical to this end of progressive education 
and demonstration of democratic ideals and citizenship participation, it is important that 
curriculum models not be control models but participatory models.  All students and staff 
should have a part to play.  In order for schools to be effective, curriculum models do 
well to address human beings, their relationships and their beliefs.  How do individuals 
shape their cultures?  How are these cultures different?  How are they the same?  What 
can we share?   Given 21
st
 century globalism, how can schools really address what some 
refer to as society‟s “ills”?  The answer may be in our history.   
Ancient Greek History and Early American History reveal a possible solution.  
Epicurus (300 B.C.) and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1830), with more than two thousand 
years separating their work, give insight and guidance for curriculum models that foster 
inclusion and participation and not exclusion and domination.  Referencing the works of 
these two philosophers, histories schools can create curriculum models that foster 
inclusion and participation and not exclusion and domination.  Each edifies a dialogue 
amongst individuals built upon a consciousness of self and other.  Dialogue is the 
arbitrator of conflict and challenge.  The friendship that results identifies the ongoing 
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active citizenship in the community.  The Peaceable Schools have evidence of these 
lessons in their philosophy. 
This chapter first examines characteristics of Peaceable Schools. The second part 
analyzes the works of Epicurus and Emerson, particularly their essays on friendship.  
These two works are foundational for the Peaceable Schools model.  Friendship, through 
dialogue, is the means to active citizenship.  This is cultivated in the Peaceable Schools. 
The Peaceable School model is foundational for active citizenship.  Everyone is 
made to feel important and youths are given meaningful opportunities to explore 
learning.  The atmosphere is not competitive or hierarchical.  It takes “into consideration 
the social arrangements of U.S. society and the larger social issues of diversity and 
tolerance” (Brush, Caulfield, and Snyder-Joy, 1998 in Caulfield, 2000, p. 173).  
Relationships built within the school community are extended into the outside 
community. 
 Peaceable Schools envision a community that embraces empowered learning, 
consensus building, excellence, and equity for all members (Caulfield, 2000).  The 
schools are built with values of working on the systemic transformation on all levels.  
School climate presents opportunities to link individuals to each other rather than create a 
rank of individuals (Caulfield, 2000).  Diversity is viewed as a resource, not as a 
problem.  Tension is absent and justice is sought.  The significance of the self, 
reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power is important.  Also, holistic solutions, 
conflict as an opportunity for change, and equity in the community characterizes the 
growth or lived process of Peaceable Schools.  (http://www.lesley.edu/academic 
centers/peace/institute.html). 
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 The school community acknowledges the realities of life.  What creates 
exclusivity in the community?  Are there alternatives to exclusivity that are realistic and 
rather than alienate, encourage individuals to participate in school life and beyond?  The 
Peaceable Schools typify a journey that includes “transformation of selves, of beliefs, or 
relationships, and perhaps most important of the ways in which we both view and treat 
the youths of our communities” (Caulfield, 2000, p.171). 
The Peaceable Schools vision or mission statement integrates 
 
a global community free of violence, disconnection, and systemic inquiry.  
This community offers inclusive, empowered learning that is rooted in the 
values of affirmation, consensus building, excellence, and equity as a 
reality for all members.  As a result of the center‟s efforts, educators, 
young people and other community members will have the tools, 
knowledge, and relationships to live out and generate welcoming, 
dynamic, and interconnected communities.   
We believe that peaceable schools and communities are built on the 
following values: 
 Systemic transformation requires working on multiple 
levels:  the individual, interpersonal and institutional; the 
personal, professional and political. 
 Diversity is a resource, not a problem.  Multiple lenses and 
multiple voices are necessary to build just communities and 
effective programs.   
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 Change happens from the inside out change starts with the 
self. 
 Reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power are important 
components in all learning and helping relationships.   
 All people, children, youth, and adults, have the capacity to 
be leaders.  New leaders and inclusive leadership must be 
supported. 
 It is important to go beyond individualistic solutions in 
order to create communities that work for all members.  
Holistic and collective analysis and strategies are more 
effective. 
 Conflict is an opportunity for growth and transformation.  
Effective strategies for dealing with conflict should be 
rooted in principles of respect and non-violence. 
 Building an intentional community in which all voices are 
heard is the underpinning for all learning in a peaceable 
setting.   
 Creating and sustaining peaceable schools and communities 
is an on-going work and a lived process 
(http://lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html). 
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 The Peaceable Schools model integrates diversity, popular education, and 
developmental assets (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005).  These three lenses that contribute 
to the overall framework for Peaceable Schools are acknowledged through dialogue.   
Dialogue is foundational for friendship that defines living citizenship in the larger 
community.  The relationship amongst individuals transcends the perfunctory actions of 
the community.  Respect, regard, and compassion are lived (my italics). 
Martin Buber writes relationships are open, direct, mutual and present (Buber, 
1947).  It is important for the individual to recognize the other, not as an object or with 
circumstance, but with the whole being.  There is no condition that identifies the 
relationship only the genuineness of their self is significant.  The relationship has no 
barriers or parameters; the relationship is a mutual immersion in the other.  Void of 
Particulars, individuals enter into relationships with no means or preconceived notions.  
Relationships are without realms but with openness, and a sense of being with another 
(Buber, 1996). 
Paulo Freire (2010) reiterates Martin Buber (1996).  The process of humanization 
is blocked by oppression. Through dialogue, peoples can restore humanity.  To do this, 
there is a consciousness of each other.  It takes into account the other‟s behavior, view of 
the world, and ethics.  Myths or prescriptions are examined and rejected.  Reflection 
leads each participant to action.  Individuals create a consciousness of each other (Freire, 
2010).  Without consciousness of each other, the three lenses that frame the Peaceable 
Schools cannot occur.  The individual cannot acknowledge the other if they do not allow 
themselves, open themselves to understanding of the other.  Understanding or empathy is 
apparent, perspective is acknowledged, and a search for the other is evident.  The dialogic 
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exchange is described with love, hope, and trust.  It is the segway or the impetus to create 
a different association or community where inclusivity is the goal.  Understanding and 
acceptance of each other yields limitless possibilities standing aside obstacles or 
oppression society fixes among them.  Both parties recognize and acknowledge the other 
as participants and contributors to the world, not simply as stationery or mired 
participants resultant of the world‟s socio economic or cultural circumstances.  Dialogue 
is a possibility.  Without this, friendship cannot evolve. 
The first lens, cultural diversity, is modeled on Ten Cs of Awareness (one‟s 
individual awareness of self) and Change (one‟s individual capability to change) 
(DeRosa, Johnson, 2002).  In order to accept others, the individual accepts self by 
acknowledging the Five Cs. The Five Cs are color, culture, class, character, and context.  
Color describes those aspects of the individual that are unchangeable.  For example, these 
are skin tone, sex, and physical appearance.  Culture determines the meaning of color as 
it relates to race or gender.  What are the beliefs, behaviors, modes of living for the 
individual that describe his/her culture?  Class addresses power relations and creates a 
status or hierarchy.  Where is one‟s position in the social structure?  Character represents 
the personal attributes and idiosyncrasies that make each person unique.  Individuals 
share character traits with others but also have particular traits unique to them.  Context 
represents the external and institutional factors that shape our identity.  In particular, 
time, history, environment, location, and social conditions in which each of us develops 
describes context (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005, DeRosa, Johnson, 2002).    
 Once the individual has identified the Five Cs of Awareness, they begin to change 
their surroundings.  The Five Cs of Change are confidence, courage, commitment, 
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conflict, and community.  Confidence in oneself acknowledges the ability that change is 
within oneself.  Courage is the ability to take action in spite of risk or fear of 
repercussion.  Dr. Martin Luther King described courage as “the inner resolution to go 
forward in spite of obstacles and frightening situations” (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 7).  
Commitment is the “focus, strategy, determination driven by love and knowledge…the 
deep and consistent passion for justice and embrace of humanity…” and “accurate 
education about history and culture inclusive of multiple perspectives (DeRosa, Johnson, 
2002, p. 8).  Conflict refers to “reflection, struggle, and tension that promotes growth and 
justice” (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 8).  Finally, community means working with others 
together toward a “shared vision that acknowledges, values, and affirms human diversity 
essential to the individual and the community” (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 8).  In other 
words, I equals We. 
 Once the individual grasps the first Five Cs of Awareness, the Five Cs of Change 
ideally occur.  The Five Cs of awareness do not “deny the genetic, cultural, and social 
conditioning we are subjected to” (Freire, 2004, p. 99).  Rather, they “recognize that we 
are conditioned but not determined” (Freire, 2004, p. 99).  They mean that “history is a 
time of possibility rather than of determinism, and that the future is problematic rather 
than inexorable” (Freire, 2004, p. 99).  Individuals are aware of what is around them.  
Through a unique background and experience in the world, the individual develops a 
consciousness and begins to understand other individuals.  The consciousness of the non 
self (the other) leads to a new consciousness or a new presence in the world (Freire, 
2004).  Freire suggests a culture circle where individuals talk about their particular 
stations or circumstances in life.  Individuals share their work and contributions to the 
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world.  They recognize their power to change or transform the world, their own particular 
worth as part of the whole.  Individuals do not degrade themselves or withdraw with 
resignation but rather see themselves as an equal.  They have the capability to contribute 
to the world regardless of class or socio-economic standing.  Individuals, without 
apprehension engage in a fruitful, reciprocal dialogue symbolic of worth and value to the 
community (Freire, 2010).  Their former oppressed station in life is now a participatory 
engagement in civic life.  Because of the new consciousness, individuals seek alternatives 
to exclusion and oppression.  They work for a peaceful, just, and humane society 
(DeRosa, Johnson, 2003).  This process is not easy.  The individual faces risk of 
alienation from his conditioned existence in society.  Change is, however, possible.  
Epicurus and Emerson realized this as well.  Even though we wish for self-preservation 
our instinct is simply to clutch at a painless state (pleasure).  Conformity and not change 
prevails (Self Reliance, Essays: First Series, 1844).  If pleasure is to be maximized, 
however, self is realized (Epicurus in Rist, 1980).   
The second lens, popular education and democratic participation focuses on the 
work of Paulo Freire and critical pedagogy, dialogue, democratic participation and 
popular education (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005).  Freire‟s work recognizes human 
oppression and points in the direction of human liberation, and political development.  
Freire begins by analyzing the nature of oppression and its effect on the consciousness of 
those oppressed.  Passivity, non reflectiveness, and an inability to engage in productive 
dialogue characterize the oppressed.  They talk about their differences and try to correct 
them.  They realize that they, too, are actors in a world where possibility had real 
meaning.  Through dialogue, they transferred their fixed station in life and begin a 
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participatory engagement in their civic life.  The recognition of each of these invokes a 
critical consciousness that precipitates dialogue and democratic participation (Brion-
Meisels, Johnson, 2005).  Dialogue and democratic participation prevails in a reciprocal 
relationship. 
 Popular Education begins with the teacher and the Five Cs of Awareness and 
Change.  Teachers also experience dialogue.  The critical consciousness is not exclusive 
for students, but for all staff, especially teachers.  Indeed, “teaching is a human act” 
(Freire, 1998, p. 85).  Teaching is an expression of the individual.  It is not a matter of 
transmitting content of discipline or depositing knowledge against which Freire cautions 
(1998).  Teaching is an act of humanity.  It is a self confident authority based on their (the 
teacher‟s) education.  “The teacher is not in the school to impose certain ideas or to form 
certain habits in the child, but as a member of the community to select the 
influences…and to assist him in properly responding to these influences” (Dewey, 1897, 
p. 5).   Recall the earlier assertion where teachers look to students not in the moment but 
with potential and not as an It or an object (Meier, 2002). 
 In Peaceable Schools, the authority is a gift of freedom for the teacher.  It is 
generous.  The teacher‟s self confident authority breeds respect born of “just, serious, 
humble, and generous relationships in which both the authority of the teacher and the 
freedom of students are ethically grounded” (Freire, 1998, p. 86).  Freedom for teacher 
and student creates not a “classroom” but a center for sharing and learning.  This assures 
education is a process of development.  An ethic which values respect for self and for 
student is significant.  Life is faced with challenge.  In order to address the challenges of 
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life, regardless of discipline, ethics is critical if the human existence is a beneficial one 
(Freire, 2004, p. 98).   
Ethics determines a good fate.  Respect for self and respect for student is critical.  
Respect is part of living ethically. The ethics referred to are not “marketplace ethics” but 
human ethics (Freire, 2004, p. 115).   These allow individuals to “speak with” rather than 
“speak to”.  Individuals do not speak to someone as an object but speak with someone as 
a being (Buber, 1996).  Respect creates an atmosphere for listening to other opinions.  
Listening is not agreeing with another.  It is rather knowing how to “listen well so that I 
can speak or situate myself vis-à-vis the ideas being discussed…of listening connectedly 
and without prejudice” (Freire, 2004, p. 107).  Listening stimulates conversation or 
dialogue and change.  If individuals, teachers, and students listen, open their minds and 
thoughts, then dialogue is not a power struggle or authoritative in nature.  It is 
democratic.  “Conversation is the central location of pedagogy for the democratic 
educator” (hooks, 2003, p. 44).  Difference and oppression in the classroom is 
acknowledged.  Change or social justice is a positive focus. 
Change or social justice alleviates control statements or ideological statements 
that are harmful to human beings.  A comment such as “do you know to whom you are 
talking?” or “you‟ll never be as good as we are” signal a lack of respect and closed or 
single minded thinking (Freire, 2004, p. 118).  An ethics of respect, and listening, and 
dialogue dispels any hurtful, critical comments in the classroom. 
The benefit of popular education typical in Peaceable Schools is multifaceted.  
Popular education as Freire suggests cultivates understanding.  “I am learning who I am 
by relating to what is my opposite” (Freire, 2004, p. 119).  A teacher‟s self confident 
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authority creates freedom and generosity in the classroom that breeds generosity towards 
students.  A generous spirit creates an atmosphere of respect between teacher and student 
and amongst students.  Respect allows listening, genuine listening (that which may/may 
not be pleasant), to create an open, creative dialogue where constructive thinking towards 
goals of social justice and absence of oppression takes place.   An opportunity for 
progress for all groups in a democratic society is present.  Teachers and students open 
themselves to each other‟s world.  The result is an adventure that the teacher and the 
student embark upon not only for the present classroom time but for life.  The classroom 
becomes a partnership of thoughts and ideas that is taken beyond classroom. 
The partnership requires that ideas of young people are regarded seriously.  The 
third lens looks towards the ideas and resources young people bring to schools and 
communities (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005).  “A constructivist approach to youth 
development involves making and protecting opportunities for young people to actively 
create or construct new ideas, values, and meanings as they struggle to understand and to 
remain engaged in the interpersonal and community relations that are critical to their 
health and happiness” (Carlson-Paige, Levin, 1992, Kohn, 1999, Christensen, 2000 in 
Brion-Meisels, Johnson 2005, p. 11).  This constructivist approach is possible only in a 
democratic school and community.  In order for development to occur, all cultures, races, 
genders, and institutional factors need to be acknowledged and recognized (Brion-
Meisels, Johnson, 2005).  This lens is closely related to the first two lenses previously 
discussed.  A democratic education is foremost the most beneficial.  Participants are in 
touch with self (the Ten Cs) and with the pedagogy and goals of popular education. 
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The acknowledged differences among children in democratic education will 
create a seedbed for growth.  It is the responsibility of the educator to create growth, to 
judge, and devise conditions, materials, physical constraints or concerns, moral and social 
concerns that interact with existing powers and preferences to bring about the 
transformation of the individual.  There is no cookie cutter approach or one size fits all.  
Teachers have confident authority and enthusiasm to go beyond the textbook.  No 
curriculum or textbook is sacred in delivering content.  Educators feel free to take the 
initiative or make changes if appropriate.  Above all, teachers take time to “listen” to 
their classroom dynamic with passion and diligence.  This realizes an “I-We” relationship 
that Freire asserts necessary for dialogue and critical consciousness (Freire, 1998).  
Development is a thoughtful, continuous process where all levels of skills and all groups 
are considered part of the process (Dewey in Archambeault, 1964). 
 The democratic educator works to create closeness in the classroom.  Parker 
Palmer writes this is the “intimacy that does not annihilate difference” (hooks, 2003, p. 
49).  The commitment to intimacy and openness of thinking fosters teacher and student 
success. Teachers create an atmosphere of “doing with” rather than “doing to” or rather 
creating biophilic education and not necrophylic education (Freire, 2010).  Teachers 
encourage creative thinking for students.  In biophilic education, teachers urge students to 
acquire knowledge dialectically.  If education is necrophylic or knowledge is simply 
transferred from teacher to student or deposited through a narrative, the openness of 
thinking that characterizes a dynamic dialogue and classroom is absent (Freire, 2010).  
Banking is “necrophylic” not “biophilic” (Fromm in Freire, 2010, p. 77). 
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 As previously emphasized, the notion of self is critical in this regard.  Individuals 
need to get in touch with whom they are.  If one‟s records or grooves (part of the Five Cs 
of awareness) are acknowledged then change (the Five Cs of Change) becomes a reality.  
Acknowledgement and work toward the Ten Cs values “wholeness over division or 
splitting”.  A transformation of self occurs.  A democratic “closeness” ensues.  
Individuals experience equality amongst others.  Through respect of self and each other 
fidelity and equality are taken beyond the classroom and into the community (hooks, 
2003, p. 49). 
 The three lenses, cultural diversity, popular education, and developmental assets 
are foundations for the holistic framework of Peaceable Schools.  The self is first and 
foremost.  Given the Ten Cs, individuals celebrate self, diversity, and change.  The focus 
on democratic practice fosters reciprocity and conflict resolution.  School-community 
partnerships are created that were otherwise hierarchical and power based.  Social justice 
or the creation of democratic communities and visioning life through different or multiple 
lenses is promoted.  Finally, a community that was based on “I” is now based on “we”.  
A transformational leadership occurs.  Everyone is responsible; everyone is a leader 
(http://www.lesley.edu/academic centers/peace/institute.html, Freire, 1998). 
 The holistic framework for Peaceable Schools, in this author‟s view, is a 
dialectical progressive pedagogy for education that assures a living citizenship model. 
Awareness of self is encouraged with shared power and leadership with others, in 
particular with students and staff and parents and family.  Guidance and input is solicited 
from all.   Every educator, parent or teacher ensures the vision prevails. John Dewey 
asserted the goal of education is to prepare the child. 
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To prepare him for the future life means to give him command of himself; 
it means so to train him that he will have the full and ready use of all his 
capacities; that his eye and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, 
that his judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under which 
it has to work, and the executive forces be trained to act economically and 
efficiently.  It is impossible to reach this sort of adjustment save as 
constant regard is had to the individual‟s own powers, tastes, and interests-
say, that is, as education is continually converted into psychological terms.  
In sum, I believe that the individual who is to be educated is a social 
individual and that society is an organic union of individuals.  If we 
eliminate the social factor from the child we are left only with an 
abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left 
only with an inert and lifeless mass.  Education, therefore, must begin with 
a psychological insight into the child‟s capacities, interests, and habits.  It 
must be controlled at every point by reference to these same 
considerations.  These powers, interests, and habits must be continually 
interpreted-we must know what they mean.  They must be translated into 
terms of their social equivalents-into terms of what they are capable of in 
the way of social service (Dewey, 1897, p. 3). 
 
 
Peaceable Schools complement this goal.  The model helps students create a sense of self, 
necessary for friendship. 
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 How do the ideals of the Peaceable Schools reflect the ideas of Epicurus and 
Emerson?  Of course, these men do not assert a Peaceable School per se, but the notion of 
self and community with a vision of social justice is evident.  The Peaceable Schools‟ 
goal for individuals to live lives with peace and justice, with reflection, celebration and 
renewal of their self is rooted in the works of Epicurus and Emerson. 
 Epicurus‟s and Emerson‟s motivation for reform each parallel the motivation for 
Peaceable Schools.  Epicureanism began as a movement in response to the civil strife in 
Greece circa 400 B.C. as Peaceable Schools developed as a response to racial, ethnic, and 
cultural divisiveness in the late 20
th
 century.  Epicurus sought to eliminate subjugation of 
free people.  He struggled to achieve a condition where the individual reveled in the 
acknowledgement of self and realized a happy, contented life.  In this regard, Epicurus in 
the 4
th
 Century B.C. urged what Peaceable Schools urge in the 21
st
 Century classroom, 
“attention must be paid to the reality of people‟s lives” (Caulfield, 2000, p. 178).  
Understanding is not only the highest virtue, it is the highest happiness for it avails more 
than any other faculty to avoid pain and grief (Durant, 1939).  The self would be realized 
in the Garden, an area free from the pressures and influences of society discussed in 
chapter 4.  Here in this intellectually provocative environment, the individual developed 
ontologically.   The individual eventually created relationships with others who had 
experienced oppression or subjugation (Freeman, 1938).   The Garden is the equivalent of 
the Peaceable Schools‟ present day campus buildings. 
 Epicurus was a contractarian who sought a voluntary acceptance of an unwritten 
contract of friendship (Farrington, 1967).  Each individual was obligated to behave 
rightly to promote happiness for his good and for each other‟s good.  Similar to the 
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promotion of social justice in the Peaceable Schools, there is an inherent obligation to 
cultivate good will and love toward mankind.  Good will and love equates with love of 
justice and love toward man. There needn‟t be a formal contract.  The goal of Peaceable 
Schools obliges the individual through a natural compact to sustain social justice. 
In the Peaceable Schools setting, what was free play for Epicurus resulted in self 
realization or the Five Cs of Awareness, color, culture, class, character, and context 
(DeRosa, P. Johnson, U. 2002).  The Five C‟s of Awareness are what Epicurus called the 
“complete life” (Freeman, 1938, p. 163). 
 The particular choices made in a friendship (in the Garden circa 300 B.C.) are 
attentive to the same ethically relevant circumstances in the 21
st
 century Peaceable 
Schools of a person‟s life (Freire, 2004).  Friendship allowed individuals to live not as 
isolated individuals but as an extended self, a person with attachments to others.  This 
notion for Epicurus led to happiness or for the Peaceable Schools, the Five Cs of Change, 
confidence, courage, commitment, conflict, and community (DeRosa P. Johnson, U. 
2002).  Relationships were dependent upon and interwoven with others.  To enjoy peace, 
a man makes as many friends as possible.  Friendships are not left to chance.  They are 
diligently cultivated (DeWitt, 1954).   
 Epicurus insisted friendship is open to all groups, regardless of class, color, or 
gender.  Friendship was a democratic and a reciprocal relationship.  It was not exclusive 
to a few.  It was not formed in haste nor slowness.  It was mutual. 
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We must not be critical either of those who are quick to make friends or 
those who are slow but be willing to risk the offer of friendship for the 
sake of winning friendship.  The tie of friendship knits itself through 
reciprocity of favors among those who have come to enjoy pleasures to the 
full  (Vatican Saying 28 in DeWitt, 1954, p. 310). 
 
Epicurus created an open, peaceful atmosphere that was caring, reflective, and 
cooperative without rank.   He would applaud the inclusion of his efforts in Peaceable 
Schools where 
 
Teaching about peace and social justice is of little value if it is done in an 
environment that is largely competitive and hierarchical (Brush, Caulfield, 
and Snyder-Joy in Caulfield, 2000, p. 173). 
 
For Epicurus, if man was to develop ontologically with opportunity for reflection, 
celebration, and renewal a democratic atmosphere was essential.  In the Garden, Epicurus 
counseled everyone to open their minds and allow free exchanges amongst themselves.  
He urged careful listening that bred understanding and a presence of all where individuals 
shared the realized the circumstances of oppression and exclusion (Freeman, 1938).    
The result mirrors Peaceable Schools where individuals value fairness and social justice 
without rank (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005, Freire, 2010). 
It is democratic as the friendships in Peaceable Schools and part of everyday life.   
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Peaceable Schools, like creating a peaceable world, requires that all 
persons are treated as though they matter, that all persons are treated as 
unique people with their own gifts, talents, and contributions, and that 
ways of teaching should provide opportunities for different gifts and 
talents to be utilized and recognized (Caulfield, 2000, p,. 174). 
 
Individuals have a happy contented life with a critical consciousness of the other.  In 
Peaceable Schools, the individual recognizes that each is connected to the collective 
(Brion-Meisels, Brion-Meisels, Hoffman, 2007) just as Epicurus assumed men derive 
intangible rewards of pleasure from the contemplation of one another and from their 
conversations presently and beyond (Rist, 1980).  Epicurus wanted individuals to share a 
fellowship of friendship that was embraced and maintained in the community. 
 
Friendship too has practical needs as its motive.  One must indeed lay its 
foundations (we seed the ground, too) but it is formed and maintained 
through community of life among those who have reached the fullness of 
pleasure (Turner, 1947, p. 354). 
  
 
In the community, friendships are developed with expediency to ensure peace and safety 
in the community just as the promotion of social justice is asserted in the Peaceable 
Schools.   Of course, friendships are cultivated wisely.  As Epicurus insisted and 
Peaceable Schools assured, ethics were critical if human existence was to have a presence 
in the world (Freire, 2004).  “It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, 
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honorably, and justly; nor to live prudently, honorably and justly without living 
pleasantly” (Diogenes in in Durant, 1938, p. 647).  
 Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), like Epicurus, was a reactionary and a 
reformer.   Emerson sought to reform the nature of man, make him capable of 
brotherhood and replace selfishness and materialism with love and sharing.  Human love 
could create a political and social revolution, a revolution in human affairs (Padover. 
1959). “The purpose of life seems to be to acquaint a man with himself.  The highest 
revelation is that God is in every man” (Diary, September 8, 1833, in Padover, 1959). 
 As Peaceable Schools use school and community, and as Epicurus used the 
Garden, Emerson used the Lyceum.  The Peaceable Schools worked with school and 
community for the promotion of social justice.  For Epicurus and Emerson, the fruits of 
the Garden and the Lyceum sought recognition of self, equality, reciprocity, and social 
justice.  Like Epicurus, Emerson insisted ethics were important.  Virtues realized in the 
Garden in the 4
th
 Century B.C. and the Lyceum in the 19
th
 Century set the precedent for 
Peaceable Schools in the 21
st
 century.   
 Emerson implores the individual to find himself amidst the sea of change in the 
early 19
th
 century.  He is troubled that society has absorbed the human side of the 
individual.  The individual has lost his sense of self and would do well to reclaim it.    
Evidence of Emerson‟s appeal to the individual is reiterated in the Peaceable Schools 
with the Five Cs of Awareness, color, culture, class, character, and context. (DeRosa, P. 
Johnson, U. 2002).  Only after this realization can the individual truly be a friend. 
Emerson values the distinctive worth of individuals.  When he suggests they 
should be self reliant, discussed in chapter 4, the individual has a full awareness of 
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himself.  His heart beats to thy “iron sting”…he accepts his place in life in the society of 
his peers and the connection of events” (Self Reliance, Essays:  First Series, 1844, p. 47).   
 
Man carries himself in the presence of all opposition as if everything were 
titular and ephemeral but he.  I am ashamed to think how easily we 
capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions 
(Self Reliance, Essays: First Series, 1844, p. 51).    
 
  
It takes courage to be independent in thought and action.   Self reliance asserts 
this as do the authors of the Ten C‟s for Peaceable Schools (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002).  To 
exude this courage, however, is to exude principle or ethics.  For Emerson, respect for 
individuality, independence, and dignity of others was the dominant principle of his 
ethics.  “The virtue in most is conformity.  Self Reliance is its aversion” (Self Reliance, 
Essays:  First Series, 1844, p. 49-59).  “Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your 
mind” (Emerson, Collected Works, in Van Cromphout, 1999, p. 93).  Freire (2004) would 
agree with Emerson‟s triumphs of principles.  These principles are the means of human 
existence critical for self reliance and Peaceable Schools (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, Freire, 
2004).  Emerson does not suggest self centeredness or arrogance of self.  He does not 
suggest the individual know only oneself and not the other.  Know yourself, indeed, but 
also have regard, understanding, and compassion for the other.  “Friends come unsought.  
They are within.  The Deity (Spirit) in me derides and cancels the thick walls of 
character, relation, age, sex circumstances” (Friendship, Essays: First Series, 1841, p. 
                                                                                                                                                 
202 
343).  This resonates the same in Epicurus.  Epicurus and Emerson maintain the openness 
to all groups, an opportunity for different “gifts and talents to be utilized and recognized” 
(Caulfield, 2000, p. 174).  The open exchange is a criterion for friendship and for the 
promotion of social justice in Peaceable Schools.  
Emerson writes of two elements of friendship, truth and tenderness (Friendship, 
Essays: First Series 1841, p. 347).  Truth and tenderness are resonated in Peaceable 
Schools as a developmental understanding of who people are in society.  Truth is 
sincerity.  Truth and tenderness allow individuals to see themselves in other people.  
They acknowledge the shortcomings and recognize that they, too, have the same 
particularities.   Comfort with oneself is the worth of self reliance.  Self reliance is the 
consciousness of the presence in the world that Freire affirms in order for the self to 
evolve (Freire, 2004).  Self reliance allows for celebration of diversity in Peaceable 
Schools. 
Friendships should never be taken for granted but should be “alert and inventive” 
so that when individuals engage in a “discourse” it goes beyond the simple conversation.   
“Partiality” is absent.  A welcome exchange occurs between each other (Friendship, 
Essays: First Series 1841, p. 348).   Reciprocity, evident in Emerson‟s essay on 
friendship is evident in Peaceable Schools. 
The friend should be regarded as a counterpart.  “Are you the friend of your 
friend‟s buttons or his thought” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 352)?  This is 
another indication for the individual to be in touch with self and appreciate the diversity 
of others.  Do not be envious of him or devious with his nature.  “Treat your friends as a 
spectacle…let him grow” (Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 352).  Realize the 
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potential of the individual, not the circumstance or moment or the It or the Object.  If the 
individual rejoices in the wonders of his friend is he not also rejoicing in the wonder of 
himself?  “I will receive from my friends what they are not what they have…they shall 
give me that which properly they cannot give, but that which emanates from them” 
(Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 352).  Appreciation and recognition of diverse 
others is critical for teachers and students in Peaceable Schools.  Diversity in others is a 
celebration, a resource, not an obstacle. 
A friendship is the “solidest” thing we know. “Happy is the house that shelters a 
friend—happier if he know the solemnity or strength of that relation and honor its‟ law” 
(Friendship, Essays: First Series 1841, p. 346).   To do this, Emerson, like Freire in the 
Peaceable Schools model, suggests one acknowledge the non self and then its own self to 
acknowledge the other (Freire, 2004, DeRosa, Johnson, 2002). 
The individual with ethics or character is a friend.    
 
Manners exude a personal beauty where victories of character are 
instant…Manners impress…a little integrity is better than any career.  
Man must be self possessed, happy at home with himself.   If man lives 
with ethics and character, he creates friendships that are „free from 
observations and the duties imposed on life from the rank and file of its 
members‟   (Conduct of Life, 1860, p. 1046, 1047, 1049-1051).         
 
Ethics in friendship is reciprocal.  “Fine manners need the support of fine 
manners in others” (Conduct of Life, 1860, p. 1044). 
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Since the early civilizations, man has sought peace and social justice.   While 
vehicles for these goals are different (the Garden, the Lyceum, and the Peaceable 
Schools) the objective of peace and social justice is common to all.   A dialectical, 
progressive model for education, drawn from the lessons of history establishes a living 
citizenship model based upon a discourse of friendship.  The Peaceable Schools 
philosophy reasserts the goal of Epicurus and Emerson.   
As early as the 4
th
 century B.C., Epicurus asserted the complete life was defined 
by recognition of self and reciprocal relationships with others.  Friendship assured peace 
and harmony in the community.   Emerson in the 19
th
 century assured the individual that 
self reliance was not easy to acknowledge, however, it was essential for the individual to 
acknowledge oneself before he could acknowledge the worth of others.  The recognition 
of self allowed for trust and tenderness to characterize a reciprocal relationship or 
friendship.   In a democracy, social harmony and justice ensued.  The philosophy of 
Epicurus and Emerson laid the groundwork for the philosophy of Peaceable Schools.  
Common to all is “human transformation in the achievement of social justice, humanism, 
and friendship” (Caulfield, 2000, p. 174.)    
The founders of Peaceable Schools sought a more perfect society.  The works of 
Epicurus and Emerson are fitting to this end.  At the outset, the individual seeks comfort 
with himself in order to find comfort with his fellow man through trust, civility, and 
equality in a democratic society, one that is dynamic and dialectic.   There are no limits 
or boundaries to “the business of human understanding” (Caulfield, 2000, p. 174).  The 
process is unending.  Peaceable Schools is a model to sustain the ages.   This 
notwithstanding, the actual process of being in the Peaceable Schools and creating 
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friendship in the manner of Epicurus and Emerson cannot occur without the essential 
dialogical progressions of the I-Thou and the critical consciousness of Martin Buber 
(1996) and Paulo Freire (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
206 
Chapter 7 
 
The Implications 
 
For 
 
Secondary Education and Citizenship  
 
 
 
  The challenge to citizenship and the worth of friendship as a citizenship 
prerequisite has been established.  Sanguinity of citizenship practice in the United States 
is the task of the educator through a discourse of friendship developed in the Peaceable 
Schools curriculum model.   The curriculum, rich in the philosophical foundation of 
Epicurus and Emerson produces a citizen whose ultimate vision is toward the good and 
worth of the state.   The effects of this citizen are seen in the growth of the individual.  
The individual, with understanding and acceptance of himself and others, becomes a 
striking force in the economic, social, and political sectors of the United States and 
globally.   The striking force of the individual is evident not only in the present but in the 
future.  Man‟s experience is not “fixed in time” but rather ongoing.  Man‟s experience is 
dialectical and evolutional, fluid, and transitional.  Temptations and demands do not 
cease.   The friendship experience is without parallel; it is always becoming without 
perfection.  The individual meets the sensitive and the timid; the reaction is 
understanding without a shudder.    As the dialectical is ongoing, so is the notion of 
friendship (Sebouian, 1989, p. 220).  The discourse of friendship manifested in the 
Peaceable Schools curriculum is pertinent.  This study asserts The Peaceable Schools 
model assures a dialectical progression as a pedagogical tool to accommodate transition 
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in society.  As a pedagogy, rather than a civic curriculum, the model enhances living 
citizenship in the school and the community.   
Public institutions often assert a civic curriculum as a citizenship handbook for 
students.  The curriculum rests upon the commitment to civic education.  The claim that 
liberal states mandate a liberal democratic curriculum is significant (Coleman, 1998).  
More significant to this end, however, is the pedagogy and not the curriculum.  The 
pedagogy delivers the civic virtues that curriculum objectives forecast.   
 Civic virtues prescribed by curriculum are supposedly assured objectives through 
what is considered by some minority groups such as Christian fundamendalists as 
unsettling (Coleman, 1998).  To alleviate this objection, the Peaceable Schools model 
assures suitable, dialectical pedagogy that promotes understanding, reasoning, and most 
importantly, active citizenship amongst cultural groups.  Specifically, Gutmann (1998) 
and Macedo (1995) argue that a liberal state requires a minimum of civic virtue within 
society if the society and the state are to exist indefinitely. 
 Gutmann (1989) argues civic education gives students skills and virtues to enable 
them to consider social cooperation.  Macedo (1995) further qualifies that political rights 
and institutions are understood and justified because of reasons and arguments with 
individuals who espouse a different understanding.  Both assert social cohesion through 
particular study of a prescribed curricula whose goal is citizenship.  Curricula refers to 
specific facts and subjects (Coleman, 1998).  More significant, however, is the 
“pedagogy” (a dialectical progressive pedagogy) or the teaching of disciplines.   
The dialectical progressive pedagogy described in the Peaceable Schools model is 
student centered.  Students engage each other to construct understanding through 
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experience.  With the teacher as facilitator, students approach issues with an appreciation 
of diversity, rather than the obstacle of diversity.  Students‟ particular experience shared 
with acknowledgment of the self, reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power is sine qua 
non to understanding.  A critical consciousness of self and others contributes to a 
classroom atmosphere typified by trust, safety, and autonomy.  Students take ownership 
of the classroom and engage in the dialogue that propitiates the opportunity to resolve 
conflict and/or different standards of behavior.  Students are not exclusive in this 
constructive discourse.  Teachers, as facilitators, are also with a critical consciousness 
advanced by Peaceable Schools. Curriculum delivery and success is dependent upon the 
participatory actions of the teacher and the student.  Each is “observant, imaginative, 
skeptical, and open indeed, respectful of evidence, mindful of the views of others, caring 
to communicate to learn and to work with an appropriate ethic” (Coleman, 1995, pp. 753-
754).  The exchange is ongoing, dialectical in nature.  The result is tolerance, 
understanding and evaluation of other values and traditions.  Autonomy and horizontal 
relationships exist in the classroom.  The result is more effective than an outlined 
curriculum that seeds specific traits and actions as perfunctory elements of active 
citizenship.  This does not, however, discount a civic curriculum that instructs the student 
in the mechanics of national and state organizations.  Rather, the progressive pedagogy in 
Peaceable Schools cultivates the general curriculum so that individuals live or example 
the curriculum.  
 Why are Peaceable Schools appropriate for citizenship?  Secondary institutions do 
well to adopt the Peaceable Schools model.  The model not only assures social justice 
within the schools, but assures active citizenship dialectic in nature.  The model sustains 
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the inclusion of multicultural groups in society and adaptations to the demands of a 
global culture.   
 In the introduction, active citizenship was defined as an individual who possesses 
a critical consciousness, is self reliant, assertive in the community, responsible, and 
accountable for their actions.  An active citizen exudes civic virtue and pride in both 
community and country.  Chapter 2 discussed the history of citizenship.  In particular, the 
challenges to the modern civic model of the liberal democratic state and democratic 
principles were addressed.  The challenges to democratic principles in the liberal 
democratic state are obliterated with a discourse of friendship in the tradition of Epicurus 
and Emerson fashioned in the Peaceable Schools. 
Dialogue and friendship assures a citizenship that exudes a communitarian, 
mosaic, or model of shared values that Kymlicka (1998) seeks and a shared conception of 
justice or Rawls‟s (1998) goal.  The discourse of friendship citizenship model assuages 
cultural vulnerability that Schachar (2000) fears and promotes a common ground for 
cooperation.  In the discourse of friendship citizenship model, there is a basis for 
informed and willing political agreements amongst individuals freely and equally.  
Indeed, the prospect of a universal truth is not likely, however, through the dialectical 
model there is a workable and shared conception of understanding and cooperation.  
Disagreement on questions of cultural and religion doctrine are absent.  Evident in the 
discourse is fairness, toleration, and cooperation.  The partnership of citizens in the 
community or city, even if the city becomes different in kind, is evident and durable.  The 
interaction is an edifying force for citizenship. 
                                                                                                                                                 
210 
The model alleviates any notion of closed borders as legitimate to perpetuate the 
shared characteristics of the nation state that Walzer (1995) urged.  Citizenship cultivated 
in Peaceable Schools promotes an open community without parameters.  No “strong 
tradition” is needed.  Citizens are bound by dialogue and friendship.  Their differences 
and disagreements are resolved through a critical consciousness that vitalizes the 
discourse.  It ensures the differences once determined “irreducible” (Young, 1998) are in 
actuality resolved.  Commitment, tolerance, responsibility, accountability, and 
participation pervade public life.  The resultant national citizenship is not characterized 
simply by perfunctory actions of patriotism.  Man, at his best, promotes his greatest asset, 
his humanness through dialogue and friendship.  The active citizen by virtue of his nature 
promotes not a temporary or perfunctory citizenship but an enduring, national citizenship 
for the nation and the global community.   
James Madison wrote: 
 
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain 
degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in 
human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.  
Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a 
higher degree than any other form (Madison, Federalist 55 in Rossiter, 
1961, p. 346). 
 
The Peaceable Schools model assures this assertion in our nation. 
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 Peaceable Schools with philosophical foundations in Epicurus and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson gives answers to three critical questions, contemplative questions that arise 
when any innovation or movement comes anew in society.  They are:  “What was the 
problem?”  “Does the answer „solve‟ the problem?”  “Is anyone short changed or left at a 
disadvantage?” (Postman, 1999, pp. 42-43).  
 The problem is clearly stated at the beginning of this dissertation.  Given 
multiculturalism and diversity in our schools, citizenship is lacking.   The answer lay in a 
discourse of friendship cultivated in the Peaceable Schools model.   The model assures 
dialogue and community where citizenship is enhanced.  Most significantly, to the third 
question, no one is left out nor short changed because of the innovation.     All people, 
wherever their ethnic or racial heritage lie, can partake of the discourse of friendship 
made commonplace to society in the Peaceable Schools model.  Assuredly, the model is a 
progressive pedagogical foundation for living citizenship to last the ages. 
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